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REMARKS ON THE AUSTRIAN RESISTANCE, 1938-1945

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THE Austrian Resistance movement against Hitler and Hitlerism is—in the eyes of this writer—not to be considered as a part of the German movement.¹ While no historian can forget the ties of origin, tradition and common history which linked the German-speaking Austrians with the population of the Reich, while it is a generally known fact that the larger part of the Habsburg Monarchy was a part of the Holy Roman Empire for many centuries and that Austria was a member of the German Confederation from the Congress of Vienna until its dissolution in 1866, it is also to be remembered that since that time Austria formed a separate and completely sovereign state and the attempts of Bismarck to make the German-Austrian Alliance a part of the constitutions of the two Empires were not accepted in Vienna.² On the question whether the Austrians form a part of the German nation or whether they have grown into a separate one, neither history nor historiography may have said the last word yet; this writer would not subscribe unconditionally to the theory of the one nation living in two states.³ Nationality—it seems—is rather an historical than a biological concept, and eventually there may develop in Austria with respect to Germany what occurred in Belgium in regard to France or with the German-speaking Swiss concerning their relations to the Germans of the Reich—although in the case of Austria the unifying ties are much closer and the problem is more complex. No inquiry can be made in these “Remarks” into whether or how far the notion of an “Austrian nationality” proper developed at the time of the Hapsburg Monarchy or whether more in this respect could have been done. Attempts towards such a goal were certainly made; and in the spheres of the Church, the nobility, bureaucracy and army, an—at least—“supernational” feeling developed, favored by the phil-

¹For the German Resistance Movement cf. Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler* (Hinsdale, Ill., 1948), Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground* (New York, 1947)

²For the history of the Danubian Monarchy since 1866 cf. the competent volume of Arthur J. May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914* (Cambridge, 1951); for its general history Hugo Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Oesterreichs*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1946, 1949)

³For a thorough discussion of the Austrian nationality problem cf. Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, 2 vols. (New York, 1950)

osophy of the Romantics who thought of that "whole" developing from different parts as being the highest form also in the sphere of social and political life. This concept has a long history that can not be discussed here. Around 1918 it found expression with a group of Austrian intellectuals such as Hofmannsthal, Andrian, Bahr; and one of them, Count Paul Thun, was to write in the very year of 1938 that to be beyond nationalism was always a determinant of the Austrian character. Equally the warning of Hofmannsthal always to remain conscious of one's origins could be referred to in this connection.

On the other hand, there appeared, especially after 1866, with increasing strength in Austria a German-national movement⁴ that aimed—very much against the plans and wishes of Bismarck—to do away with the political boundaries separating the two Empires. It would be of interest to study the sociological background of these two trends in "German Austria." Here, attention may be called only to the fact that the chances of a "Germanization" of the Habsburg Monarchy deteriorated after the loss of Silesia in the middle of the XVIIIth century; one may well understand—also from this aspect—the deep lament of the Empress Maria Teresa. The king of Prussia may claim to have been the first gravedigger of the Danubian Monarchy; as the second to him this writer would count Beust a century later—Beust, of course, for his activities not as an enemy but as the chancellor of the Habsburg Empire.

The Austrian resistance movement, thus, while it is separate from the German opposition against Hitler, is distinguished from the resistance in the other Nazi-occupied countries by all the ties which linked together the oppressed with oppressors—ties among which the outstanding one was the community of language that made an attempt to keep an organization secret infinitely difficult.

The concept of a duty to resist the "tyrant," an evil ruler, knows a long history in western civilization and within the Catholic Church. The teaching of John of Salisbury (1159) and of the Jesuit branch of the Monarchomachic group were outstanding in the radicalism of the solution they proposed; the second circle climaxed in *De Rege et Regis Institutione* of Mariana (1599). No attempt shall be made to analyze these doctrines here. Neither, as a matter of fact, will it be undertaken to give a history of the Austrian Resistance Movement: a few preliminary remarks may be sufficient at first; they may have made their contribution fully if they succeed in starting an historical inquiry into this problem. Such research would have more than a merely scholarly bearing. The Moscow declaration as published on November 1, 1943, reminded Austria that "the consideration of how much she will have contributed to her liberation, will be unavoidable." While the fact that Austria made a remarkable contribution along that line

⁴On the German national movement in Austria cf. Paul Molisch, *Geschichte der deutschnationalen Bewegung in Oesterreich* (Jena, 1926)

has long been recognized, still—on either side of the Atlantic—not much is known about the concrete circumstances; therefore, a highly fragmentary presentation may not be amiss.⁵

One may not be wrong in basing the Austrian resistance on the wish and the will to remain what one had been, not to "look out for new foundations" and therefore to fight off the "foreigners," the intruders. Some traditional antipathy or opposition against the Germans of the North, the "Prussians," strengthened such an attitude in which Monarchists, Catholics, Socialists and even Communists joined—apart from the specific flavor added by the special characteristics of the National-Socialist regime. This determination to resist the "Prussians," to undo 1866, to take off where Beust had failed in 1869 or 1870, continues with the Austrian resistance all through the years of 1938 to 1945. This attitude explains what often is overlooked in the west and what such documents as the protocols of the Guido Schmidt trial bear out largely: that the first Nazi government of Austria, including such members as Seyss-Inquart and Wolf, actually planned a Nazi regime in an Austria remaining independent of the Reich. If this was a highly unrealistic dream, it was nevertheless a propelling force behind their activities. However, the brief dream exploded with the appearance of Hitler in Linz on March 12 around noon. It is reported by reliable sources that Seyss-Inquart was given no opportunity to deliver there the welcome address he had prepared on such assumptions.⁶ For an illustration of the divergencies existing on this issue, it may be recalled that such conservative North German members of the resistance group in the Reich as von Hassel and Goerdeler in their plans for the period following the overthrow of the Hitler regime considered the "Anschluss" as a definite fact to be kept intact.⁷ In Austria those who wanted to remain what they had been, the "traditionalists," rejecting a search for "new foundations" had formed what probably

⁵A semi-official publication was issued in Austria in 1946; the title of the English translation to which references will be made here, is *Red-White-Red-Book. Justice for Austria*, published in 1947. Only the first part has come out. The volume contains valuable material on the "history of the occupation of Austria" reaching up to the days of the military collapse of the National Socialist régime. Probably due to the fact that the material is poorly organized, this publication is little known inside and outside of Austria. The ponderous volume on the trial of Dr. Guido Schmidt, Austria's Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the Anschluss, a first class source of information on the history of Austria for the period from 1936-38, has little on the Resistance. The present study is based 1) on a collection of 23 publications concerning Austrians in Nazi-concentration-camps, 2) on unpublished documents at the Landesarchiv in Linz, Upper-Austria, and 3) on information the writer received in conversations. My sincere thanks are due to the Director of the Landesarchiv, Linz, Dr. Erich Trinks, for having made available the documents to me.

⁶Count Revertera, Director of Security in Upper Austria in 1938, told the writer that he had been ordered to attend that ceremony. When he arrived at the air-port, Seyss-Inquart, very excited, approached him with the words: "We are sailing full blast into a complete Anschluss," to which the count replied: "What else did you expect to be the result of your activities?" The conversation was interrupted then by the arrival of Himmler; the count was released from his functions a few days later and soon was to start on his trip through prisons and concentration-camps.

⁷Rothfels, *loc. cit.* p. 145; von Hassell, *Diaries, 1938-44* (New York, 1947) p. 118; Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand* (Zurich, 1947) pp. 214f.

was the most valuable part of the *Heimwehr*, the "home-guards," after 1918;⁸ they had come into political activity in this way.

It is a well-known fact that through the unfortunate policy of the Austrian government in the February days of 1934 a split occurred between the cabinet and the workers. While no agreement has been reached so far on the motives which prompted the decisions of the government, there seems to be no doubt that some members of the government, and among them Dr. von Schuschnigg, sincerely regretted the measures they considered themselves compelled to take or to accept. Anyone to whom, as to this writer, the *Anschluss* was to a large extent the result of conditions of foreign relations and who, furthermore, assumes that, while giving its full share to the difficulties of the prevailing circumstances, the few, the very few, remaining chances were not used with the utmost adroitness, feels that the events of February, 1934, can not be too much deplored. It also seems to be an established fact that Schuschnigg together with some others in his cabinet did not enjoy dictatorial measures but considered them to be a necessity of transitory character; and it is known today that among the supporters of the government were such personalities as the President of the Republic and the veteran leader of the Christian Socials, Kunschak, who asked for a much more democratic attitude. They were not heeded by the chancellor; yet, their attitude was no secret. The gulf separating the two major political groups in Austria could be partially spanned when Schuschnigg after Berchtesgaden addressed himself to the workers two minutes before twelve o'clock.

The Austrian resistance movement has been criticized for having gone into full action only in the last stage of World War II when the outcome was already in clear sight. Such a charge may be countered by the statement that to some extent a similar attitude held true of many resistance groups, that geographically the situation of the Austrian fighters was a specially difficult one lacking, with the exception of Yugoslavia which was herself overrun by the German armies, a frontier bordering on allied territory. Furthermore, immediately after the *Anschluss*⁹ the first wave of arrests brought to concentration camps and jails 76,000 people from Vienna alone; the well-prepared Gestapo took care to get hold in this way of all potential leaders of an opposition movement in addition to Jews and Communists.¹⁰ To these may be added the large number of those who under Gestapo super-

⁸Quite a few members of the Austrian nobility entered the home-guards. Yet one can not refer to the nobility of Austria as to a political whole at that time. Members of these families had joined very different political groups extending from the extreme right to the moderate left and many abstained from any political activity; some of the younger generation came under the influence of nationalistic ideologies.

⁹Dr. Hans Becker, *Oesterreichs Freiheitskampf* (Wien, 1946) p. 9. This publication of 39 pages contains much valuable information. F. Romanik, *Der Anteil der Akademikerschaft an Oesterreichs Freiheitskampf* (Wien, s.a., p. 13). According to *Justice for Austria*, p. 173, the figure of more than 70,000 arrested in March 1938 seems to apply to all of Austria.

¹⁰If my information is correct, the Gestapo moving into Vienna before Dr. Schuschnigg

vision either were confined to their domiciles under explicit order not to leave them or were assigned compulsory domiciles somewhere in the Reich. Some of those who fought Nazism before and later, decided to keep quiet at first, "to give them a chance" and to watch. On the other hand, the problem that existed for many participants in the German resistance, the choice to make between "national" loyalty, the desire natural to most members of Western Civilization to wish well for the strength of their nation or what appeared to them to be such strength, and, on the other side, the obligation to oppose an "evil" government, did not exist for most of the Austrian fighters as they felt themselves to have been conquered by a foreign power. Neither were the members of the Austrian underground actuated by a motive of "atonement" that was characteristic of some of the finest members of the German Resistance.¹¹ So far there is only little evidence that the Austrian underground entered into connections with the German movement; Dr. Gruber's "Blumengarten" (Flower Garden) was run temporarily from Berlin where its leader found shelter.¹²

Yet evidence exists that the formation of Austrian resistance groups started immediately after March, 1938, and this was done—the present fragmentary remarks cannot but point to the fact—at the moment when the chances for success were dimmest, when the occupation of Austria took place in the midst of the icy silence of the western governments; it was certainly not the British ambassador in Berlin alone who voiced among the diplomats during the winter of 1937-38 the difficulties he had in understanding why the Austrians attempted to object to the Nazi-willed *Anschluss* inasmuch as they were, after all, Germans like the Bavarians, the Saxons and so on. To the knowledge of this writer, no evidence has been brought forth to prove that Hitler was lying when he told Schuschnigg in Berchtesgaden that an English diplomat "who sat in the very chair you are now sitting in," in the course of a conversation no longer "contradicted me on the Austrian issue You can't expect any help from England."¹³ No analysis can be attempted here of the extent to which the Austrian government had contributed to the bringing about of that desperate situation. But the reader should bear in mind that it was under these morally highly uncomfortable conditions that the activity of the Austrian resistance began.

Though it is not pleasant either to the reader or to the writer to lay repeated stress on the fact, we must remember that only a very small

had resigned on the evening of March 11, 1938, brought with them files in which for each member of the faculty of the University of Vienna one special card had been elaborated.

¹¹cf. on this attitude Rothfels, *loc. cit.*, p. 12, 158.

¹²*Austrian Information*, XII, 5, 1952.

¹³Kurt von Schuschnigg, *Austrian Requiem* (New York, 1946) p. 17. On the British attitude towards Austria in winter 1937 cf. the instructive pages in Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London, 1946) pp. 332ss. Mr. Chautemps, then president of the French government, told this writer that when he visited London in winter 1937, he asked the Foreign Secretary whether Great Britain would consider war in the case that Germany should march into Austria or Czechoslovakia, Mr. Eden's answer for the first alternative was completely in the negative.

section of the evidence necessary for writing a history of the Austrian resistance movement is available today and even out of this segment far from all the facts have been ascertained.

A report of the Gestapo in Tyrol warned on June 30, 1938, against being misled by the result of the Austrian plebiscite of April 10th giving 99.7 percent of the votes cast in favor of Hitler: "nothing essential has changed [since the pre-Anschluss period] . . . A great many voted out of fear or for tactical considerations."¹⁴ In the forties People's Courts imposed penalties on defendants who participated in resistance activities that were already in operation in the summer of 1938.¹⁵ At that time such activities began also in the Oetzthal in Tyrol, a resistance group characteristic of Austria with its stubborn and sturdy determination to be rid of the yoke of the foreign Nazis and with its difficulties to overcome the distrust for communication with people outside of the valley, the "Talfremde."¹⁶ Equally early in 1938 the Resistance group in Upper-Austria referred to as "G.B."—the meaning was first just "Gegenbewegung," later according to its distinguishing mark "Gelbe Blüten"¹⁷—and a group made up largely of intellectuals of Vienna and Linz "Mayer-Thanner" started its activities, keeping contact with the Austrians in Paris. This circle included writers and artists. While it began on a conservative basis, there were soon established with the Communists in Vienna connections which, however, came to an end after the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact had been concluded on August 23, 1939.¹⁸ The organization to be led by Dr. Gruber, Austria's Foreign Minister after 1945, was also organized in 1938.¹⁹

In the summer of 1938 the Gestapo took action in its well-known way against Austrian Socialists attempting to bring their former organization to new life;²⁰ a resistance group in Vienna began its activity not later than on April 24, six weeks after the *Anschluss*.²¹ The leader of an opposition group of Catholic students in Vienna, Albin, was executed in May, 1938, and we know of more resistance cells among the students of the Austrian capital who were willing to fight.²² It is highly probable that—as Dr. Becker indicates²³—some preparations for a resistance underground were laid in the fall of 1937 before the Anschluss occurred when the situation of Austria grew more dangerous.

¹⁴*Justice for Austria*, p. 86.

¹⁵*Justice*, pp. 93, 97, 99.

¹⁶The report on this movement is reproduced in *Justice*, pp. 226ss.

¹⁷Two reports on it are kept in the Oberösterreichische Landesarchiv at Linz (later to be referred to as LAL); one of them states that the nuclei of the resistance groups were "mostly" formed in 1938 and gives as their aim to "harrass the new regime whenever and wherever an opportunity presented itself for doing so."

¹⁸Report in LAL.

¹⁹Romanik, *loc. cit.* p. 17

²⁰*Niemals Vergessen* (Wien, 1946) p. 129

²¹Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 5. Its leader, Dr. J. F. Kastelic was executed after trial before the People's Court; the verdict and the reasons for it in *Justice*, pp. 93ss.

²²Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 12.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 8.

The immediacy of the reaction on the side of the Austrians must be stressed since it occurred against overwhelming odds at a period when Hitler was allowed to reap his biggest triumphs, when he went full blast on his road to Munich, when hardly one word came from the official chancelleries,²⁴ when there was practically no chance whatsoever of succeeding, when many of the staunchest opponents to Nazism thought it to be correct "to give them a chance," when Nazism had not unveiled itself fully and few Austrians could recognize its paganism, when those who took action in those days—if they did not believe in and serve the cause of the great international revolution—could not hear any other voice than the commands dictated by the love for their country, the loyalty to the past and of the moral duty to resist the brutal methods of ruthless tyranny whatever the risks. Soon they learned that such risks involved not only their lives, but also those of their families—one more fact the reader should keep in mind when judging the participants of the Resistance movement; and again the risks involved not only exposing themselves to the still relatively simple choice between life and death, but to a scientifically elaborated system of physical and psychic tortures.

Those who joined in resistance in spite of the risks involved had to guard against betrayal, for betrayal played a large part in all underground movements and actually was instrumental in undoing some carefully planned plots; they followed, therefore, the old tradition of secret societies (Free Masons, Carbonari, e.g.) of keeping to small cells, a system that the German Communists also had adopted in their fight against Nazism after 1933; according to that rule, "members must, under no circumstances, be aware of the activities of any cell but their own."²⁵ This device, excellent, unavoidable for tactical purposes, made it difficult to move on strategical levels; yet necessary it was and more than one group got caught by the omnipresent Gestapo and its henchmen at the moment when it attempted to make contacts with others. In addition—as already observed herein—an inborn distrust of the Alpine countries against any "Talfremde" favored such tactics which rendered it difficult to rise above isolated local actions. As time went on, after World War II had begun, the conviction became general with the Austrian resistance groups that they alone could not do it; the decisive blow must come from abroad;²⁶ all that was up to them was to keep the will alive, to prepare the cadres, constantly to prepare for struggle, be ready to co-operate, knowing that theirs was the task of the vanguard.

Who then were the men, from which social strata did they come who were willing to take upon themselves such tasks? It would still be premature to ask for and disclose names. A full fledged inquiry has become definitely impossible through severe losses of material, for the Nazi government at-

²⁴A noteworthy exception was the protest of Mexico to the League of Nations on March 19, 1938, *Justice*, p. 80f; it carried—as a matter of course—no immediate consequences.

²⁵Rothfels, *loc. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁶Insistence on this point of view e.g. in "Linzer Widerstandsgruppe 'G. B.' " LAL

tempted in the days of collapse to destroy documents that would compromise them, such documents as, for instance, the records of trials held before Courts Martial and the People's Courts.²⁷ As a measure of caution, not even the leader of a group had a complete list of its members and possibly did not know all of them. In two cases the approximate number of members in a resistance group in Upper Austria is given as 600.²⁸ Contrary to the attitude of such Germans prominent in the underground as Goerdeler, the Austrians did not believe in keeping lists or any written records; if the Gestapo received notice of a resistance cell, at least the number of sacrifices—they hoped—would be reduced in this way.²⁹ But ample evidence exists to prove that the men came from the most different social groups: members of old noble families, intellectuals of socialist and of monarchical convictions, workers of all political shades, peasants of course, many who formerly had participated in the *Heimwehr*, Catholic priests in increasing numbers,³⁰ former officers of the army and gendarmes who had been dismissed by the new regime. In those days there was absent that generous sprinkling of opportunists who showed themselves in the ranks of the Resistance in the final stage; and why—we may ask—should the Austrian picture be deprived of these people who colored the Resistance groups everywhere when success was in sight and who in the summer of 1938 may still have proudly swelled the columns of Nazi enthusiasts? And what probably is the worst indictment against them is that quite a few of them may have acted in good faith both times.

The "reasons" for the verdict of the People's Court in the trial of the Kastelic group show a blending of very different political trends, and—if we choose to trust later evidence—all these groups cooperated smoothly in the early months of the Austrian resistance: differences of parties were of no importance then. In one case it was made a rule not to ask about

²⁷*Justice*, pp. 127, 146s, 173, 214. The attorney general of Salzburg burnt the record of the People's Court of this town in the main heating installation of the town's prison for eight consecutive days and nights. Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 31.

²⁸A report by Ludwig Bernaschek, LAL, puts the number of the resistance fighters in Upper Austria tentatively at 6,000 (0.6% of the population of that province). This figure is to be compared with 26,000 (2.6% of the population) illegal Nazis (that is people who joined the Nationalsocialist party in secret before the *Anschluss* according to a Nazi estimate out of a total population of 1,000,000 in Upper Austria.) ("Kampf gegen Nazismus," Hofer, *Wegeführten* (Wien, 1946) p. 16 reports that of 500 members of the police in Linz numbered, five had joined the party. However, one must bear in mind that the police had a special character. In Styria, equally supposed to have been a stronghold of Nazism in Austria, with a population of 1,140,000, the number of "illegal" members of the NSDAP was 6,751 (0.6%) *Justice*, p. 29. Such figures do not include the Nazi-sympathisers. It is not necessary to mention that the risks in joining the Resistance were infinitely greater than those involved in becoming an "illegal" member of the NSDAP under the Schuschnigg regime.

²⁹Oral communication and e.g. "Kampf gegen Nazismus," manuscript in LAL, p. 7, where evidence that the Gestapo failed to extort names even by afflicting worse torture.

³⁰Leopold Arthofer, *Als Priester im Konzentrationslager* (Graz, 1947) published as an appendix—pp. 139ss—a list of 94 Austrian Catholic priests who were sent to concentration camps; of these 21 died there. The list is not complete. On Father Johann Gruber and his martyrdom cf. Jean Cayrol, "Der Held und der Heilige" in *Wort und Wahrheit* (Wien, November 1952) p. 811.

former party allegiances.³¹ The contact of "Johann Müller" with the Viennese Communists bears out the same evidence.

Austrian political plotting and conspiracy went on even in the midst of the horrors of the concentration camps.³² As Benedict Kautsky, an expert in concentration camp techniques from the passive side, states: those who belonged to the truly "politicals," had the best inner chances for survival.³³ Thus it was in Dachau that in 1938 the nucleus of the later Austrian resistance was formed. "Everyone who was released had the obligation to become the leader of a resistance cell."³⁴ Such releases occurred in larger numbers in the spring of 1939.

The first concrete activities of the opposition groups were applied largely to bringing help to the families of the arrested as the Gestapo sadistically took care to keep them deprived of the bare necessities of life. Such assistance was, in the eyes of the Gestapo, evidence of active resistance against the regime and was therefore coupled with heavy risks.³⁵ Soon, economic propaganda against Nazism was initiated, for the agents of the new regime missed in this field the chance many had given them and committed astonishing blunders; these blunders—like the removal of most Austrians from the important positions in Austria—had political repercussions and the propaganda activity was made easier when the disappointment for economic reasons became widespread by the spring of 1939. Despite all the successes that Hitler reaped in foreign policy, among the population of Austria disillusionment increased with the beginning of World War II in the fall of 1939.

More and more people began to realize that the Nazi Empire would not last the thousand years' span the *Führer* had given it in a generous mood. Dr. Becker states³⁶ that the ephemeral character of Nazi rule was always obvious to his group, and Count Revertera told this writer that after having watched the regime a few months he was sure that Hitler was doomed. However, one would be far from doing justice to the resistance fighters by referring to them as to those who guessed rightly in the political gamble. Yet, the men who went to their execution with a "Long live a free Austria!" on their lips,³⁷ may have been convinced that their sacrifice was for a victorious cause just as were those who were slaughtered in the concentration

³¹"Widerstandsbewegung 'G. B. ', LAL.

³²*Niemals Vergessen* (Wien, 1946) p. 130; Benedikt Kautsky, *Teufel und Verdammte* (Wien 1948) p. 211ss; Becker *loc. cit.*, p. 10.

³³*Loc. cit.*, p. 218; cf. Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 10, on the basis of thorough personal experience: "Es entwickelte sich ein österreichisches Gemeinschaftsgefühl in den Konzentrationslagern von solchen Ausmassen, dass es—heute betrachtet—nur schmerzlich sein kann, dass nicht alle Politiker Oesterreichs in diese Hochschule politischer Lernmöglichkeiten gesperrt worden sind." However, such optimistic appraisal of the functions of the concentration-camp is rare indeed.

³⁴Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 10; Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁵"Kampf gegen Nazismus" LAL, p. 2.

³⁶*Loc. cit.*, p. 11s.

³⁷For evidence Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 19; *Justice*, p. 175.

camps a few days before the armies of the allied powers arrived. Only a small minority—although politically a decisive one for Austria—of Gestapo prisoners destined to be brought for trial before the People's Court, was spared from being liquidated.^{37a} The words one member of the German resistance said as his farewell could be set as a motto here: "Whoever joined the Resistance movement, had to realize that his life was doomed. A man's moral value begins only when he is prepared to sacrifice his life for his convictions."³⁸ This they knew well in Austria, too.

With the war on, the many weak spots of the regime became clearer to those who watched from within; the specific "Austrian" resistance against fighting a war for a "foreign" cause grew stronger;³⁹ and most important of all, the chances of not being left once more alone by the rest of the world became brighter. Of course, the reaction from those in power increased in brutality in corresponding measure; the techniques of the Gestapo were perfected, yet a remark like that of Mr. Dulles who had ample opportunity to observe during his mission to Switzerland, should not be overlooked: "Himmler's secret police and intelligence service, while they excelled in recklessness and cruelty, were neither very skilled nor really subtle. Far too many venal, ignorant and crude men were in it for real efficiency."⁴⁰ Even before Stalingrad (winter of 1942-3) the resistance in Austria got stronger.

New devices were developed: during the incarceration of the Austrian leaders in Dachau, before they were released or transferred to other concentration camps, they had agreed upon a three-point program, and the aims of the underground were to be—

1. To disintegrate the German military and civil offices, to disintegrate the German will to conquer;
2. To contact the Allies; and
3. To develop the forces of the Austrian resistance, being careful not to sacrifice their own Austrian people to the henchmen of the Third Empire without purpose.⁴¹

Two years later, the aims of a resistance group in Upper Austria were summarized thus:⁴²

1. To gather all Austrians apt and willing to resist without regard for their former party allegiances;
2. To continue help for the persecuted;
3. To enlighten and to influence the population's sections that could be impressed; to collect information from abroad and to make full use of it;
4. To watch all happenings in the NSDAP (National Socialist German Labor Party), its fractions and the military and civil offices depen-

^{37a} *Niemals Vergessen*, p. 127f.

³⁸ Fabian von Schlabrendorff, *They Almost Killed Hitler* (New York, 1947) p. 120.

³⁹ *Justice* p. 127ss gives evidence for the large number of Austrian soldiers court-martialed for their unwillingness to fight.

⁴⁰ Dulles, loc. cit. p. 141s.

⁴¹ Becker, loc. cit., p. 11.

⁴² "Kampf gegen Nazismus," LAL, p. 5s.

dent on it; to advertise evidence of misgovernment and to insist specially on the increasing misbehavior of the Nazi bosses; consistently to undermine respect for the party and to oppose its claim for national leadership;

5. To inform the population about the impossibility of a Nazi victory, about the inequality of power of the two belligerent fronts, about the political and philosophical tensions which divide Germany of today, and about the immorality of the Nazi racial ideology;
6. The war having no chances for a victory must not be permitted to last any longer than absolutely necessary and every effort must be made to abbreviate it [then eleven special points illustrating such efforts are listed];
7. To take such measures as to raise difficulties for the Nazi administration and government; and
8. To prepare the measures necessary for taking over the government in the case of the collapse of Nazism:
 - a. To prepare for the occupation of the offices;
 - b. To secure the maintenance of public order;
 - c. To secure the continuation of public services (such as food, water, light, electricity, and the supply of raw materials and clothing);
 - d. To prevent the destruction of public and private houses and equipment;
 - e. To secure a minimum traffic of railroads and streetcars.

It has been said that the Nazi regime itself was instrumental in organizing the best information service for the underground: all employees of the civil service, the police and the gendarmerie who were brought into concentration camps were, upon their release, discharged immediately without any salary. In such conditions, most of them became traveling agents and as many Austrians placed their orders with them willingly, their reputation in the branch rose quickly to prominence; small wonder that to such willing customers they volunteered welcome information and even made sure of some new resistance members.⁴³

At the beginning of the period stretching from the fall of 1939 to the fall of 1942, it called for courageous leadership and perspicacious psychology to counteract the effects of the continuing successes of the Third Reich. Reference may be made here to the story of the group Mayer-Thanner (to become a part of the larger "Johann Müller" after July, 1939) as an example that such activity went on unremittingly.⁴⁴ A task of importance, to procure news for the Austrian Liberty transmitter, proved fraught with special risks; it did not succeed often. The Müller group was completely betrayed by a Gestapo agent "Alge" who had managed to infiltrate into it and to get hold

⁴³Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 28.

⁴⁴cf. the report in LAL.

of its foreign correspondence. The results were arrests and death penalties,⁴⁵ but some of its leaders survived; it would be worthwhile if one of them would tell their story in detail.

Evidence is available that from 1939 on there existed an organized resistance group in Upper Austria within the army—the *Freiheitsbatallion Enns*; it numbered about 150 men. Viewed with suspicion by Gestapo agents, they had to pay dearly when they went into open action in the last phase of the struggle.⁴⁶

A more general wave of doubt in the infallibility of the *Führer's* decisions may have spread in the fall of 1940 after the failure of the German army to invade England and in the next summer when the war opened on two fronts. Dr. Becker points out the disappointment that took place with the intellectual youth of Austria, many of whom had been genuine followers of the Nazi ideology in the beginning.⁴⁷ The example of the *Freiheitsbatallion Enns* was followed in numerous instances; "cells" were built up by the drafted Austrians, albeit the Germans saw to it that no military unit was formed by Austrians exclusively.⁴⁸ But here, too, Gestapo infiltration occurred, leading to death penalties. As time went on, the techniques of the underground were improved and the losses decreased.

A part of the resistance program concerned the disintegration of army morale by spreading unpleasant news to the troops; and the mailing of letters—anonymous of course—containing jokes at the expense of the Nazi bosses proved no waste of time, for such letters to a large extent undid the "political education" the soldiers had been given. Another underground activity in which the Austrian indeed excelled, was to keep as many soldiers and officers as possible out of the front line by declaring them unfit for combatant activities and assigning them to less heroic tasks. This activity, that began on a larger scale in 1941, developed techniques of ever growing perfection. As one report has it: strangely enough, "the honor of wearing the grey coat of the leader was assigned to those who had fallen into ill favor with the party while the Nazi brass-hats preferred to live for the honor of the *Führer* somewhere far in the rear rather than to die for him at the front . . . [The physicians of the underground did their very best] to procure the opportunity to the party-members to spill their precious blood on behalf of the dearly beloved leader."⁴⁹ In Upper Austria alone approximately 20,000 men were saved in this way from being sent to the front. Help in all possible ways was also extended to the deserters from the army, and in Tyrol these men often formed the nuclei for the resistance fighters: they were not afraid to risk their lives; what they wanted was to give them

⁴⁵*Justice*, p. 175.

⁴⁶A report on the "Freiheitsbatallion Enns" in the LAL.

⁴⁷*Loc. cit.*, p. 12.

⁴⁸On this issue cf. *Justice*, pp. 125s, 215; Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 20s.

⁴⁹"Kampf gegen Nazismus," LAL, pp. 10, 14; on the activity of the Austrian physicians and the risks involved, Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 25s; Becker, p. 27; also oral information.

for the liberation of their country, not for its enslavement; they did not look at the war as a national one but as a party affair.

For those who held such an outlook, it was almost natural to develop another kind of underground activity: the co-operation with the foreign workers which the Nazi regime was forced to enlist in ever increasing numbers and to put at work in the most important industries. We may believe that it took not much effort to persuade them to work as little as possible, although we have complaints from the Austrian side that their output was still too high. The brutality and the stupidity of the overseers proved of little avail. Huge numbers of Polish, Italian and French workers had been brought into Austria; but British and Dutch prisoners were also used in this way. The co-operation with the underground developed well; so far, evidence is available to show that British and Italians joined hands with the Resistance groups, sometimes after help had been given them out of humanitarian motives.⁵⁰ Later on, the reliable ones were given arms. The report on the Resistance in Upper Austria makes reference to organizations including 1,000 Italian and 400 Dutch workers; Count Revertera was in contact with British and French prisoners of war who did an excellent job.

A group of underground activities difficult to appraise in every detail, but the efficiency of which it will be hard to over-estimate, was the sabotage on the economic-military borderlines. There were cases of such blatant stupidity as when the Gestapo turned to a man whom they had arrested as a political enemy and sent to concentration camp, for expert reports on economic questions, for instance on forest culture. What they got, of course, was not the correct facts but a distorted picture that could and should be of no use to them. The economic sabotage was considered to have been the most important contribution of the underground activity in this period.⁵¹ Dr. Becker's survey lists some examples of a truly "sophisticated" sabotage such as sending the most inadequate type of oil for engines at a time when it could no longer be tested and it was therefore safe to assume that it would do heavy damage to them, or such as the chaos brought about by directing railway cars systematically in the wrong direction. Smaller groups seemed to have specialized in different sabotage activities, which later included even interference with the production of V-weapons.⁵²

The Austrians were given no chance to enter a conspiracy like the one leading up to July 29, 1944, though there was some Austrian co-operation in it; the Austrian underground apparently was and remained critical concerning the adequacy of the preparation.⁵³ In general, they had to con-

⁵⁰Oral information.

⁵¹Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 21s; other examples given by Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 22s. From January 1945 on the underground in Salzburg issued orders for economic sabotage day by day, Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 27s, 31. On the interference with the production of the V-weapons, see also Dr. Becker's testimony in the *Hochverratsprozess gegen Dr. Guido Schmidt* (Wien, 1947), p. 163.

⁵³Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 33, lists Major Szokoll as having had contact with Count Stauffenberg, the "soul" of the attempt of July 20, and an Austrian lieutenant colonel

tent themselves with getting ready for the moment when the decisive action would begin abroad. Therefore, it was of much importance to keep in contact with the Allied armed forces, and the activity of the couriers carrying and obtaining information was a task as risky as it was necessary. Again, some useful contacts could be established in concentration camps where prisoners of various nationalities met. Here too was a difference between the Austrian and the German attitude. No evidence exists that the Austrians attempted to obtain conditions except the one of the freedom of their country. That that independence they could consider a part of the Allied program was evidenced also by the declarations which the British Government, especially, continued to make during 1940 to 1942, and by statements which reached their climax in the well-known Moscow Declaration of 1943⁵⁴ already referred to.

So far the programs of the Austrian Resistance did not include immediate acts of violence against persons, though isolated "terror acts" mostly as retaliation are known;⁵⁵ they later increased with such speed that a Gestapo report of March 12, 1945, considered it specially noteworthy that no Nazi officials had been attacked in Vienna during the previous three days.⁵⁶

The situation of the Resistance changed after Stalingrad—which an increasing number of people understood to be the writing on the wall, and certainly more than a few remembered a tradition of totalitarian regimes that no damage might come from holding membership in more than one party. The willingness of NSDAP members to co-operate in the economic sabotage may be explained partly by such considerations. Equally indicative is the fact that the number of denunciations decreased after that time, though they continued, helped by a well elaborated system of the Gestapo, into the last days—witness the betrayals of Lieutenant Hanslick and Dr. Roland in the early days of April, 1945; such treachery was responsible for casualties for which no substitute could be found.⁵⁷ But on the whole the resistance groups in Austria increased well until the summer of 1944.

Some contacts had been established with the groups of the German officers and generals in opposition to Hitler, and offers coming from the circle around Goerdeler were now outspoken in their promise of full Aus-

Bernardis as having participated in it; for Benardis' participation also *Justice*, p. 165: for the critique Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 18. Colonel Count Rudolf Marogna-Redwitz, the chief of the Abwehr branch in Vienna, was a former Austrian officer; he belonged to the group around Admiral Canaris. Pechel, *loc. cit.*, p. 232. "He too was murdered after July 20. Some day, when the history of the Austrian liberation is written, his name will take one of the first places." Hans B. Gisevius, *To the Bitter End* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), p. 425f. Also General Lahousen in the Canaris group was Austria born.

⁵⁴The declarations on the restoration of Austrian independence in *Justice*, p. 207s.

⁵⁵The SS general Fitzthum, former president of the police in Vienna was killed by members of the underground for his crimes against Austria in January 1945. When the battle of Vienna began, several leaders of the "Volkssturm" were shot, Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 36. Dr. Becker reports that when he was arrested the second time, a student shot two of the Gestapo men to death; of course, the Gestapo took its full revenge; *loc. cit.*, p. 20.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 20, 23; Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 35.

trian independence; the Germans expressed hope that the Allies could be approached through the good offices of an Austrian government to be formed in the process of the revolt. But the Austrians then did not think they could co-operate with the German generals in a way they had been willing to accept before the outbreak of the war, at a time when the ideas of von Fritsch⁵⁸ could be trusted. All this would need and deserve a closer investigation to be based on primary sources. So well did the Austrian resistance develop that Vienna became a meeting ground for underground emissaries of most different countries.⁵⁹

The attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, started a huge wave of arrests also in Austria. Reacting against it, the underground decided to bring the remaining single groups into closer contact and to give them a common name: "05";⁶⁰ but a real centralization was never effected. Preparations were made for the formation of a provisional government, and more detailed plans were drawn up to keep order for the period of transition. The leading idea was that in conformity with a past of many centuries an organization of all the countries of the Danube basin should be prepared. The members of the Central Committee thought that the recent events had proven the necessity of such an organization, as all the nations which once had formed the Danubian Monarchy and which had fallen into isolation after 1918, were overrun in such a condition by the Third Reich.⁶¹ It would be of interest to have more information about their plans. The Austrian underground—as has been pointed out here already—was never under the orders of one central agency.⁶²

In 1943 and in the first half of 1944, a resistance organization of the farmers and of the students was built on a nation-wide basis. The co-operation with the underground of other countries developed.⁶³ No full information is available concerning these contacts yet, but a number of isolated facts in this respect are known. Apart from the fact that Austrians enlisted in the regular armies of Great Britain and France, they participated in the resistance groups of Yugoslavia, Italy and France and took part in outright fighting with the German army.⁶⁴ The Tyrolese were especially tough north as well as south of the Brenner; the Gestapo reacted by large scale

⁵⁸So far the most concrete information in Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 15, 18.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁶⁰Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 29. '05' was chosen as rendering the first two letters of "Oesterreich"; the letter 'e' being the 5th in the alphabet, this number was substituted. —A list of prominent Austrians arrested after July 20, and sent to Mauthausen concentration camp in Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 47. On July 20 in Vienna some remarks in *Justice*, p. 165, Dulles, *loc. cit.*, p. 187. Dulles' remarks on this particular issue need some amplification; on the activity of Count Marogna-Redwitz cf. also Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 17.

⁶¹Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 14s.

⁶²e.g. *Justice*, p. 164; Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶³Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 17, 28.

⁶⁴Romanik, *loc. cit.*, pp. 31s; Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 20, 34ss; and specially *Justice*, Second Part, Chapter 5: "Austrians in the Camp of the Allies," pp. 180ss. Here, p. 180, evidence that an Austrian legion in France existed already in winter 1939. Chapter 6 "Foreign Press Comments and Reports on Austrian Resistance" *ibid.*, pp. 187ss, deals with events from January 1945 on.

slaughtering of those who came under suspicion of belonging to the liberation movement.⁶⁵

Yet, it was only in the last months of the war, approximately after January, 1945, that the Austrian resistance movement became generally known; to many this fact was evidence that it did not exist before. These remarks have given—it is hoped—sufficient, however incomplete, proof of the earlier activities that were paid for so dearly. Yet, certainly with the last phase the underground came into the open: the sabotage increased to such an extent that the fortifications against the Russian army in the southeast were never completed.⁶⁶ Preparations to forestall the destruction of bridges, public installations, railways, of the carefully hidden treasures of art ordered by the Nazi authorities were made everywhere and, as a matter of fact, succeeded eventually in most places completely. Military defenses were destroyed, sometimes in sharp fighting with Gestapo and SS formations. Open rebellion broke out in Vienna where some 15,000 men were reported to have taken arms against the Nazis. A telegram of Hitler sent from Berlin in his last days, illustrates the situation well: "Against the rebels in Vienna the utmost brutality must be used—gegen die Aufständischen in Wien mit den brutalsten Mitteln eingreifen."⁶⁷ If such an order was of no further avail, it was not because the SS hesitated in carrying it out: it was their guns which set fire to the Cathedral of St. Stephan.

On the last phase of the Austrian resistance some documentary evidence has been published;⁶⁸ it will suffice, therefore, to single out a few points while it remains a duty for Austria to prepare a full presentation of the military activity of the underground. Outstanding from the military point of view were probably the participation of the Resistance in the "battle of Vienna" and that concerning the defense of the "Alpine retreat," the latter known to have been the refuge on the stubborn defense of which the Nazi regime pinned its last hopes for a somewhat miraculous turn in the outcome of the World War. As it is equally known, this turn was to have been brought about mainly through the perfection of the V-weapons, on the presumption that the Alpine defense would be supported up to that moment. The claim has been made that the Austrians by their co-operation shortened the war by one year.⁶⁹ No attempt shall be made here to ascertain whether such a claim can be substantiated at all or whether it is correct in the case of Austria. It is certain, however, that the activities of the Austrian resistance in the last months also were carried on at great risks and at the sacrifice of heavy casualties until the last moment. Under such conditions Austrian officers saw to it that the South-East Wall was not

⁶⁵von Schlabrendorff, *loc. cit.*, p. 148; Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 34ss.

⁶⁶Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 34.

⁶⁷Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 23s; Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 37.

⁶⁸cf. *Justice*, Part II, Chapter 4 Section 2: "The Military Sector of the Austrian Resistance Movement," pp. 163ss; Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 21-37; Romanik, *loc. cit.*, pp. 33-46.

⁶⁹Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 20.

manned, that the "Volks-Sturm," the last levy, ordered to take up the defense there, was sent back, that decisive information on the defense of Vienna was handed to the Russians while German reinforcements and equipment were prevented from reaching the capital through some ingenious maneuvering on the railways; in addition, the strategically important bridge of Gmünd (on the northern frontier of Lower Austria) was caused to collapse. The activity of the underground grew so strong in Vienna that the *Volkssturm* was practically prevented from participating in the battle of the capital in spite of the fact that Vienna had been ordered to halt at any cost and that reliable SS divisions had been sent there; but the *Volkssturm* did more: "the fighting of the "Volkssturm" on the side of the Red Army brought the defense of Vienna soon to an end."⁷⁰

The Alpine fortress was weakened and undermined by the Austrian resistance in the North as well as in the South; in the first, by the Tyrolese who, like the fighters of the Oetzthal, became increasingly active in the spring of 1945, and in the second, by the Austrian partisans co-operating with Tito's army and the fighters of Styria and South Tyrol.⁷¹

Everywhere in Austria the underground accomplished a task which, if less conspicuous, was no less necessary; it had a preventive character: to shorten the fighting, to prevent a last-ditch passionate though hopeless resistance as had been in the plans of the Nazi leaders, and to prevent wanton destruction. "Wenn die Germanen untergehen, so muss die Welt in Flammen stehen." Though the Austrians who held superior military posts had long since seen to it that as many Austrian soldiers as possible were brought back to the country, Austria was still widely occupied by German troops in the spring of 1945, and a good number of them were especially fanatical SS. Nevertheless, the underground succeeded in its task: its forces seized the capitals of Upper Austria, Salzburg and Tyrol before the Allied armies arrived and the capitals of the other provinces (Graz, etc.) surrendered without a fight.⁷²

The story of how the treasures of art, which had been brought to the saltmines of Alt-Aussee and hidden there from all over Europe, were saved from destruction reads like a novel.⁷³ They were handed over to the American forces who returned them to the Austrian authorities in due time. In innumerable places the resistance prevented the Nazi forces from destroying bridges, installations of gas and electricity and factories. Often they succeeded in rendering military defense preparations useless.⁷⁴ The risks continued to be heavy; desperate SS formations often took savage revenge while the Allied forces were already in sight. Vienna was taken by the Russian army on April 13; two weeks later, on April 27, 1945, the declaration of

⁷⁰*Justice*, p. 167.

⁷¹On the co-operation with Tito, *Justice*, p. 188s; on South Tyrol, Becker, *loc. cit.*, pp. 34ss.

⁷²Romanik, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

⁷³The story told in Becker, *loc. cit.*, p. 29s; *Justice*, pp. 158ss; a detailed report in LAL.

⁷⁴e.g. the group of Count Revertera.

the independence of Austria was proclaimed: its Article II reads, "The Anschluss imposed on the Austrian people in the year 1938 is null and void."

A member of the German resistance wrote: "It seems a habit in Europe that spiritual seeds be drenched in blood."⁷⁵ The seeds for a political and spiritual revival were drenched in blood in Austria also; it is to be hoped that from such a soil they grow all the more vigorously.

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⁷⁵Dulles, *loc. cit.*, p. 101.

SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE NATIONALITY CONFLICT IN THE HABSBURG EMPIRE

by Edward Marz

HOWEVER long the death agony of the Habsburg Empire may have lasted, it appears that the debate about its causes may well last longer than the agony itself. This melancholy prediction is provoked by a survey of some recent writings on the decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire. Three kinds of diagnoses which are expressed with varying degrees of literary clarity emerge from the welter of conflicting opinion. First, there is what may be called the "extremist" point of view which holds that the Monarchy had long outlived its historic mission even before it was dealt its *coup de grace* on the battlefields of the first world war. For example, A.J.P. Taylor writes in a recent work:

By 1914 the constitutional mission of the Habsburg Monarchy had everywhere ended in barren failure. Yet men were never more confident of the future of the Habsburg Monarchy than in the last few years before its end. Though *rigor mortis* was setting in, there was no lack of schemes to revivify the derelict corpse. . . .¹

A somewhat more "moderate" viewpoint is taken by a second school of writers who see some merit in the way the Austro-Hungarian state attempted to mold a common destiny for its ten strong-headed member nations (or nationalities, as they are frequently called). We are invited to suspend judgment on all those who sought to preserve Danubian unity under Habsburg auspices, keeping in mind the fate which befell the peoples of that region after the dissolution of the Monarchy. Such a position is taken by A. G. Kagan in a recent paper on the Social-Democratic point of view concerning the conflict of nationalities:

Today we may ponder whether the solutions of 1918 have really stood the pragmatic test of historic success much better than the old form which they replaced. We may also wonder whether final judgment can be pronounced upon those who labored to fill this old form with a new content suited to the demands of a new age.²

Lastly, there is the "conservative" viewpoint which finds no major flaw in the socio-economic performance of the Monarchy, and which, as a result, is constrained to interpret the rising hostility of some nationalities to the continued existence of the Monarchy as the expression of an irrational grudge which fed upon "motives of power and prestige". This is, for instance, the view of Frederick Hertz, an old hand in Danubian economics, who makes the following comment:

¹A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918*, (London 1948), (New Edition), p. 224.

²Arthur G. Kagan, "The Social Democrats and the Conflict of Nationalities in the Habsburg Monarchy", *Journal of Modern History*, Sept. 1949, p. 216.

It was the tragedy of Austria-Hungary that the fierceness of the national struggles had induced many of the best elements of all nations to withdraw from public life. A large part of the German-Austrian intellectuals had Pan-German sympathies and deprecated Austria in order to extol Germany. . . . The only serious movement for economic separation was that of the Hungarian nationalists who called themselves the Independence Party, and demanded a customs barrier around Hungary, a separate national bank, and in general the abolition of all common institutions, though they did not reject a common Monarch provided he was willing to fulfill the aspirations of Hungarian nationalism. The development of national income, however, showed that Hungary derived greater profits from the economic union than any other part of the Empire. The demand of the Hungarian nationalists, therefore, was actuated merely by *motives of power and prestige*, and it shows that aspirations of this kind pay no regard whatever to the real economic interests of the nation.³

It is with the latter point of view that this paper intends to raise certain issues. The history of the Habsburg Empire, it seems to this writer, provides no support for the thesis that the nationalistic aspirations of some non-German minorities were pursued in blind disregard for their economic interests. To state it more positively, it will be argued in the following pages that much of the discontent prevailing among the ten nationalities of the Monarchy was motivated by legitimate economic grievances.

There is one further point which this paper attempts to clarify. The Austro-Hungarian nationality conflict is interpreted by most writers as an issue which concerned solely the middle classes of the ten feuding nationalities. Thus Louis Eisenmann observed in his famous work, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867*, that "the national question is a problem of language, and, furthermore, it is a problem that concerns the middle class."⁴ This statement appears unnecessarily restrictive, for, as will be shown below, the working class did not remain immune to the virus of national dissension. Some of the causes of its susceptibility will be briefly indicated.

On the eve of the first world war the land of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy can be considered as scarcely more than a huge, economically under-developed, area. While the 52 million people who lived in its territories in 1914 placed the Monarchy among the most populous countries of Europe, its comparatively meagre industrial resources and the low standard of living of its diverse nationalities deprived it of the claim to great power status. Little could be gained by comparing Austria-Hungary's national income with that of its leading European rivals⁵, for the methods of national income measurement varied widely in the different statistical

³Frederick Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States* (London 1947), pp. 51-52. (My italics—E. M.)

⁴Quoted by A. G. Kagan, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

⁵Creditable estimates of Austria-Hungary's national income were made by Friedrich Fellner in *Statistische Monatsschrift*, edited by the Austrian Statistical Office, Vienna 1916.

bureaus of pre-1914 Europe.⁶ Some indication of Austria-Hungary's lowly rank among the great powers is provided by a study by Colin Clark which attributes to Great-Britain in the year 1913 a national income per head of working population exceeding that of the Monarchy by some 175 percent, and which puts Germany ahead of the Monarchy by some 115 percent.⁷

I shall next focus attention upon certain key production data of the Monarchy, and its powerful neighbor, the German Reich. The statistical evidence will be better appreciated if one keeps in mind that in 1914 Germany possessed a population of some 67 million, and Austria-Hungary of 52 million. In 1900 the per capita consumption of pig iron amounted in Germany to 289.7 pounds; in Austria-Hungary to only 68.2 pounds.⁸ This would give Germany an edge over the Dual Monarchy of more than 300 percent. The latter fares even worse if the total coal and lignite production of the two countries is compared. Germany produced 191.5 million tons of bituminous coal and 87.5 million tons of lignite in 1913.⁹ On the other hand, Austro-Hungarian production of coal amounted to 17.6 million tons and of lignite to 35.5 million tons in the same year.¹⁰ If we reckon lignite as possessing an approximate coal value of 50 percent, the total coal production of Germany surpassed by more than 550 percent the combined Austro-Hungarian production. This, of course, only confirms the fact that the Dual Monarchy was relatively poor in fuel, and that its industry depended to a large extent on coal imported from abroad. A last illustration of the relative economic strength of the two countries is provided by a consideration of their industrial census. In 1895 German industry employed 39 percent of all gainfully employed, while in 1900 Austrian industry employed only 22 percent of all gainfully employed.¹¹

Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that Austria-Hungary entered the great war equipped economically in very much the same way as its Balkan neighbors. Such was not the case. In certain fields the industrial resources of the Monarchy were substantial and technically up-to-date. Since Austria-Hungary during the 19th century had lagged considerably behind the West in the development of large scale industry, it possessed in some respects the advantages of the "late-comer" which may pass over certain phases of economic growth that a pioneer nation is compelled to undergo. The following observation from one who knew Austrian industry well may be recorded here:

The output of pig iron per high furnace, for instance, was before the

⁶Even today comparative national income studies encounter formidable difficulties as attested to by a recent publication of the United Nations, *National and Per Capita Incomes of Seventy Countries in 1949*, New York, Oct. 1950.

⁷Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, London 1940, pp. 92 et seq.

⁸Cf. L. Beck, *Geschichte des Eisens*, vol. 6, pp. 233 and 1385.

⁹Cf. J. H. Clapham, *Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914*, p. 281.

¹⁰Gustav Gratz and Richard Schuller, *Der Wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Oesterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna 1930), p. 36.

¹¹Cf. Otto Most, "Die Berufliche und Soziale Gliederung der Bevoelkerung Oesterreichs", *Schmoller's Jahrbucher*, Leipzig 1905, vol. 29, p. 697.

war twice as great in Austria as in Great Britain, and the Austrian cotton mills were, according to the statistics of the International Cotton-spinners Association, equipped to a much greater extent with modern ring frames than the British mills.¹²

One may ask how a country which remained, on the whole, backward and economically under-developed, could achieve prominence in certain areas of industrial endeavor? In reply to this let me note, first, that low as the purchasing power of the average consumer may have been, Austrian industry catered to a very sizable market which was unencumbered by internal trade barriers for more than half a century. Second, certain branches of Austrian industry, such as the iron and steel producers and the cotton spinners, enjoyed after 1880 concealed subsidies in the form of high tariff protection.¹³ Third, some of the conspicuous attainments of Austrian industry must be attributed to a unique partnership between the manufacturing interests and Viennese high finance. The latter phenomenon merits a few additional comments.

The close association between banking and industrial capital in the Austrian lands has received a great deal of attention in literature from commentators of all political nuances. Oscar Jászi, who does not seem to have any particular political axe to grind, makes the following observation in his monumental study of the Habsburg Empire:

Almost every plant, factory, or mine in Galicia, Bukovina, or in the Austrian southern Slav territories was the property of the Austro-German capitalists or at least controlled by them. The situation, though not the same, was nearly akin in Hungary, in Transylvania, and in Croatia, though the political government of these territories utilized the Hungarian state power as far as possible to make industry independent of Austria. In spite of this, the Hungarian, the Transylvanian, and the Croatian industry were to a large degree dependent on Austrian capital as a result of the 'bank rule' which characterized the whole industrial and commercial life of the Habsburg Empire.¹⁴

The all-pervading influence of the Viennese high finance over the economic life of the Dual Monarchy had far-reaching consequences. In both parts of the country most branches of industry came to be organized, under the inspiration of their financial patronizers, in tightly knit cartels, despite the negative attitude taken by the courts in various anti-trust cases. In 1912 more than 200 cartels were known to exist in the Austrian part,¹⁵ and 56 were operating over the entire area of the customs-union.¹⁶ Viennese

¹²Frederick Hertz, *op. cit.*, p. 23 footnote.

¹³The period of transition from a policy of free trade to that of protection is described, in some detail, in Adolf Beer's, *Die Oesterreichische Handelspolitik im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, pp. 450-512.

¹⁴Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 203.

¹⁵Cf. Eva Priester, *Kurze Geschichte Oesterreichs*, Vienna 1949, pp. 486-487. Priester notes the existence of cartels in the following major fields: cement, sugar, petroleum, cotton spinning.

¹⁶Oscar Jászi, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

banking interests were thus strategically placed to implement an industrial policy designed primarily to protect vested interests rather than to promote a vigorous program of industrialization for the benefit of the entire country. Fundamentally, this policy aimed at the preservation of the then existing economic structure of the Monarchy, with highly developed industrial regions in the West and with backward, raw-material and food-producing areas in the East and South-East. To quote, once again, the blunt Oscar Jászi:

When the ruling "big banks" established their cartels, they took care that inside of the customs union no new enterprise should be created which could rival their plants. And as their more important industries were originally located in the Alpine and Sudeten territories, their cartel policy damaged in the first place the eastern, middle, and southern parts of the Monarchy, the agrarian population of which was yet unable to develop a national industry. . . . It was an economic tyranny which hindered progress in the Hungarian, Slav, and Rumanian territories of the Monarchy, and which thereby obstructed the well-being of the population.¹⁷

Viennese bankers must be exonerated, to some extent, for their conservative and sectional policies on the ground that venture capital had never been plentiful in the Austrian lands. Throughout the century the process of capital formation was comparatively slow, and it was frequently halted by severe trade depressions. Especially after the violent crash of 1873, the public maintained a suspicious if not hostile attitude toward capitalist enterprise, and was generally unwilling to invest its scant savings in industrial securities. Austrian banks were thus induced to maintain among their assets an unusually high proportion of corporate stock, and each new business venture tended to impair still further their financial solidity. How this calamitous situation affected practical banking policy, is summed up in a very illuminating article on the Austrian banking system:

The small and medium-sized business firm cannot hope to obtain credit from the big banking interests. This phenomenon results from a lack of adequate security much rather than from the terms of the business transaction. It is the risk that the banks assume by maintaining their large industrial holdings which forces upon them a policy of excessive caution—up to the very point of timidity. In principle they are ready to grant credit, provided that every possibility of loss is excluded.¹⁸

In such circumstances, it was perhaps natural for Viennese bankers to show a certain partiality toward long established, and financially rewarding, enterprises in the West, and to behave with some circumspection toward new, and potentially competitive, enterprises in the East.

It must be noted, however, that during the decade preceding the great

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

¹⁸Alfred Lansburg, "Zur Charakteristik des oesterreichischen Bankwesens", *Die Bank, Monatshefte fuer Finanz und Bankwesen*, March 1911, p. 226.

war industrial development seems to have proceeded at a fairly uniform rate in all parts of the Monarchy. This appears to have been the consequence primarily of the following three factors: first, the policy of subsidization of native enterprise, both open and in concealed form, on the part of the Hungarian government; second, the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial stratum in the backward regions of the country; third, the rearmament program of the government with its stimulating effect upon investment.¹⁹ In support of the thesis that the rate of economic development was uniform in all parts of the country during the decade before the war, Hertz cites the following data:

From 1903 to 1913 the province of Lower Austria, which included Vienna, showed an increase in assessed income of 107 percent and in wages of 92 percent. In all the other, predominantly German-speaking, Alpine territories the assessed income rose by 95 percent and wages by 87 percent. In the three Bohemian territories, where the Czechs formed the majority, assessed income increased by 97 percent and wages by 94 percent. The predominantly Southern Slav territories on the Adriatic Sea showed an increase of 94 percent in income and of 92 percent in wages. In Galicia and Bukovina, which were mainly Polish, Ruthenian and Rumanian, income rose by 91 percent and wages by 148 percent.²⁰

And from these data Hertz concludes "that all nationalities and all parts of the Empire derived almost equal profits from the general development."²¹ Leaving aside the question of profits (we suspect that Hertz means benefits rather than profits), the impression of harmonious development under Habsburg auspices quickly evaporates if one considers the very unequal endowment with industrial resources which prevailed in different sections of the Monarchy at the start of the century, i.e. after almost two hundred years of capitalist development.²² Whoever seeks enlightenment on this point is advised to consult the Austrian industrial census of 1902.²³ To quote a few illuminating figures: in the province of Lower Austria (includ-

¹⁹On the interventionist policy of the Hungarian government compare: W. Offergeld, *Grundlagen und Ursachen der industriellen Entwicklung Ungarns*, 1914.

²⁰Frederick Hertz, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 41.

²²I must refrain in this paper from a discussion of the genesis of Austrian capitalism. It is of course clear that the pattern of industrial location, as it prevailed at the turn of the century, was the result of two centuries of capitalist development. Three factors seem to have played an important part in securing for the German territories a position of industrial hegemony; first, in the beginning of the 18th century, when Austrian capitalism made its first hesitant steps, the German minority, then the undisputed master of the land, assumed the role of an industrial pioneer. Second, the mercantilist policies of Maria Theresa and her successors were designed primarily to promote industry in the German territories. And third, rich iron ore and coal deposits were opened up at a comparatively early stage in German settled Alpine and Sudeten provinces. For a short but instructive treatment of this question compare: Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, Vienna 1924 (Second Edition), pp. 242-244.

²³Cf. Oesterreichische Statistik, vol. LXXV, *Ergebnisse der gewerblichen Betriebszählung vom 3. Juni 1902*, Vienna 1908. Compare also: Statistische Mitteilungen der niederösterreichischen Handels und Gewerbekammer, Heft 9, *Ergebnisse der gewerblichen Betriebszählung*, Vienna 1909.

ing the capital city of Vienna), an average of 9.3 horse power was counted per 100 persons; the corresponding figures for Bohemia were 8.6 horse-power per 100 persons; for Dalmatia a mere 3.8 and for Galicia (the most populous province of the Austrian half of the Empire) not more than 1.2. Bohemia with less than one-fourth of the population had about one-third of the horsepower, while Galicia, with almost one-third of the population, possessed a mere five percent of the horsepower.²⁴

Let us pause at this point to take a closer look at the pattern of industrial location which characterized the Monarchy at the turn of the century. Heavy clusters of industrial activity could be found in the Alpine provinces of Lower Austria, Styria and Vorarlberg, in the northern and western parts of Bohemia, and in the small Silesian strip of land to which Austria had been able to cling after her unlucky war with Frederickian Prussia. With the exception of the latter territory and the Bohemian city of Prague, which was predominantly of Czech complexion, all of these regions were inhabited, either wholly or in large measure, by a German-speaking populace.²⁵ Significantly, the population of the highly industrialized areas, some 11 ½ million people, accounted for less than one-fourth of the total population of the Monarchy. As for the great majority of the people in the other, non-German, parts of the Monarchy, their main occupation was agriculture. In regions like Dalmatia, Galicia and Bukovina, more than four-fifths of all gainfully employed persons belonged to the latter category.

On the whole, the standard of living in all parts of the Monarchy was strikingly low.²⁶ But there existed marked contrasts between the industrially advanced and the under-developed areas. It was estimated that before 1914 the per capita consumption of meat and tobacco was only three-fifths that of Germany; cotton one-half; beer two-fifths; coffee one-third; and coal less than one-quarter.²⁷ The excise statistics of the Austrian Treasury

²⁴It may be noted in passing that Galicia seems to have passed through a retrogressive phase of industrial development during the years 1890 to 1900. According to Otto Most, its industrial population suffered a decline from 6.26 percent of the gainfully employed population in 1890 to only 5.88 percent in 1900. Compare: Otto Most, "Die Berufliche und Soziale Gliederung der Bevoelkerung Oesterreichs," *Schmoller's Jahrbuecher*, vol. 29, Leipzig 1905, p. 703.

²⁵In a review of Heinrich Rauchberg's celebrated work, *Der Nationale Besitzstand in Boehmen* (Leipzig, 1905), Cl. Heiss makes the following observation, after first noting the predominantly Czech character of the province of Bohemia: "An examination of the distribution of the main industries by political districts shows, in particular, that almost all leading Bohemian industries are located in territories which are predominantly German, or, at the very least, that they can be found in the latter territories in better than average proportion." Cf. Cl. Heiss, "Der Nationale Besitzstand in Boehmen," *Schmoller's Jahrbuecher*, vol. 30, Leipzig 1906, p. 380.

²⁶The following passage from a well-known work may serve as a vivid illustration: "A few weeks ago I heard an Austrian economist remark: 'With us two-thirds of the population are beggars.' He did not say proletarians but beggars, and he was well aware of the distinction between the two words. I will leave it an open question whether or not the estimate of two-thirds was exaggerated but it remains true that almost everywhere and of course especially in the east, one meets with men and women who, so to speak, never escape from their rags their whole life long." Cf. Friedrich Naumann, *Central Europe* (New York 1917), p. 127.

²⁷Compare: C. A. Macartney, *Problems of the Danube Basin*, London 1942, pp. 74-75.

reveal that the per capita consumption of sugar amounted to no more than 13 kilograms in the financial year of 1912-13. This compares rather unfavorably with a per capita consumption of 21.6 kilograms in Germany and 42.2 kilograms in Great Britain. A breakdown of the Austrian sugar consumption by provinces illustrates the enormous regional differences in the standard of living, for the sugar consumption in Lower Austria exceeded by 4.3 times that of Galicia or Bukovina.²⁸ Austrian income tax returns provide us with a further measure of regional inequalities in the distribution of income. The Germans who constituted only 36 percent of the population in the Austrian part paid 63 percent of the direct taxes in the first decade of the century. A German paid on an average twice as much in taxes as a Czech, four and a half times more than a Pole, and seven times more than a southern Slav.²⁹

A similar impression of crass regional inequalities in the distribution of national income is conveyed by a comparative study of wage earnings. Nowhere in the Monarchy were real wages at a par with western standards. Conditions were relatively favorable in Lower Austria which embraced the highly industrialized city of Vienna. Real wages were somewhat lower in the provinces of Styria, Upper Austria, Bohemia and Moravia, but the workers of these regions enjoyed a far higher real income than their brethren of Hungary, Galicia, Croatia and Slovakia. It is true that the wage statistics of the Monarchy are not a very reliable source of information, for conditions varied greatly from factory to factory.³⁰ But the defective nature of Austrian wage statistics notwithstanding, the existence of marked regional differences in the wage income of the Austrian working class is rarely disputed by students of the *Ancien Régime*. In a recent analysis we find the following conclusion:

In each instance, wages in areas outside the Austro-German territories were found to be lower than wages inside these territories. In fact, the wages of the worst remunerated occupational group in Vienna, (i.e. the textile industry which was notorious for its starvation wages,) were still higher than the wages of highly skilled workers, (e.g. metal and construction workers) in Lvov (Galicia). Moreover, our findings refute the often heard contention that the workers outside the Austro-German areas were compensated for their lower wages by a lower price level. . . . The superior position enjoyed by the Austro-German worker vis-a-vis the other workers was not limited to the difference in the wage income. Sanitary conditions, transportation, etc., were much more developed in the Austro-German communities than elsewhere. . . . The same was true of medical services and of cultural opportunities.³¹

²⁸Compare: Friedrich Hertz, *Die Produktionsgrundlagen der Oesterreichischen Industrie vor und nach dem Krieg* (Vienna 1917), p. 84.

²⁹Compare: Heinrich Rauchberg, *Die Bedeutung der Deutschen in Oesterreich*, Dresden 1908, p. 18.

³⁰For an informative discussion of wage conditions in the Monarchy compare: Benedikt Kautsky, "Loehne und Gehaelter", *Schriften des Vereins fuer Sozialpolitik*, Leipzig 1925, p. 105 et seq.

³¹Eva Priester, *op. cit.*, pp. 503-505. For the sake of greater clarity, I have substituted for the term 'Austrian', which Priester uses, the term 'Austro-German'.

This income differential between the East and the West cannot be fully attributed to the higher level of technical efficiency which was characteristic of the industries in the Alpine and Sudeten regions. Nor can it be fully ascribed to an unequal regional endowment with natural resources, for the sources of raw-materials were widely scattered over the expanses of the Empire. Except for the Bohemian basin, where iron and coal lay in close proximity, coal had to be transported over long distances to the centers of production. Moreover, the Monarchy's most important economic assets, i.e. rich soil, abundant water power and extensive forest lands, were fairly evenly distributed over the Bohemian, Hungarian, Rumanian, Croatian and Ruthenian provinces.

It appears that the main cause of the depressed wage level in the East was the steady pressure of a truly enormous agricultural excess population. The population of the Monarchy had grown from roughly 34 million in 1870 to about 50 million in 1910. During the same period more than three and a half million persons had migrated overseas, most of them to the United States. In the years between 1900 and 1910 alone more than two million persons had turned their backs on the Monarchy. These data will be better appreciated if allowance is made for the fact that in the first decade of the 20th century emigration from the more populous Reich had almost completely ceased. A further breakdown of the above figures reveals that emigration was comparatively insignificant in the industrialized West, and preponderantly concentrated in the under-developed regions of the Monarchy.³²

The large-scale exodus from the Monarchy was only a symptom of a more deeply rooted evil, the *morbis latifundii*, as it was so aptly termed by Oscar Jászi. In Hungary, the large estates (above 1420 acres) comprised 40 percent of the total area of the country. If medium sized properties are included, i. e. properties between 142 and 1420 acres, the larger farms covered 54.4 percent of the entire territory.³³ A similar situation existed in Galicia, where a third of the entire area was in the possession of some 1100 estate owners.³⁴ The same mortal affliction prevailed in the provinces of Bukovina, Dalmatia, and, to a lesser extent, in industrialized Bohemia. As Krzyzanowski once pointed out, none of these territories could boast of the counterpoise of a well entrenched "medium-sized" farming population.³⁵ Everywhere there was the socially dangerous juxtaposition of great land-owners (secular as well as ecclesiastical), who made steady inroads into the holdings of the peasantry, on the one hand, and of an agricultural proletariat, which increased in numbers at an alarming rate, on the other hand. Unfortunately, rising grain prices, which resulted in part from the

³²For a thorough study of Austrian emigration before the first world war, cf. Leopold Caro, "Auswanderung und Auswanderungspolitik in Oesterreich", *Schriften des Vereins fuer Sozialpolitik*, Leipzig 1909, vol. 131.

³³Compare: Oscar Jászi, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

³⁴Cf. Adam Krzyzanowski, "Die Grundbesitzverteilung in Galizien", *Schmoller's Jahrbuecher*, vol. 19, Leipzig 1895, p. 193 *et seq.*

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

excessive customs duties of the Monarchy, led during the last three decades before the war to a continuous increase in the price of arable land. As a result, the small landowners were compelled to divide up their farm holdings among their heirs into plots which diminished in size with each new partition. Thus the Austrian peasantry suffered from an acute shortage of arable land; and "land-hunger" became one of the most prominent causes of migration.³⁶

It is well to distinguish at this juncture between internal and external migration. Not all of the Slav or Hungarian peasants migrated overseas. A considerable proportion, especially of the former, was attracted toward the highly industrialized regions of Bohemia and the capital city of Vienna. The Czech immigrant laborer, and to a lesser extent his Croatian and Slovenian counterpart, became soon a familiar figure in the industrial West. But unfamiliarity with the German language and the lack of technical skill barred the newcomer, as a rule, from all but the most lowly industrial occupations.³⁷ In this connection the following observation may be quoted:

In the branches of industry where unskilled labor predominates, e.g. in the building trade, . . . the Austro-German was to be found only rarely. This was primarily the field of the Southern Slavs or Italians who came in groups, and left at the end of the construction season.³⁸

In the report of a special commission which inquired into the living and working conditions of the Viennese female worker, we find frequent references to the back-breaking, and at times health-impairing, work-assignments which were thrust upon the hapless "foreigner".³⁹

There was still another barrier on the road toward social advancement which the newcomer had to face: viz. the open hostility of the indigenous German worker who was inclined to treat him as an unwanted intruder and a potential strike-breaker. A socialist writer, who may have had reasons to deny the existence of such sentiments, made the following comment:

The Czech worker comes from regions where wages are low, and where living conditions are comparatively depressed. Thus he appears in the role of one who may lower wages, and when the occasion arises may act as a strike-breaker. No wonder that he arouses the hatred and resentment of the German worker.⁴⁰

In these circumstances, the influx of non-German labor into the indus-

³⁶It may be argued that rising grain prices were bound to improve the terms of trade to the advantage of the under-developed areas, provided that the prices of manufactured goods did not increase at a commensurable rate. Such a contingency arose during the decade before the war, but neither the subsistence farmer nor the landless farm laborer was in any way benefited by this development.

³⁷It must be noted, however, that the Czechs made substantial social and economic gains during the last two decades before the war in the face of stubborn opposition on the part of the Austro-German population.

³⁸Cf. Karl Pribram, *Der Oesterreichische Volkswirt* March 29, 1919, vol. II, p. 455.

³⁹Cf. *Die Arbeits- und Lebensverhaeltnisse der Wiener Lohnarbeiterinnen* Vienna 1897, pp. 306, 326, 332 and 402.

⁴⁰Cf. Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 252. Bauer then adds that the antagonism between the

trial areas of the Empire may have tended to lessen the regional differences in the real income of the Austrian working class, but could not drastically reduce them in the few decades during which it was operative. Moreover, the identification of non-German labor with socially unattractive and lowly remunerated occupations perpetuated, and intensified, a feeling of national superiority on the part of the German speaking population (soon to be translated into sentiments of "racial" superiority by reckless demagogues), and evoked a yearning for independence on the part of all non-Germans.

The Austro-German proletariat of the Alpine provinces and the Sudeten regions may not have been conscious of its privileged position. Indeed, it might have considered it a cruel jest if somebody had lectured it on its exalted rank among the peoples of the Empire. Its mode of living was still markedly below the accepted standards of the West. Yet it is inconceivable that it should have completely discounted the progress it had made during the three decades before the war. As early as 1891, Victor Adler, the prominent socialist leader, had declared that "Austria had the best legislation for the protection of the workman after England and Switzerland."⁴¹ And although social legislation had not been materially extended since that date, wages had steadily risen and working hours had been cut to an average of less than ten hours per day during the decade before the war. This is the background against which we must project an increasingly conciliatory mood on the part of the socialist leadership in the Austro-German provinces.

Throughout the nineties and the first decade of the new century, the Socialists of the Austro-German provinces conducted an impressive number of strikes,⁴² and up to 1907 they campaigned violently in behalf of the introduction of universal franchise. Yet despite their frequent skirmishes with the police, and their bitter denunciations of what they considered the capitalist partiality of the Habsburg regime, a markedly sweet undertone crept into their agitation. Having started as virtual outlaws of Austrian society, they came more and more to consider it as something worthy of their reformist zeal. In the pre-war writings of both the "right-winger" Karl Renner and the "left-winger" Otto Bauer, "solutions" were frequently advanced with respect to the knottiest problem of the Monarchy: its conflict of nationalities. I am not concerned in this paper with the nature of these "solutions".⁴³ Suffice it to say that their essence can be found in the attempt to bring about a re-arrangement of national relationships without disturbance to the prevailing social and economic relationships. I may add that neither Renner nor Bauer analysed seriously the Monarchy's historic chance of survival, as had been done by the Marxian classicists, but took its con-

German and the Czech worker is increasingly superseded by a feeling of class solidarity. But we shall see later that the very opposite development took place.

⁴¹Cf. Karl Schwechler, *Die Oesterreichische Sozialdemokratie*, Graz 1908, p. 133.

⁴²Cf. *Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch*, vol. 24, Vienna 1907, p. 248. Contains relevant data for the years 1903 and 1904.

⁴³For a concise discussion of the socialist proposals, cf. Arthur G. Kagan, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

tinued existence as axiomatic. One of the keenest analysts of the Austro-Hungarian nationality conflict has this to say about the character of Renner's proposals:

He believed he had solved the national problem by finding a mechanism that would grant to all children education in their mother tongue, without taking account of the fact that the different social position of the parents of the average child of either nationality would allow for very different levels of education, and a great inequality of opportunity in later life. It is strange that Socialists should have thought that the claim for national could be dissociated from that for social equality, but that is what Austrian Social Democrats did.⁴⁴

Such moderation earned the Austro-German Socialists many plaudits from their bourgeois opponents.⁴⁵ The impression is indeed inescapable that the concern of the Austro-German Social-Democrats for the preservation of the Empire reflected the interests of a German working class who acted the role of a rich relative among the pauper nations of the country.

But by the same token, the labor parties outside the realm where the German tongue was dominant, were constrained to take a contrary point of view. They curried favor with their own bourgeois opponents (who became increasingly chauvinistic with the passage of time) by going on record as favoring a state of political and economic autonomy for Austria's second-class nationalities. Among the latter, the Czech Socialists, who represented the numerically and culturally most significant segment of the Slavic working population, were the most vociferous champions of an autonomous solution. The dissension among the proletarian parties of the Empire along ideologic lines, gave of course rise to a serious division along organizational lines. In 1897, a federalist party organization was set up which gave complete autonomy to the national groups within the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. In 1911, the Czech Party broke all links with the Austrian federal organization. Even prior to this schism, the Czech trade-unions had seceded from the all-Austrian trade-union movement.⁴⁶

Understandably enough, the Czech Socialists were charged by their Austro-German compatriots with the most grievous of all proletarian offences, i.e. with a betrayal of working class solidarity. But before the tribunal of history the Czechs may well present an impressive list of mitigating circumstances. They may point, first, to their opposition to a system

⁴⁴Rudolf Schlesinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York 1945, p. 216.

⁴⁵The following quotation may serve to illustrate this point: "Dr. Victor Adler was a bourgeois by origin. Despite his passionate love for the proletariat his demands were always of such a nature as to show due concern for what the economy could afford as a whole. The Austrian Social-Democratic Party has presented a long bill of particulars, but Dr. Adler has taken pains to express his thanks for the smallest partial payment. . . Good sense and moderation have always characterized the policy of the Austrian Socialists. This is why they have acquired the honorary title: Imperial Social-Democrats or Palace Socialists." Cf. R. Charnatz, *Deutsch-Oesterreichische Politik*, Leipzig 1907, pp. 301-2.

⁴⁶Compare: Julius Deutsch, *Geschichte der Oesterreichischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung* (Vienna 1929).

of financial control, exercised by distant banking interests, over their country's economic resources; second, to their aversion to a method of resource development which was geared to the *desiderata* of long established Austro-German industrial interests; to their impatience with a political arrangement which reserved the richest plums of social and economic advancement for a single ethnic minority; and lastly, to their longing for a political and social order which would sweep away all artificial impediments to the development of their indigenous resources and their national talents.

Yet while nationalistic passions ran high in both the Czech and the Hungarian lands during the years preceding the war, few men went so far as to advocate the atomization of the Empire. Such restraint may have been motivated in part by a fear of Austria-Hungary's powerful neighbors to the north and the east who were known for their ruthless treatment of minorities; and it may have been caused, perhaps to an even greater extent, by a widely shared realization that the customs union, for all its defects and imperfections, was an alternative preferable to the balkanization of Central Europe. But the war with its unrelenting cumulation of fratricidal strife soon put an end to all such restraints and hesitations.

Let me summarize: 200 years of capitalist development in the Austrian lands had placed the Austro-German middle classes in a position of prominence. They not only were the masters of the industrial establishments in the advanced western regions but they exercised financial control over a sizable segment of the industrial wealth in the under-developed areas of the country. Generally speaking, the Austro-German middle classes pursued policies which aimed at the preservation of the *status quo*, both in the economic and in the political sphere. But in the degree that a native entrepreneurial stratum arose in the backward areas, these policies encountered increasing resistance. Although the conflict among the nationalities seemed to revolve largely around problems of language and education, one of its root causes was the crass inequality in the regional distribution of wealth and income. There were especially wide variations in the real income of the working population. It is true that migration (both external and internal) would have tended to lessen the regional differences in the income of the Austrian worker, but for reasons pointed out above an adjustment of this kind could have come about only slowly, and would have procured rather imperfect results. Thus the nationality conflict, whose main protagonists were the middle classes of German and non-German complexion, spread in time to the Austrian proletariat, a fact which contributed importantly to the eventual downfall of the Monarchy.

THE GERMAN WORKING CLASS AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905

by Richard W. Reichard

By 1905 none of the workers of the world had taken Marx's famous injunction to unite more seriously than the Germans. The political arm of the German working class, the Social Democratic Party, had three to four hundred thousand members and over a fifth of the seats in the Reichstag. It possessed a transcendent prestige among the socialists of the world. The free or socialist trade unions had over a million members and were growing rapidly. The problem here is the effect on this movement of the Russian revolution of 1905, the first revolutionary upheaval in Europe since socialism had been solidly installed in the hearts of German workers.

In 1905 German social democracy was looking forward confidently to achieving a Reichstag majority, an event referred to by long habit as a revolution. This revolution was not expected for several decades, but the three million votes gathered in 1903 proved that it was coming.¹ Meanwhile the *sine qua non* for the party was continued legality. With the majority of the population once behind them, the social democrats expected to change the electoral laws, to improve wages and working conditions, to lower the tariffs on food and to free the schools from traditional church and state influence.² The change to a socialist economy was to come much later.

The goal of social democracy and the method of achieving it represented an unwritten compromise among the three elements determining party program—the leadership, the membership and the fellow travellers.

The leadership consisted of one or two thousand paid officials who, with several functions apiece, ran the organizations, participated in state and local parliaments and published the huge socialist press. Most of these men were former craft workers who had diligently educated themselves into being capable politicians; men of middle class origin were prominent only in the highest quarters.³ Party careers demanded unending labor but offered security of employment and the glory of position. Within the leader-

¹In the exhilaration of first election reports in 1903, Kurt Eisner had written in *Vorwärts*, the party's leading organ, "If the night finishes what it has begun then a turning point in German politics is being prepared. Germany will become the land of socialism."

²The modesty of socialist demands appeared in this speech of Bebel before the Reichstag: "What the German worker demands is this: he wants his full share of human rights and of his rights as a citizen. Furthermore he no longer wants to be treated as a pariah but wants to be able to do what you would regard as natural for yourselves if you were in the same position. ('Quite true' among the social democrats). My lords, equal rights for all is what the German emperor once called for. We demand this equal right, we demand it with all our energy and we will continue to do so until, for or against you, we get this right." *Verhandlungen des Reichstags* (hereafter *V.d.R.*), XI Legislaturperiode, II Session, Band I, 315.

³For several thousand party officials listed in a 1914 directory the twelve most common occupations, in order of importance, were: carpenter, compositor, mason, locksmith,

ship itself, control was in the hands of the 'old guard', i.e., men like Bebel, Singer and Auer who had guided the party since the time of the exceptional laws against socialism.

The party membership consisted predominantly of Protestant laborers engaged in craft occupations or in small industry in the urban areas.⁴ There were exceptions, for the Catholic workers of Munich and the Saxon textile workers were socialists, but in the main the party thrived in proportion to the Protestantism of the population, was strongest among masons, carpenters, printers, painters, tailors, etc., and did best in the big cities. The heart of proletarian Germany, the Catholic Ruhr and Rhineland were not among the party's strongholds. The role of party members was to appear at meetings, to sell the newspapers, to circulate leaflets and to electioneer. By comparison to members of other German parties social democrats participated actively in party affairs, but nonetheless their right to control party actions, being only rarely exercised, was largely theoretical.

The fellow travellers were those who voted socialist and were potential members and subscribers to the press. Election statistics showed that they were primarily proletarians but that there were also many discontented middle class people among them. The fellow travellers backed the party in campaigns like that of 1903 against higher tariffs on food, but were less likely to be loyal to it on more exclusively working class issues.

In 1905 German socialism had just emerged from a period of intense conflict between revisionists and orthodox over political and economic theory. The significance of this famous struggle, resolved at the Dresden party congress of 1903, has probably been exaggerated.⁶ It was concerned

printer, miner, shoemaker, weaver, tailor, factory worker, clerk and intellectual. *Handbuch des Vereins Arbeiterpresse*, III (1914), 243-552.

Of the 82 social democrats elected to the Reichstag in 1903 at least 56 had had occupations in which a man began as an apprentice, spent a number of years as a journeyman and could hope, in the normal course of things, to become an independent master. Twenty-two came from the middle classes; among them were five doctors of philosophy. Only four at most of the eighty-two seem to have worked in the large capitalist enterprises which were so characteristic of German industry. *Ämtliches Reichstags-Handbuch Elfte Legislaturperiode, 1903-08* (Berlin, 1903), 173-356.

⁴Election statistics for 1903 show the Protestant and urban character of the Social Democratic vote. A. Neumann-Hofer, *Die Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie bei den Wahlen zum deutschen Reichstag, 1871-1903*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1903) has complete tables. Good analyses can be found in Akademikus, "Statistische Nachklänge zu den Reichstagswahlen," *Neue Zeit* XXII-1 (1903-04), 364-9, 489-494 and R. Blank, "Die soziale Zusammensetzung der sozialdemokratischen Wählerschaft Deutschlands," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XX (1904-05), 507-550. There is no reason to believe that party membership did not have the same characteristics as the socialist electorate.

⁵E. Bernstein, *Die Berliner Arbeiterbewegung von 1890 bis 1905* (Berlin, 1924), 74. O. A. Piatnitsky, *Aufzeichnungen eines Bolshewiks Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1896-1917* (Berlin, 1930), 218-19.

⁶"I have in the course of years (earlier I was of a different opinion) come to the conclusion that the theoretical discussions over principles, over tactics, over individual points of the program, in short, everything which has been said with such ardour for and against 'revisionism' in the last few years, particularly in Germany, has practically no significance for the practise of the Social Democratic Party. The leaders hardly read the literature against Bernstein, the great masses read it even less; if they do read it, it is out of pure theoretical or literary interest. That even so much as one decision of

very little with what the party should do or how it should do it but very much with what flag the party should fly. Both revisionists and orthodox expected revolution through the Reichstag and neither wanted to do anything to prepare the socialists to break with century old German habits of obedience to established political authority. The groundswell of support for the orthodox showed the great sympathy for the idea of revolution which existed in the party but since the leaders of both sides were actually in agreement the issues were not clearly drawn. When the real split came in the German socialist movement it was over issues of practise rather than of theory.

The socialist trade unions, to which seventy percent of the organized workers belonged, were like the party largely Protestant and were stronger in small than in large industry. The unions were younger than the party, but with more than a million members, huge funds for unemployment insurance, and the power of decision over whether strikes should take place or not, they had an influence over workingmen's lives which surpassed that of the party. Union leaders felt themselves in the precarious position of those with great power; a strike settled too easily or one which was lost might wreck a union. Accordingly they inclined to move cautiously at all times. They conducted the class struggle more by speeches and moral pressure than by strikes and demonstrations.

The rising tide of the Russian revolution received little attention from the German working class until December, 1904. After that interest rose rapidly and in its New Year's editorial *Vorwärts* proclaimed that 1905 would be a 'Russian year'.⁷ There was every reason for the German socialists to be enthusiastic over the long expected Russian revolution.⁸ Since 1848 Russia had been regarded by socialists as the fountainhead of reaction in

the Reichstag delegation was influenced by these discussions of principle I find unbelievable. Quarrels and differences of opinion are naturally always in existence in a party, but they don't have their roots in basically different points of view, as the theoreticians try to make out (generally with very little success)." Werner Sombart, *Sozialismus und Soziale Bewegung*, 6th ed., (Jena, 1908) 254.

⁷With remarkable foresight of the effect of the Russian revolution on German workers, *Vorwärts* went on to remind its readers that politics should never be conducted by violent means: "We who call ourselves 'revolutionaries' have never thought of that word in the narrow sense which suggests fighting with pitchforks. It is not we who have incited to violence; rather we have always preached to the ruling classes that the first and last method of *their* policy, brutal force, is powerless against great movements of ideas. Physical fighting which pits man against man and uncovers the savagery in human beings has never been to our way of thinking the ideal means of solving great conflicts of interests."

⁸Marx and Engels spoke of the coming revolution in Russia as early as 1851 and then frequently again until their deaths. Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe*, (Berlin, 1929-1931), III Abt., Band I, 206-207; Band II, 448; Band IV, 280. In later years they believed revolution would start in Russia and then spread to Western Europe *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen von Joh. Phil. Becker, Jos. Dietzgen, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx u. a. an F. A. Sorge und Andere* (Stuttgart, 1921), 157; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels *Briefe an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, K. Kautsky und Andere*, Teil I (Moscow, 1933), 382-383. Karl Kautsky used this idea in a famous article in Lenin's *Iskra*, "The Slavs and the Revolution" on March 10 1902.

Europe and as the main danger to European peace,⁹ an attitude which had the inestimable advantage of sounding revolutionary while permitting some agreement with Hohenzollern foreign policy. German socialists wanted to see a bourgeois revolution in Russia which would create what they called 'civilized' conditions. Russian political life would then become open, legal and non-violent and Russia would live at peace with her neighbors.

After troops fired on St. Petersburg crowds on January 22 ('Red Sunday') the Russian revolution was thrust into a new prominence. The socialist press railed at the bloody Tsar. Party meetings called to discuss the upheaval in Russia drew unprecedentedly large and enthusiastic crowds.

It was not only events in the east which aroused the German working class. Early in January, after successive spontaneous pit meetings two hundred thousand Ruhr miners struck the coal industry despite all the efforts of leaders of their various unions to keep them at work.¹⁰ Unsatisfactory working conditions rather than news from Russia had made them strike, but their militancy set a new tone for the German labor movement. The miners were out for a month and then their leaders, with the approval of the party's executive committee, called them back to work.¹¹ The union officials were afraid that with their unemployment benefit funds running low they would be unable to restrain their members when, as was feared, the government sent the army to the coal fields.¹² This was the biggest strike in German history; it revealed the potential power of the working class both to those who were inspired by it and those who trembled at it.

After January and February there was a return to less exciting days. Klara Zetkin was well received when, in urging a general strike, she told German workers that they should give up their 'superstitious fear' of the

⁹Sinclair Armstrong discusses the persistence of this opinion of Russia in "The Internationalism of the Early Social Democrats of Germany," *American Historical Review*, XLVII (1941-42), 245-258.

¹⁰The official organ of the German free trade unions said on January 28, 1905, that: "It is only due to the work of the trade union leaders if in past years hard struggles have been avoided" and went on to argue that the present strike could not be laid to their account either. *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, XV (1905), 49.

Vorwärts, when charged by a conservative paper with having encouraged the strike, wrote on January 13, 1905: "The social democratic press as well as the miners' press has not urged a wage struggle in even a single word."

¹¹Except in Essen the miners went back to work with no more than usual complaints when their leaders called off the strike. Ending of the strike went down about ten per cent in mining districts in a June Reichstag election at Oberbarnim, but in a September election in Essen the social democrats scored an unprecedented success. Whatever resentment against socialist leadership had been produced by their conduct of the strike would appear to have been short lived.

¹²"No, the leaders did not flinch but they were convinced that it was a case of either breaking off the strike or next week the military will arrive. And if we hadn't been able to pay out enough money, then the infantry and the cavalry would have appeared and our movement would have fallen apart." Statement of Hermann Sachse, one of the socialist miners' union leaders in *Partei und Gewerkschaften: Protokoll der Konferenz der Gewerkschaftsvorstände von 19-23 February, 1906*, printed as a supplement to *Vorwärts*, August 11, 1906, 31. (cited hereafter as *P. u. G.*).

legal institutions which the ruling classes create,¹³ but such speeches seem to have been isolated phenomena. The May Day celebrations were no more spectacular than before. In Hamburg thirty thousand marched but elsewhere there were only the usual meetings. Nevertheless the rise in feeling was sufficient to put some of the more conservative labor leaders on their guard at the Cologne trade union congress in May. Theodore Bomelburg of the masons' union recalled how in 1889 German delegates to the Second International had permitted themselves to be carried away by enthusiasm for May Day and committed the German socialists to work stoppages on May Day.¹⁴ He was determined to fortify the unions against any future wave of feeling for political strikes and the resolution which he introduced condemned discussion of the general strike as well as such strikes themselves.¹⁵ As Rexhäuser, the head of the book binders, later put the sense of the meeting: "If you don't give children knives, they won't be able to hurt themselves."¹⁶ There was very little opposition to this policy from union officials present at Cologne.

After Cologne there were more and more evidences of radicalization of the German proletariat. Trade union officials were frequently attacked in public meetings for their attitude at Cologne.¹⁷ Eduard Bernstein, the revisionist theoretician, told a Breslau audience that German socialism had too limited means for struggle.¹⁸ He had said this before but his statements became more effective as the disparity between Russian and German working class success began to widen. In Russia mass action seemed to get results while in Germany the proletariat had to remain helpless when in Hamburg, one of the showplaces of socialist strength, the city council changed the voting system to exclude social democrats from getting control of local government, and when in July the Berlin police chief forbade Jaurès to address a peace rally. Kautsky also helped open debate on new methods of class struggle. When *Vorwärts* wanted to bury the general strike question Kautsky polemicized against the Party's leading organ¹⁹ and was

¹³*Vorwärts*, March 25 1905.

¹⁴*P. u. G.*, 39.

¹⁵Bömelburg indicated that he would not be in favor of a nationwide strike even if German workers were deprived of their right to vote or to organize. *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des fünften Kongresses der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, Köln, 1905, (Berlin, 1905), 221. Legien, the head of the trade unions, added that: "The danger of a general strike cannot be put sharply enough before the eyes of the workers." *Ibid.*, 225.

¹⁶*P. u. G.*, 25.

¹⁷*Vorwärts* of June 29, 1905, described a meeting at which Robert Schmidt, of the trade union executive committee, was sharply criticized in his Berlin Reichstag district for his statements at Cologne. The Cologne social democratic organization, never known for being radical, passed almost unanimously a resolution condemning the trade union congress for not having thought of new methods of struggle. *Vorwärts*, July 4, 1905.

¹⁸Police tried to seize all copies of the Breslau *Volksmacht* which carried Bernstein's speech and the responsible editor of that paper was later sentenced to six months in prison for having printed it.

¹⁹The issue arose when *Vorwärts* attacked Henriette Roland Holst's *Generalstreik und Sozialdemokratie* (Dresden, 1905), a book for which Kautsky had been a sponsor. Roland Holst had only analyzed general strikes and had not made a call for action, but *Vorwärts* did not want the question opened. The pen war began in June and continued through the summer in innumerable articles in *Vorwärts* and *Neue Zeit*.

joined by the left inclined *Leipziger Volkszeitung*. This provided a convenient means for throwing the question of the general strike into public discussion in both party and unions.

Debate on this issue continued to rise through the summer, as radical speakers became more popular and trade union officials more unpopular. There was talk of an actual general strike at Lübeck when the city government began to restrict voting rights.²⁰ The party leadership tried to divert debate to the proposed new party constitution but this effort was only partly successful. On August 22, 1905, Dr. Friedeberg spoke before three thousand Berlin unionists, accusing the party of having strayed from Marxist paths and of floundering because it confined itself to parliamentary action. He was supported by the Berlin trade union cartel. Not since 1892 had a speaker who was sympathetic to syndicalism gained so much influence in Germany.

The summer rise of feeling was registered at the Jena party congress in September. Party congresses cannot be taken as exact reflections of social democratic opinion. Delegates were often elected indirectly²¹ and many of the same delegates appeared year after year at the congresses. The agenda always gave greatly disproportionate amounts of time to speakers selected by the executive committee.²² The change from the previous year is the more striking since it expressed itself against these obstacles. At the Bremen meeting of 1904 hardly a corporal's guard had backed the idea of political strikes; the subject had been brushed aside with the old slogan 'general strike is general nonsense'. But at Jena it was Bebel, the party's traditional leader, for whom nearly all German social democrats had an intense personal loyalty, who was entrusted with introducing a new policy on the general strike. Bebel knew the feelings of party members as no one else did; in over forty years as a leader of Germany's proletarians he had only once been on the minority side on a major issue. The factors which influenced him to take the position he did were different from those which had influenced Bomelburg at Cologne. Not only was Bebel himself more inclined to use radical phraseology, but by the end of summer there was more intense feeling on the issue and furthermore the party, with less hold on its members, was forced to bend more with the times. Bebel, who had conferred beforehand with union leaders,²³ attacked them mildly for their opposition to political strikes, spoke warmly of the importance of

²⁰*Vorwärts*, August 15, 1905.

²¹E. Deinhardt "Das Beamtenelement in den deutschen Gewerkschaften," *Sozialistische Monatshefte* XI-2 (1905), 1023.

²²At the Dresden Congress Bebel himself had had the floor for almost one fifth, and at Hannover (1898) for almost one fourth of the whole six day meetings. Members of the executive committee almost invariably made the introductory and concluding speeches on important issues. Paul Singer was nearly always chairman of the congresses.

²³"Some days before Jena the General Commission of the trade unions held a discussion with the party executive. . . It is chiefly due to this conversation that the attacks against the unions did not appear in the introductory speech on the general strike in the same form as they have in the party press." Statement by Karl Legien, head of the unions, in *P.u.G.*, 6.

parliament²⁴ but nevertheless came out in favor of the general strike. It was to be saved for use in case the Reichstag ballot were in danger, i.e., it was not to be employed to bring about a revolutionary situation but to prevent the government from bringing about a potentially revolutionary situation. The succeeding debate, though it did not last as long as Bebel's speech, showed how the Russian revolution hovered over the gathering. Rosa Luxemburg, the party's firebrand, castigated some of the delegates for their complacency:

When one has heard the previous speeches. . . one must really knock oneself on the head and ask 'Are we really living in the year of the glorious Russian revolution?'²⁵

Other speakers sympathized with Luxemburg's position and they drew the response from Eduard David that the only thing to be learned from the Russians was that the Germans could not imitate their example. He was happy that German socialism had reached maturity and was no longer revolutionary.²⁶ Bebel, who remarked that he had never heard so much talk about blood before, agreed with David's sentiments.²⁷ A resolution 'adding the general strike to the armory of social democracy' was adopted by an overwhelming vote after a weakening amendment urged by Legien of the trade unions had been rejected. This was a victory for neither radicals nor moderates. For those leaning to the left it was a great gain over the previous year, but the weakness of the left showed in that it had to be satisfied with a paper decision. The congress evidenced a potential opposition to the policy of exclusive reliance on parliament but it did not shake the hold of the old leaders over the organization.²⁸

It was after Jena that the German working class reaction to the rising tide of conflict in Russia became pronounced and unmistakable. In October the Saxon socialists held a great number of meetings on the question of the

²⁴At Jena Bebel said "Yesterday Bernstein was complaining of the increasing powerlessness of the Reichstag. That is fundamentally wrong. The opposite is true. I have seen things develop from the beginning in the Reichstag and so let me say that the power of the Reichstag viewed as a whole, if it ever raises its voice, has much more influence today and more decision than it ever had in an earlier period." *Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitag der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, Jena, September 17-23, 1905* (Berlin, 1905), 287. The following year he wrote: "Parliamentary government is not only growing more and more unfruitful in Germany but the saying of Bismarck in the sixties of the last century is gradually getting to be true: parliamentary government must be destroyed by parliamentary government." "Das Fazit der letzten Reichtagssession," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-2 (1906), 345. This is a particularly striking example of how Bebel adjusted his thinking to his audience.

²⁵*Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitag, 1905*, 320.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 328.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 338-39.

²⁸That Jena was not an actual victory for the left is shown in the fact that the general strike resolution did not worry the less radical leaders. R. Schmidt, "Der Jenaer Parteitag und die Gewerkschaften," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XI (1905), 847-49. Eduard David remarked that: "In practical terms, it is just the same as the motto of the Cologne union congress 'When the time comes we will talk about it!'" E. David, "Rückblick auf Jena," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XI (1905), 843.

Saxon three class suffrage which had been installed in 1896 and never yet seriously challenged by a working class campaign. Then at the end of October a general strike in Russia caused the Tsar to liberalize the provisions for Duma elections and powers; in Russia the effect was only to increase the number of political strikes, demonstrations, mutinies in the armed forces and peasant outbreaks. From Russia the new excitement was first communicated to Austria²⁹ where there were proletarian street marches in the large cities and even barricades in Prague; to a lesser extent the excitement spilled over into Germany. The Breslau social democrats asked the party for permission to hold a street demonstration early in November. In Leipzig the workers poured out of a meeting late in November and then trooped to the center of the city by the thousands to show publicly their determination to get equal suffrage. At the beginning of December the workers of Dresden, Chemnitz, Plauen and other Saxon cities met and then marched in the streets by the tens of thousands. Feeling in Saxony ran very high in December.³⁰ Germany had had no street demonstrations for political purposes since 1848. The decades long lethargy of the German workers seemed to many to have come to an end.

Comrades in other countries have declared that German social democracy is philistine and devoid of revolutionary élan. Here and there they have even asserted that its tactics take the spirit out of the workers and render them unfit for real revolutionary action. . . . In our own ranks are comrades who held it was doubtful whether the German workers would heed a call to go into the streets in masses. . .

These opinions have been proved false by the events of the last weeks.³¹

The *Sächsische Arbeiter Zeitung*, not at all a radical paper, said that the last word in the struggle could not be given by police attacks on the workers and called for still more action. To many the times seemed to warrant a general strike and the question of whether to call one or not was seriously discussed by the heads of Saxon social democracy.³²

²⁹The *Deutsche Rundschau* (XXII, 1906, 147), remarked that the influence of the Russian revolution was felt most strongly in Austria-Hungary where the successful general strike had had a 'hypnotic effect' on Austrian workers.

³⁰"As the writer of these lines called for calm in one of the meetings and advised that we should not reply to force with force, he was greeted with general agreement; but when he indicated that in a civilized land the people had the right to the streets of their city and that this could not be denied them, then loud jubilation bellowed forth from the thousands present. It was the liberating outcry of the masses: 'We have been harassed too long, our patience is exhausted, our demand for rights shall be sounded in the open air.'" Georg Gradnauer "Ein Vorstoss," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-I (1905-06), 364.

³¹A. Block, "Kampfeslehren" *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-I (1905-06), 585-86. As a sample of the earlier opinion Block mentioned one might take the *Allgemeine Rundschau* (II, 1905, 574): "Revolutionary international social democracy has been brought into a high pitch of excitement by the successes of its Russian comrades. Of course German social democracy has too much respect for state authority to seek its fortune on the streets in imitation of the Russians."

³²*P. u. G.*, 27.

The December third outburst³³ brought reaction from government quarters. Chancellor von Bülow warned the German workers not to behave like the Russians³⁴ and police in various Saxon cities forbade further meetings on the suffrage issue. Nevertheless, where they were permitted, the Saxon socialists called new meetings on December nineteenth and huge crowds marched through the streets again. In Dresden the police fired blanks on a giant procession of workers and eighteen were injured. There was violence in other cities also.

The enthusiasm of the Saxons and the rising tide of the Russian revolution touched off other movements for ballot reform. In late December when the International Socialist Bureau summoned the European working class to hold meetings to commemorate January 22 ('Red Sunday'), the executive committee of the German social democratic party decided to combine this cause with that of the Prussian suffrage. By the end of the year the whole country was agitated by the ballot question. Freidrich Naumann wrote:

The old struggles are returning once again. Whereas one was accustomed to say twenty years ago that the time of constitutional questions was over and that the period of social problems has been begun, we are now living in a time when all Europe east of France and Belgium is now racked by ballot questions. Everywhere the problems of the share of the masses in the government of the state is in the foreground [nine examples of such a struggle in Germany as well as Austria and Russia are cited here]. It is as if out of the wildly aroused East a somewhat belated centenary celebration of the French revolution has been prepared in order to take up again a new round of the old struggle between citizens and privileged powers.³⁴

The leftward swing manifested itself in other ways. In the fall of 1905 the party's executive committee responded to a long standing criticism and appointed six new and more radical editors to *Vorwärts*. In Chemnitz Max Schippel, long a target of orthodox and radical criticism in the party, finally found his health so bad that he had to resign his Reichstag seat.³⁵ Rosa Luxemburg, speaking at a Berlin women's meeting before she left to take part in the Russian revolution, said that the Russian people had begun a new epoch in world history. She was given 'hoch's,' an unaccustomed honor.

³³*V. d. R., XI Legislaturperiode, II Session, Band 1, 196.*

³⁴Friedrich Naumann "Wahlrechtsfragen," *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, II-2 (1905), 529-530. Adolf Grabowsky later noted that at the beginning of 1905 suffrage reform was a dead question and that it had only become significant since then "Deutsche Wahlrechtsreforme," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, I (1907-08), 127.

³⁵Gustav Noske was selected to replace Schippel because he was more of a radical. *Vorwärts* commented after Noske's election with a smaller majority than Schippel had received that apparently fewer fellow travellers supported Noske than would have supported the more moderate Schippel. Another analyst believed that it was the Russian revolution and its repercussions on Saxony as well as Noske's views which had frightened some of those who previously voted for Schippel. Hermann Wendel, "Zur Chemnitzer Reichstagsnachwahl," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-I (1905-06), 735.

Balthasar Cramer, a socialist, was forced to resign his Reichstag seat immediately after participating in Hessian court functions. Bömelburg, speaking in Leipzig, the center of the militant movement in Social Democracy, felt compelled to say that his Cologne resolution condemning the general strike meant the same as the Jena resolution approving it.³⁶

When the holiday lull had ended the momentum of the radical movement was already affected by the decline of the Russian revolution. The climax in Russia had been reached in two weeks of barricade warfare in December in Moscow; when this revolt was smashed there was a sensible lagging of revolutionary fortunes and the Tsarist government began to feel its power growing. Both social democrats and conservative forces recognized that the decline of the Russian revolutionary movement effected a decline in the German movement.³⁷ Saxony was quiet in January. In Hamburg, however, where the city council was finally getting ready to pass a measure to prevent socialists from winning control of the state government they were met by a new protest. Party leaders announced meetings for the late afternoon of January seventeenth but they did not anticipate that tens of thousands of workers would leave their jobs to attend the meetings.³⁸ After the meetings the workers marched through the streets and there were brushes with the police. The demonstration again caught party leaders off guard; they had not gotten the requisite permission in advance. It was the first time since 1848 that German workers had gone off their jobs for political reasons. Small and partial though it was, it qualifies as the first general strike in German history.

The events in Hamburg brought to a head the opposition to the newly found radicalism of the German workers. Conservative forces in and out of the government had been disquieted early in 1905 by the Russian revolution and when its repercussions reached Germany they acted forcefully out of conviction that the Russian government would never have gotten into difficulty with its population if enough severity had been used. Towards the end of 1905 the number and harshness of jail sentences imposed on socialists for political crimes increased sharply. After the Saxon demonstra-

³⁶In Leipzig Bömelburg said: "Despite the difference in wording there is not an actual difference between the Cologne and the Jena resolution. . . . Even if Jena had come before Cologne, Jena would not have been any different than it was." *Vorwärts*, November 16, 1905. In the private union leaders' conference of February, 1906, his position was different: "It was a blessing for the labor movement that we took a stand at Cologne on the political general strike. . . . Why was it that things didn't go so far at Jena? It was because we had already taken a position." *P.u.G.*, 41. The contradiction in opinions here would seem to justify the statement that Bömelburg felt compelled to say what he did in Leipzig. In the sense that the Jena resolution was not seriously intended and was only a piece of demagoguery Bömelburg would be correct in saying that there was no essential difference between Jena and Cologne.

³⁷*Allgemeine Rundschau*, III (1906), 27; Karl Kautsky "Grundsätze oder Plane," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-2 (1906), 785; Henriette Roland-Holst, "Zur Massenstreikdebatte," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-2 (1906), 689.

³⁸The spontaneity of the Hamburg general strike was emphasized by one of the local socialist leaders Gustav Stengele, "Der 17. Januar in Hamburg," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-I (1905-06), 620.

tions of December, described by newspapers on the right as 'experiments in revolution', there was a rising chorus of demands for special legislation against socialists and for a new Reichstag suffrage law to cut socialist strength. Demonstrations and meetings were frequently forbidden in December 1905 and January 1906. Meetings were halted in other cases when speakers suggested that the patience of the German people was wearing thin. After January seventeenth the intensity of the campaign increased even more. The *Hamburger Nachrichten* spoke of that day as a 'revolt'³⁹ and the *Berlin Post* attacked the socialists as 'un-German'.⁴⁰ Rumors were spread through the press that troops were to be held in readiness on the forthcoming 'Red Sunday' celebration. There were liberals who called for a policy of concessions⁴¹ but their voices were weaker than the voices of those who called for stern measures.

The social democratic executive committee responded to this campaign by trying to quiet the rank and file. In November it had forbidden the Breslau socialists to hold a street demonstration and in December Bebel had told the Reichstag that the party was trying to hold the workers back⁴² but in late 1905 the party seems nonetheless to have given the masses a certain amount of free rein. This policy was changed about the time of the outburst in Hamburg. Trade union leaders testified to a change about this time⁴³ and it was noticed in conservative quarters also.⁴⁴ The party used all possible pressure and propaganda methods to keep the workers off the streets after the big meetings of January twenty first. The day after the Hamburg demonstration *Vorwärts* warned German proletarians: "Do not let yourselves become provoked!" It was the old slogan of the period of the anti-socialist laws and it meant that party members should never disobey the police. On 'Red Sunday' itself the speeches were given a mild tone; the workers were told their blood was too precious to be spilled by the police and every Berlin speaker stressed the recent statement of the heir

³⁹*Frankfurter Zeitung*, January 19, 1906.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, January 20, 1906.

⁴¹In the Reichstag Karl Schrader told the government: "In south Germany social democracy has never been treated as it has been in the north. The result is that it rises up less forcefully and that it is much easier to deal with in the south. The same attempts should be made among you in the north." *V.d.R.*, XI Legislaturperiode, II Session, Band II, 1093. Hans Delbrück argued that the social democrats had proved themselves harmless in the Reichstag and the times demanded concessions to equal suffrage in Prussia and Saxony. "Die Reform des Landtagswahlrechts", *Preussische Jahrbücher*, CXXIII (1906), 193-195. Maximilian Harden made the point that conservative threats of suppression of socialists only gave the latter aid. *Zukunft*, LIV (1906), 248.

⁴²"Do you not believe that what has gone on in the east also moved and excited the souls of the German workers? (Quite true! among the social democrats. Interruptions from the right.) I tell you, Herr von Kardorff, if we had not held them back, things would have gone bad with you." *V.d.R.*, XI Legislaturperiode, II Session, Band, I, 162.

⁴³"If there is a complaint to be made against Bebel, it is that he did not put on the brakes in time," as von Elm said at the February union conference. *P.u.G.*, 20. Other leaders agreed that Bebel and the rest of the party chiefs had become worried when the masses became too excited. *Ibid.*, 4, 15, 37.

⁴⁴The conservative *Deutsche Tageszeitung* remarked on January 17, 1906, that "the twenty first of January appears to be making the leading comrades a bit uncomfortable."

to the Bavarian throne in support of equal universal suffrage.⁴⁵ The party succeeded in quelling the rebellious spirits and the big meetings went off without incident. Only at Halle were there clashes with the police.

After January twenty second the momentum which 1905 had generated declined sharply and then died down gradually during 1906. The three factors which had slowed it in January were now able to stop it entirely. It was becoming ever more clear that the Russian revolution was not likely to repeat its earlier achievements. The restatement of Kautsky's theory of 'permanent revolution' in Russia was a confession of this fact.⁴⁶ Pressure on the social democrats, the second of the factors, continued. After 'Red Sunday' some of the conservative press, like the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* confessed that they had overestimated the danger of revolution but there were still enough cries for suppression of social democrats to indicate to the party what lay ahead if so much militancy continued to be displayed. Therefore the efforts to reduce agitation among the masses continued. *Vorwärts* declared that government could not be carried on against the will of the majority to intimate that no more action was needed.⁴⁷ In February party and union leaders met secretly on the invitation of the former and coordinated plans for lessening the possibility of a general strike.⁴⁸ By March party meetings were back to the usual pattern of lectures on such topics as the relation between socialism and Christianity and the history of Prussia. Political activity continued to dwindle through the year. At the Mannheim party congress in 1906 the last touch was put to the party-union campaign to eliminate chances of a general strike. A resolution was passed stating that there was no contradiction between the Jena and the Cologne resolutions and giving the unions a veto over any political strikes.

That it was the Russian revolution which served as a trigger to the German movement of 1905 cannot reasonably be doubted. Social democratic leaders of all varieties of belief, who were in contact with the masses and who had no particular reason to emphasize the Russian revolution as against their own efforts, accepted this idea as a commonplace.⁴⁹ It was also the opinion of bourgeois politicians and analysts.⁵⁰ The parallel chronolo-

⁴⁵This point is underlined in Berlin dispatches to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 22, 1906.

⁴⁶*Vorwärts*, January 28, 1906.

⁴⁷*Vorwärts*, January 24, 1906.

⁴⁸In summer 1906 partial reports of the trade union leaders conference which followed this party-union meeting fell into the hands of Berlin syndicalists who immediately published them. This forced *Vorwärts* to publish the whole report of the union conference (P.u.G.) on August 11, 1906; this document is one of the most important single sources on pre-1914 German working class history.

⁴⁹Eduard Bernstein "Politischer Massenstreik und Revolutionsromantik," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, X (1906), 13; Lily Braun, *Memoiren einer Sozialistin*, Vol. 2, (Munich 1911), 552-553; *Vorwärts*, November 14, 1905; Henriette Roland-Holst, "Zur Massenstreik-debatte," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-2 (1906), 685; Karl Kautsky, "Grundsätze und Plane," *Neue Zeit*, XXIV-2 (1906), 784; *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, XVI (1906), 626, to cite just a few.

⁵⁰In addition to those previously cited, Dr. Mugdan, *V.d.R.*, Xi Legislaturperiode, II Session, Band II, 994; Ernest Bassermann, *Ibid.*, 1082; Hans Delbrück, "Die Reform des

gical development of the two movements helps to confirm it. Both began in January 1905, built up during the year, though not without temporary declines, and then reached a peak of intensity in the fall and early winter only to decline at the beginning of 1906. Other reasons for anticipating such an outbreak of radical feeling in Germany in 1905 are lacking, especially since 1904 was a relatively quiet year for the socialist movement. Nineteen five was a good year economically, the government passed through no crises and there was no unusual amount of police persecution except as a reply to the rise of militant feelings. The only other event which might have set off the movement of 1905 was the miners' strike but it was neither such a victory as to stir the desire for more victories nor such a defeat as to make the working class thirst for revenge. Had it been the miners' strike which caused the movement of 1905 the movement presumably would have taken more of an economic than a political direction.⁵¹

Nineteen five shows that a large part of the German working class was growing dissatisfied with the pace of progress toward socialism. The party had grown large and commanded many seats in the Reichstag and yet there was no observable change in the lives of workingmen. Hope in the Reichstag therefore tended to diminish. Furthermore it seemed that the Reichstag majority might never become a reality since in the case of almost all the smaller parliamentary bodies in Germany whenever socialists came close to getting a majority the election laws were altered to give permanent control to the propertied classes. For a greater part of the German proletariat increased activity, public displays of strength and general strikes seemed to be an answer to the insufficiencies of the parliamentary road to socialism. The Russian revolution did not so much cause discontent among the German workers, as it served to touch off the open expression of discontent and to offer proof that non-parliamentary political methods could win changes. It would be hazardous to estimate the proportion of the German proletariat which was inspired by the Russian revolution to hope for similar forms of action in Germany; men's opinions can only be known at those rare moments when they manifest themselves in some obvious way. However since there was a large group which was ready to follow the lead of the Russians one can presume that there was another large group which was more passively enthusiastic.

For what became of the left wing of the German working class movement 1905 seemed to bring a new era. Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring

Landtagswahlrechts," *Prussische Jahrbücher* CXXIII (1906), 193; the *National Liberal Kölnische Zeitung*, quoted at length in *Vorwärts*, Dec. 7, 1905.

⁵¹Membership in the socialist unions rose 28% in 1905 but it rose 21% in 1903, 18% in 1904 and 26% in 1906. *Statistische Beilage des Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, 1908, 166. The number of workers organized in socialist unions who went out on strike for better conditions in 1905, exclusive of the miners' strike of January, was about 50% higher in 1905 than in 1904, when it was under 100,000. *Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, XVI (1906), 843, 846. Both figures show a considerable rise in working class interest in economic questions in 1905, but not on a scale to be compared with rise of interest in politics.

and others expected the class struggle to come to life in Europe as it had not since the Paris Commune. It was not that they wanted to stage or to provoke a revolution but they felt that every situation should be used to stir up the class struggle and to hasten the day when revolution would become unavoidable. The task of the party, according to them, was to lash the masses forward at every point. Meetings should give way to demonstrations, demonstrations to the general strike. They considered a more equal Prussian and Saxon suffrage useful, but not an end in itself. They were willing to go as far on the road to socialism as the situation would permit. For them there was no question of a change of theory but rather of the beginning of a period which fulfilled the promise of the *Communist Manifesto*.

For a great part of the German working class and for a majority of their leaders the situation understandably looked different. Almost without exception they wanted Tsarism destroyed and welcomed the Russian revolution⁵² but when it became a question of beginning to imitate the Russian revolution in Germany their attitudes changed. A great part of the Social Democratic rank and file consisted of better paid German workers⁵³ who wanted more elbow room for unpropertied people in Germany. Though they called themselves socialists they accepted most of the traditional beliefs of German society and were not willing to go against the status quo. Over the years they had grown accustomed to the idea of achieving what they wanted within existing society⁵⁴ and they opposed anything which inclined towards destroying the toleration which the existing society had for them.

The majority of the German working class leaders were even more sensitive than the conservatives among their followers to the dangers which the Russian revolution created for their movement. Their arguments against a general strike—that it required giant organizations and vast funds—were exploded by what happened in the east. Their insistence that all political expression should be channeled through parliaments was less effective when the Russian workers gained more without a parliament. They worried over the problem of the fellow travellers, many of whom might take fright at the party because of the sympathy it showed for the general strike.⁵⁵ Most disastrous of all for them, working class organizations in 1905

⁵²Heinrich Peus, editor of the *Volksblatt für Anhalt*, began to have doubts about the Russian revolution when it turned to barricade warfare. He was on the extreme right wing of German Social Democracy.

⁵³Paul Kampffmeyer pointed out that it was not the worker who had been ruined by capitalism but the worker who had a relatively favorable situation who tended to become a social democrat. P. Kampffmeyer, "Historisches und theoretisches zur sozialdemokratischen Revisionsbewegung," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, VIII-1 (1902), 345-354.

⁵⁴"If one were to put the history of the tactics of social democracy into one sentence one would have to say: it is a history of the gradual adaptation of social democracy to the existing political institutions." P. Kampffmeyer, "Eine Wiedergeburt der Unabhängig-Sozialistischen Bewegung?", *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XI-2 (1905), 850.

⁵⁵"If we substitute propaganda for the general strike for all our [regular] activity then we will lose our influence on broad sections of the people." George Lebedour, Reichstag representative, quoted in *Vorwärts*, September 7, 1905.

began to take a road which led toward suppression by the government. As the unions warned:

The discussion of the question of the general strike in political circles up to this time has given rise to expressions and tendencies which consciously or unconsciously tend toward sacrificing the power of the workers' organizations, which has only been accumulated in the course of years, in mass demonstrations with incalculable consequences. As the experience of other lands shows, this would endanger in the extreme both the material and the legal position of the trade unions.⁵⁶

Both general strikes and street demonstrations were likely to be forbidden by the police but the Saxon example showed that German workers might not heed such orders and might thus create a situation where riots would occur. Even more dangerous than this to the leadership would have been the occasionally discussed possibility of German intervention in favor of the Tsar, an action which would have been infinitely destructive of the moderate position of the unions and the socialists. Thus the Russian revolution created a problem for the majority of labor and socialist leaders in that they wanted Tsarism overthrown but could not be happy at the by-products of that overthrow.

Faced with the rise of working class sentiments the leaders handled their followers in two different ways. Most of the union leaders wanted to put a damper on the unruly spirits from the first while most of the party leaders made concessions to mass enthusiasm and only suppressed it when it threatened to become too dangerous. This difference was less important than their similarity in permitting the extent of their opposition to the government to be determined by the government itself and than their implied agreement that if it ever came to a point of either acting with the proletariat in a dangerous way against the state or of acting with state authorities against the proletariat they would feel they had to do the latter. In the history of the organized German working class movement there had never been a situation of such conflict with the government and therefore the inclination of the leadership to give way in difficult circumstances had not earlier been so recognizable.

Since the role of the party changed this year from more or less constant encouragement of the class struggle to a policy of encouraging struggle yet holding it within bounds, a change in party theory was clearly also in order. Probably because the 1905 movement was so shortlived no such development took place. This direction of such a change had been indicated somewhat earlier in a polemic between Kautsky and a Polish socialist, Krauz.⁵⁷ Krauz had tried to force Kautsky to admit that revolution could not be bloodless

⁵⁶*Correspondenzblatt der Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands*, XV (1905), 306. This was written in May before intense agitation for a general strike had begun.

⁵⁷C. V. Kelles Kraus [Michael Lusnia] "Unbewaffnete Revolution," *Neue Zeit* XXII-I (1903-94), 559-567.

in Germany by asking him what the social democrats would do if the army were used to provoke violence during a general strike. In his reply Kautsky attempted in every way to avoid such a sharply worded question. He quoted Engels, he hypothesized that revolutions would come first in other countries and that their effect would be to make transference of power to the Social Democrats automatic, and he finally spoke of the discipline of the working classes which would create so much confusion, disorder and moral uncertainty among the ruling classes as to make them willing to surrender power.⁵⁸ In Kautsky's position there is a beginning of that tendency which later became dominant in Social Democratic theory to argue most strongly for revolution in times when revolution was least likely to occur and then to back away from revolutionary conclusions when excitement was rising among the masses.⁵⁹ It is significant here that this tendency was first brought out by a debate between a Russian socialist and a German socialist at a time when the very first tremors of revolution were starting in the east.

The trend on the left and that among the majority of the leadership were the most important for the later history of the German working class but there was yet a third trend of significance. A group of revisionists who, although they believed that society would gradually grow into socialism and denied in theory that revolution which party leaders denied in their acts, proved to be very zealous advocates of electoral reform. Eduard Bernstein was one of the first to call for the general strike and argued that the German workers, trained by their nation's history to submit to authority, needed experience and training in resistance to the government, an argument which implied rejection of the cherished self portrait of German social democracy as the leading fighter in the European class struggle.⁶⁰ Kurt Eisner, one of the editors dropped by *Vorwärts* for his revisionism, also advocated new and more provocative methods of struggle. He attacked the traditional German socialist position that no campaign should be launched if one of its possible results would be a crushing defeat for the working class. The chief organ of revisionism, the *Münchener Post*, wanted the fight for the Prussian ballot to be carried to success regardless of obstacles and spoke of how a small group of determined people could often win great political successes.⁶¹ This was more violent language than was generally heard in party circles. These social democrats did not want to provoke a socialist revolution in Germany. Their aims were limited to a desire to complete the work of 1848 and 1870 in providing Germany with bourgeois

⁵⁸Karl Kautsky "Allerhand Revolutionäres," *Neue Zeit*, XXII-I (1903-04), 588-598, 620-627, 652-657, 685-695, 732-740.

⁵⁹In spring 1910 when for the first time there was some probability that a general strike might break out in Prussia over the ballot issue, Kautsky refused an article of Rosa Luxemburg for *Neue Zeit* which urged such a general strike. Instead he urged that the German working class model its tactics on those of the Romans in the Second Punic War, and wait for the class enemy to defeat itself. Karl Kautsky, "Was Nun?" *Neue Zeit*, XXVIII-2 (1910), 33-40, 68-80.

⁶⁰Eduard Bernstein, "Ist der politische Streik in Deutschland möglich," *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, XI-1 (1905), 29-37.

⁶¹Quoted lengthily in *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, Dec. 7, 1905.

institutions and to destroy the power of the conservative land owning classes but within this limit they were in a fighting mood in 1905. Thus some of the revisionists such as Bernstein seemed to be further left than some of the orthodox like Kautsky. This trend of what could be called radical revisionism appeared again but it never attained the significance of either of the other two trends.

The relationship between the Russian revolution of 1905 and the German working class⁶² offers not only anticipations of later reactions in Germany when the working class was subjected to outside stimulation as at the time of the Russian revolution of 1917 or to severe internal strain as happened during the war. The Russian revolution had also two important continuing effects on the future of German social democracy. Internationally the lead in the international socialist movement slowly began to slip out of the hands of the Germans. This process had begun before 1905 but it was vastly accelerated by events in 1905. Their size and their election victories had originally given the Germans this hegemony over the parties of the Second International and they preserved it as long as the European class struggle took a peaceful form. However they were so well adjusted to the status quo that with the rise of more militant socialism they gradually lost their position of authority.⁶³

Even more important, 1905 brought the first approach to the creation of a leftist group in German socialism and hence the first step toward the later portentous split between the communists and the social democrats.⁶⁴ Nineteen five suggested to part of the German workers that they could gain more if they took to the streets and that if their old leaders would not countenance adventurous methods they should look elsewhere for leaders. To Rosa Luxemburg and others 1905 suggested that to get their type of revolution they would probably have to bring about a shift in party policy and get the masses away from the traditional leaders. In 1905 nothing was

⁶²This close relation between these two socialist movements existed even though there was very little personal contact between them. The Russian socialists had none of the virtues which the Germans prized (all of which could be measured in statistics) — large membership, a successful press, a well filled treasury, seats in parliament. Accordingly they tended to look down on the Russian socialists and not to have much contact with them while at the same time they looked forward to the day when the Russians would have the same maturity, stability, organization and mannerly ways of the west European socialists. Some of the German social democratic radicals and intellectuals were friendly with mensheviks but very few of the Germans associated with the bolsheviks. In 1905 the flight of many Russian revolutionaries through Germany presumably increased the amount of contact between the two movements, but coordinated action between the two at this time did not take place.

⁶³At the Stuttgart congress of the Second International in 1907 the majority of the German delegation was defeated on its proposed resolution on the colonial question, the first major defeat the Germans had ever sustained in the international. On the decline of the influence of German social democracy due to the rise of a more militant socialism see R. Michels, "Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie im internationalen Verbande", *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XXVI (1907), 148-231; E. Vandervelde, *Souvenirs d'un militant socialiste*, (Paris, 1939), 162.

⁶⁴Karl Kautsky dated the appearance of the left wing in German social democracy from 1905 in *Mein Verhältnis zur Unabhängigen Sozialdemokratischen Partei*, (Berlin, 1922), 3-4.

done to constitute a left wing; it was only in 1910 that a continually existing left group began to form. Nevertheless the chronological starting point was 1905. Then it first appeared that the great dispute was not whether the party should be orthodox Marxist or revisionist. The great dispute was actually whether the party dared challenge the government to achieve its demands or whether if it needed to challenge the government to get what it wanted it was better to reduce its demands. German social democratic theoreticians and politicians had long tried to wish this dilemma out of existence. It appeared first in 1905 in cloudy form but the responses given to it in 1905 showed the responses which would be given to it when it arose in unavoidable form, when answers could no longer be postponed and when the split therefore had to come.

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BENEŠ AND STALIN—MOSCOW, 1943 AND 1945

by *Eduard Táborský*

DURING the second World War the late President of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Eduard Beneš, made two journeys to Moscow to meet Joseph Stalin and his Kremlin associates. The importance of these journeys transcends the narrow framework of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. What happened between Beneš and Stalin on these two occasions became an inseparable part of the tense and still controversial history of East-West relations in the fateful years 1938-1945. The first journey, which took place in November-December 1943, helped to strengthen the belief, at that time widespread in the West, that the Soviets meant business when they pledged non-interference with other nations' international affairs as a paramount principle of their foreign policy. The second journey, which took place in March 1945, resulted in the formation of a new Czechoslovak government with communists and their fellow-travelers in key positions of power—which enabled them to deal a deadly blow to the Czechoslovak democracy a few years later. And the sharp contrast between the Soviet attitudes on these two occasions, separated from one another by a mere 15 months, serves as a dramatic illustration of the suddenness with which the Soviet Union cast away the friendship of the West and began the "cold war".

In view of the fact that so many matters pertaining to the origins and causes of the "cold war" are still highly controversial, it is not surprising that Dr. Beneš' policy toward the Soviets during the crucial years 1938-1945 has been subjected to a close scrutiny ranging from bitter hostility to resentful exoneration. Some of Dr. Beneš' critics visualize him as an unfortunate sufferer from unrealistic dreams of lasting Soviet-Western collaboration. Others blame his tactics and think that he continued to appease the Soviets too much and too long. Still others go so far as to brand him as "quarter-master of communism in Central Europe" and explain his behavior as sheer pro-Soviet opportunism.¹ These criticisms are based mainly on what one might call judgment by results. When the outcome was bad, resulting as it did in the eclipse of democracy in Czechoslovakia and so many other countries in that part of the world, something must indeed have gone wrong in the policy that was designed to prevent just such a disastrous development. Yet to discover what it was requires a careful analysis of all the events and facts in their relationship to these results. Unfortunately, many important facts, including those surrounding the two journeys of Beneš¹ to Moscow in 1943 and 1945, still remain hidden.

Beneš himself dealt with his first war time visit to Moscow in his *Memoirs*,² but he never got around to giving an authoritative report on his second visit in 1945 (or on what happened between those two visits). Moreover,

¹Cf. Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory* (New York, 1947). Also: Václav E. Mareš, "Could the Czechs have remained free?", *Current History*, Vol. 23, p. 150 ff. (Sept. 1950).

²*Paměti* (Praha, 1947), p. 355 ff.

what he wrote in his Memoirs does not give a complete picture of *all* that happened. At the time his book was being prepared for publication (1945-47), Beneš was still Chief of State and his primary endeavor was to save what still could be saved. And whoever reads the Memoirs can discern the caution and restraint that guided his pen when touching upon any delicate aspect of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.³ There are a few books and articles, in particular since 1948, touching upon the subject,⁴ but so far the full story of those two visits of Dr. Beneš to Moscow in 1943 and 1945 has not been told.

The present writer, in his capacity as Personal Secretary to Dr. Beneš, accompanied him on both these journeys, kept a day-to-day diary of all that happened and has in his possession copies of all important documents bearing upon the subject. This article is based mainly on these primary sources and has been written in a belief that the knowledge of some hitherto unpublished facts may throw some additional light on that important sector of the origins and beginnings of the "cold war".

I.

Dr. Beneš began to contemplate a trip to Moscow shortly after the Germans had attacked the Soviet Union and the Russians had become allies of the West.⁵ At that time Beneš believed firmly in the possibility of peaceful relations between East and West. In fact, he clung to that belief even during the exasperating period of Soviet-Nazi collaboration in 1939-1941 and gave expression to it in a number of political messages to the Czech underground at that time.⁶ The conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance to last twenty years between Britain and the Soviet Union in May 1942 was to him a confirmation *par excellence* that his estimate had been correct.

He deemed this promising East-West collaboration to be the best guar-

³Dr. Beneš began to write his Memoirs as early as 1943, while in exile in Britain. His original idea was to publish the book immediately upon his return to Czechoslovakia. Later on he changed his mind, mainly because he did not wish thereby to sharpen the split between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

⁴Cf. Edvard Beneš, "Czechoslovak Plans for Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23, p. 26 ff. (October 1944); Sheila Grant Duff, "Tragedy of President Beneš," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 174, pp. 264 ff. (London, November 1948); Ivo Ducháček, *The Strategy of Communist Infiltration, The Case of Czechoslovakia*, Yale Institute of International Studies, 1949; Josef Josten, *Oh, My Country* (London, 1949); Eduard Táborský, "Beneš and the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, p. 302 ff. (January 1949).

⁵In a number of messages from the non-communist Czechoslovak underground groups he was urged to go to Moscow, and this even before Russia was attacked by Germany. One of them, typical of others, went like this: "Has Dr. Beneš already been in Moscow? If not, why not? Does he think that the West will have sufficient trump cards in their hands?" From Dr. Beneš' papers. This and other documents from Beneš' archives referred to in this article are the author's translations from the Czech original, unless otherwise specified.

⁶"The West will now cautiously attempt some settlement with Russia," he wrote to the Czech underground on October 4, 1939. "Should there be a change of government in Britain with Churchill at the head, everything will be done for an alliance with Russia." From Dr. Beneš' papers. Cf. also Curt F. Beck, "Can Communism and Democracy Coexist? Beneš' answer," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XI, p. 189 ff. (October 1952).

antee for world peace, especially for that part of the world in which his homeland was situated, and he considered it his duty to do all he could to promote this worthwhile purpose.⁷ With memories of the Franco-British appeasement at Munich and its fatal consequences for Czechoslovakia still in his mind, he felt, further, that he must make sure that a similar disaster would not happen again. He endeavored to achieve this specific aim by establishing closer ties with Poland,⁸ and by concluding an alliance with the USSR. Finally, having experienced bitter setbacks at the hands of communists at home, in particular in the years 1939 and 1940,⁹ he thought it would be helpful to secure, straight from Stalin, certain assurances with respect to the Soviet's future behavior with regard to Czechoslovakia. He knew, of course, that he could not take agreements with the Soviets for a foolproof guarantee.¹⁰ Yet he thought a clear and unequivocal written obligation to be a more solid ground than a misty uncertainty. Moreover, he believed that Stalin had come to understand and appreciate the value of good relations with England and America and that this would make him hesitate to violate an agreement.¹¹

These were in essence the main reasons why Beneš undertook his first wartime journey to Moscow in December 1943.

⁷When he visited Roosevelt in June 1943 he spoke warmly for American-Soviet cooperation. Reporting on the results of his talks with the American President in a special meeting of the Czechoslovak cabinet upon his return to London, he said: "I emphasized that there would be no peace until a definite agreement had been reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in a like manner to that existing between the U.S.S.R. and Britain. What happened after the last war must not be repeated, i.e., Russia must not be isolated but she must participate to the full. This matter must be solved as soon as possible also by the United States." From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁸Cf. Eduard Táborský, "A Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 9, p. 379 ff. (January, 1950).

⁹During the time between The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 and the German invasion of Russia, Dr. Beneš was often a target for bitter attacks from the communist underground groups in occupied Czechoslovakia. Cf. the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia dated 15th December, 1940, which accused Beneš of having "placed himself . . . in the service of English imperialism", of "cooperation with the bankrupt Polish nobility," etc. Cf. *Pameti*, p. 213 ff.

¹⁰A long list of documents could be quoted to show that Beneš had no naive illusions about this. Illustrative of his attitude at that time is a paragraph of the message he sent to his collaborators in Czechoslovakia on September 1, 1939: "It is evident that the Soviets expect a social revolution in the spirit of their policy. Therefore we shall have to be careful concerning this. It may well be that they could later on overestimate their chances. I do not think that they judge Western Europe correctly just as they did not in 1918 when they expected a world revolution. Western Europe is socially and economically very strong and will certainly oppose a social revolution very strongly, even if this war will change it quite a lot in that respect. Poland, Germany, and Central Europe are, however, in a much more dangerous situation." From Dr. Beneš' papers.

¹¹"Soviet Russia will have the interest to maintain the cooperation with Anglo-Saxon democracies, which is developing so promisingly, even after this war," he wrote in a message to the Czechoslovak underground as late as July 16, 1944. "She will need their help in many ways. The devastation and the sufferings of Russia are beyond imagination and the Soviet government's main aspiration is the speediest possible reconstruction of the country. That is also the guarantee which makes our treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union so real and so vitally valuable for us. That is why the Soviets will not interfere in our internal conditions any more than in those of other countries." From Dr. Beneš' papers.

Before describing that trip mention should be made of a painful incident illuminating Soviet methods in dealing with their allies.

In the summer of 1943 Beneš paid a visit to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Upon his return to London¹² he advised the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of his intention to go to Moscow and to attend the signing there of a Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Thereupon Eden declared that the British government deemed such a trip inappropriate on the ground that such an agreement between Russia and Czechoslovakia would isolate Poland still more and thus further weaken that country's position.¹³

This came as a shock to Dr. Beneš, for on several previous occasions he had mentioned his plan (to go to Moscow) to the British Ambassador Nichols¹⁴ and had heard no objections. When he came to Washington to see Roosevelt in the summer of 1943, he gave the President a detailed account of his plan to visit Stalin and conclude such a treaty. The Chief Executive expressed his full approval thereof, told Beneš that he himself planned to meet Stalin in the near future and even asked him to explain to Stalin his (i.e. Roosevelt's) attitude in the delicate question of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic Republics.¹⁵

Beneš considered Eden's negative attitude as unwise. He sincerely believed at that time that a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement might even pave the way for a similar arrangement between Russia and Poland.¹⁶ He therefore did not accept Mr. Eden's opinion as final, but continued to urge the British to reconsider.

That is why, on the occasion of yet another lively discussion of that issue on July 1, 1943, Eden showed Beneš a Protocol written a year earlier during Mr. Molotov's visit to London in June 1943 and two other documents. They bore evidence to the effect that Britain and Soviet Russia had agreed not to enter into any agreements with small nations regarding frontiers and other postwar matters until cessation of hostilities.¹⁷

It was obvious that the Russians had offered Beneš to do something they had no right to do. When Beneš expostulated at this strange fact, the Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov at first flatly denied (on July 7, 1943) that

¹²London was the permanent seat of President Beneš and his government in exile during the Second World War.

¹³This took place during their meeting at the Savoy Hotel in London on June 24, 1943.

¹⁴For the first time on May 1, 1942. Mr. Nichols was the British Envoy to Beneš' government in exile.

¹⁵*Pameti*, pp. 285-289, quoting Dr. Beneš' report sent from Washington to Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, in London.

¹⁶According to his wishes a special Protocol was appended to the Treaty to the effect that "any Third Power which was appended to the Czechoslovak Republic or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has been the object of German aggression in this war will be given the opportunity, after mutual agreement between the Governments of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to sign this Treaty, which will thus acquire the character of a tripartite agreement." Cf. the text in Eduard Táborský, *The Czechoslovak Cause* (London, 1944), p. 154.

¹⁷One of these documents was a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Moscow notifying Mr. Eden that the Soviets agreed to refrain from concluding such treaties.

there was any such agreement but three weeks later (on July 29) admitted that such an agreement had indeed been discussed and the Soviets had consented. However, as the British did not subsequently present a formal proposal which, according to Bogomolov's statement, they were supposed to do, the Soviet government deemed itself under no obligation in that respect.

Dr. Beneš was perturbed by this development. His supreme hope was to contribute towards a betterment of East-West relations. Instead, Czechoslovakia had now become an object of discord. The Soviets made an obvious attempt to misuse him in order to shake off an obligation that had become burdensome for them. Though Beneš was eager to have the best possible relations with Russia, he was by no means ready to achieve this at the price of losing British friendship. Thus, despite Bogomolov's heated insistence that he should avail himself of his prerogatives as Head of a sovereign state and disregard British objections, Beneš remained adamant and decided to postpone his journey until the British and Russians had settled their dispute.

At Beneš' specific request the matter was placed on the agenda of the Moscow conference of the three Foreign Ministers, Eden, Hull, and Molotov, which took place in October 1943. It did not look very promising. When Eden left for the Conference, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was notified by the British Foreign Office¹⁸ that it was Eden's intention to insist that no such Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty be signed before the end of the war.

Yet a week later, on October 26, 1943, the Soviet chargé d'affaires Orlov came hurriedly to Beneš and triumphantly informed him that Eden had dropped his objections, so that nothing stood in the way of Beneš' trip to Moscow and the conclusion of the Treaty.

What had made Mr. Eden reverse himself and so suddenly yield to the Russians was not revealed. But the obstacles were cleared and after a ten-day delay, occasioned by bad weather, Beneš started his first war-time journey eastward.

II.

In late 1943 at the time of Beneš' arrival in Moscow, relations between the Soviets and the West appeared highly promising. The Teheran conference had just ended and throughout the allied world hopes were high for a sensible understanding between the Soviet Union and the two Anglo-Saxon Powers. In fact, Stalin omitted no opportunity to extol to Beneš the results of the Big Three conference. With obvious pleasure and self-satisfaction he recounted how "Vinston", as he called Mr. Churchill, had presented him with the symbolic sword dedicated by Coventry to Stalingrad, how they had embraced, overcome with emotion, and kissed each other. He narrated how they had exchanged jokes, how he esteemed Roosevelt and Churchill, what a fine time they all had together, and so forth.

In the summer of 1943, when Beneš was in Washington, Stalin had

¹⁸By Sir Alexander Cadogan on October, 1943.

disbanded the Comintern. While he was in Moscow in December 1943, it was announced that the *Internationale* would be replaced by a new Soviet patriotic anthem, since the *Internationale* "did no longer express the fundamental changes which the Soviet lands had undergone as a result of Soviet victories."¹⁹

All this seemed, in December 1943, to be perfectly natural and sincere, in particular to those who, like Beneš, were convinced that there was no reason why Soviet communism and western democracy could not find fair *modus vivendi*²⁰ despite the differences in their systems and ideologies. Writing in 1953, with the wisdom of hindsight, one can however easily discern how all that fitted into the pattern of Joseph Stalin's plans.

Actually, the performance began even before Beneš set his foot on Soviet soil. When the British plane carrying the President and four members of his suite landed at the R.A.F. base at Habbanyah near Baghdad they were met by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Alexander Korneychuk. Stalin could not have picked a better man for the job. Contrary to most Soviet diplomats, Korneychuk had a most pleasing personality and very affable manners. A Ukrainian, a writer, and inveterate story teller, he never stopped smiling. The weather being very bad, the plane remained grounded for ten days and finally Dr. Beneš had to continue his journey by train from Baku to Moscow (which required four days and four nights). Thus it happened that Beneš spent one and a half weeks talking to the smooth, companionable, cajoling Soviet diplomat Korneychuk. The President was not, of course, one of those easily deceived by charming manners. However, the frankness with which Stalin's emissary broached even the most delicate questions was truly amazing. He spoke with contempt of the "old ideology of leftist trends and deviations which were often abstractly international and had nothing in common with the tradition of the Russian and Ukrainian people."²¹ He pleaded with elated enthusiasm for the brotherly cooperation of the Slavic nations, based, as he stressed repeatedly, on full equality and independence. He admitted that there still were among the Russian communists some specimens of "the old extremist bolshevistic type," but the leaders headed by Stalin himself had the opinions that he, Korneychuk, was describing.

These talks, and more of them during the four long days on the train, made quite an impression on Beneš, as he himself readily admits in his *Memoirs*.²²

Thus when Beneš arrived in Moscow on December 11, 1943, he was in an excellent mood, anticipating with certainty the complete and speedy

¹⁹*Izvestia*, December 21, 1943.

²⁰As is well known, Dr. Beneš had been an ardent advocate of close cooperation between Soviet Russia and western democracies long before Munich. Cf. his *Pameti*, pp. 65 ff., p. 355 ff. Compare also the letters he wrote to Stalin and Molotov on August 6, 1941, in Eduard Táborský, "Beneš and the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 309.

²¹From Dr. Beneš' notes written after each conversation he had with Korneychuk.

²²Cf. *Pameti*, p. 393.

success of his mission. He was received with highest honors. The Kursk Station in Moscow, lavishly decorated with Czechoslovak and Soviet flags, was full of Soviet dignitaries from Molotov and Voroshilov down. Even the aging Litvinov was taken out of cold storage as was the former Ambassador to Britain, Ivan Maisky, since it was rightly believed that Beneš had had cordial relations with them. The Guard of Honor was mustered for a rumbling review. The air was chilly but the atmosphere was full of warm cordiality.

The main event of the day was a banquet given at the Kremlin. There Beneš met Joseph Stalin for the first time in eight years.²³ Many men who met and talked with Stalin those past days of friendly East-West relations, have testified how Stalin could be downright winsome when he wanted to weaken the caution of his victim. He used this magic successfully with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. And he was superb in his encounter with Eduard Beneš.

He trotted across the hall in the Kremlin with an old man's short steps, a jovial smile lighting his wrinkled face, his eyes humorously half-shut, and he commenced immediately with his customary "shutki". There was indeed nothing about him that would betray the "man of steel", the dictator who could ruthlessly liquidate his enemies as well as his former collaborators, who let millions die from hunger rather than yield in his policy of forcible collectivization, the man who had thrown additional millions into jail and labor camps. At that meeting, with his charming roguish smile above the greyish moustache, he looked like a good-natured Dutch Uncle.

This impression was strengthened by the way he acted and negotiated. In dealing with Beneš in 1943 this number one bolshevik really did not look like a man dedicated to any rigid political dogma. He seemed to act in a thoroughly practical way, like a realist, as if he were concerned solely with defeating the Germans, liquidating fascism and creating conditions under which the German aggression could not be repeated. He showed no inclination to diplomatic artifice. He did not beat around the bush; his approach even to the most delicate problems was direct, one might even say abrupt. It was most unorthodox, but it gave a strong impression of frankness.

Beneš was from the first moment a special object of this "directness of approach". It began at their very first meeting on the occasion of the banquet in the Kremlin on December 11. As they sat facing each other at the long Kremlin dinner table, overloaded with exquisite delicacies, Stalin suddenly shot this question at Beneš: "And why didn't you fight in 1938?"

This unexpected sortie caught Beneš, who is otherwise an alert debater, almost completely off guard. What could he answer? The truth was that what finally forced him to yield in 1938 was not only the capitulation of Britain and France, but also the fact that he could not really count on

²³They met for the first time in 1935 on the occasion of signing the Alliance Treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.

effective Soviet assistance. When during the peak days of the crisis in September 1938 Beneš had asked Stalin (through the Soviet Minister in Prague) what aid Soviet Russia was prepared to give under the circumstances, the Kremlin's answer contained no more than a vague promise to help, provided France fulfilled her obligations under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty of Alliance or provided the League of Nations recommended it in accordance with articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant.²⁴ But Stalin knew then as well as Beneš did that France had already thrown in the sponge and that the League was moribund.

Beneš felt that he could not jeopardize his good prospects of an agreement with Russia by telling Stalin, in front of his own generals, the full and undiluted truth. And so, with some difficulty, he limited himself to a recital of reasons connected only with the defeatist attitude of France and Britain in 1938.

Another sample of Stalin's behavior, typical of those days, was served to Beneš during a solemn performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's *The Snow Maiden*, given in Dr. Beneš' honor in the Grand Opera of Moscow. During the intermission Stalin, who came to the theatre incognito, took Beneš to the drawing room adjoining the government box and began to talk about Polish affairs. Polish-Soviet relations were very strained in those days and this was one of Beneš' greatest worries at that time. As mentioned, earlier, the ideal for which he never ceased to fight was a close cooperation, and if possible, a confederation, with Poland, backed by an alliance with the Soviet Union. He saw in this plan the best guarantee of security both for Czechoslovakia and Poland and believed that such an agreement of three Slav countries at the eastern border of Germany ought also to be in the interest of the Soviet Union.

Beneš wrote in his Memoirs about the long conversation he had on this subject with the Polish Prime Minister Mikolajczyk before leaving for Moscow.²⁵ The Polish Prime Minister asked Beneš to explain in Moscow his willingness to make another attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets even at the price of some Polish territorial concessions from the frontiers of 1938. Stalin knew this from Korneychuk who had been informed by Beneš during the delay at Habbanyiah, but he wanted to hear it directly from the President. Above all, the Marshal was anxious to know what Beneš' personal opinion was of Mikolajczyk.

Beneš had a sincere esteem for the Polish Prime Minister and he recommended him with great zeal. Stalin finally announced that Mikolajczyk was entirely acceptable to him as Premier, showed himself willing to return to Poland some smaller territories occupied by the Russians in 1939, gave his assurance that the Soviet Union did not intend to interfere in Polish internal affairs, and even authorized Beneš to explain this position to the Polish

²⁴Cf. Eduard Táborský, "Beneš and the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 304.

²⁵*Pameti*, pp. 399-400.

Prime Minister. Finally, Stalin rose to his feet, took a glass of vodka and proposed that all drink a toast to Mikolajczyk.

Neither Stalin nor Molotov lost a single opportunity to remind Beneš that they had absolutely no idea of interfering in any way with the development of the Czechoslovak domestic affairs. The Treaty that was signed during Beneš' visit contained a specific clause that the High Contracting Parties would "act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty as well as of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State."²⁶ But as if this were not enough, Stalin, Molotov, and others competed with each other to expound this to Beneš as the highest principle of Soviet policy.

"There was not a single occasion during our negotiations here," wrote Beneš from Moscow to Jan Masaryk in London, "where our partners would not emphasize, whenever possible, that our internal affairs did not concern them and that they would not interfere with them."²⁷ To this sentence of Beneš' letter it is necessary to add that Stalin and Molotov not only had non-interference always on the tip of their tongues, but went so far in their wiles that they almost refused to listen whenever Beneš tried to explain how he imagined the future development of things in Czechoslovakia after the war. They wanted to show him how unjust were the accusations of those in the West who suspected them of secret intentions.

The cosy and cordial atmosphere encountered by Beneš on that occasion has had to be described at some length because, however fantastic it may sound, it contributed immensely to his conviction that Stalin might be trusted.²⁸ He repented this many times later and considered his trust in Stalin the biggest mistake he ever made.²⁹ Yet in 1943, and for some time thereafter, he was certain that he was right.

With regard to the subject matter of the Stalin-Beneš negotiations themselves, the first thing to be mentioned is of course the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Postwar Cooperation signed and ratified during Dr. Beneš' sojourn in Moscow.

In essence, it was a treaty of alliance against a possible future aggression on the part of Germany (and countries allied with Germany), similar to that concluded between Britain and the Soviet Union a year previously. Like the Anglo-Soviet Treaty it contained also a specific obligation of non-interference with internal affairs (as mentioned above), a pledge "not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party";³⁰ a promise to "develop their economic

²⁶Article 4. Cf. text in Hubert Ripka, *East and West* (London, 1944), p. 76.

²⁷Cf. *Pameti*, p. 397.

²⁸He repeatedly gave expression to such feeling during his journey. Cf. also *Pameti*, pp. 364 and 394.

²⁹At the end of August 1948, a few days before he died, he sent the present writer a message saying, "My greatest mistake was that I refused to believe to the very last that even Stalin lied to me cynically both in 1935 and later, and that his assurances to me and to Masaryk were an intentional deceit."

³⁰Article 5.

relations upon the broadest possible scale and to afford each other all possible economic assistance after the war";³¹ and, of course, an undertaking of mutual support in the war against Germany and the States "associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe".³²

There were, however, some notable deviations from the Anglo-Soviet pattern, which seemed unimportant in 1943 but which can now be seen in the very different light shed by the subsequent eruption of the "cold war" and the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia.

Thus, while the military aid clause of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty was to remain in force only until the adoption of "proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the postwar period"³³ no such limitation was embodied in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty. While the former pledged mutual aid against *attack*,³⁴ the latter used the considerably broader phrase "in case one of them should, in the post-war period, become involved in hostilities."³⁵ The Anglo-Soviet Treaty clearly limited the alliance to a *casus foederis* arising out of acts perpetrated by "Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe" (which clearly referred only to Germany and her *wartime* European allies).³⁶ The corresponding clause of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty on the other hand refers to Germany and "any of the States which may unite with her directly or in any other form in such a war,"³⁷ which clearly includes any such country whether or not that country had been associated with Germany in the Second World War.

In December 1943, under the circumstances prevailing at that time and with the beliefs he then held regarding East-West relations, Beneš saw of course nothing wrong in this broader scope of the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance. He could not have anticipated that four years later Stalin would invoke that Treaty as an argument against the Czechoslovak participation in Marshall Plan discussions in Paris, interpreting it as intended participation on the part of Czechoslovakia in a coalition aimed against the USSR.³⁸ Still less could he visualize in 1943 that in a few years such a situation would develop as to enable the Kremlin, should it become necessary, to draw Czechoslovakia into a war against her former allies, Britain, France, and the United States. On the contrary, he honestly believed that the treaty had been constructed wholly "within the framework of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 1942."³⁹

³¹Article 4.

³²Article 1.

³³Article 3.

³⁴Article 4.

³⁵This phrasing is highly reminiscent of a corresponding clause in the Italo-German Treaty of Alliance of May 1939, which pledged mutual aid in case one party "becomes involved in warlike complications."

³⁶Articles 3 and 4.

³⁷Article 3.

³⁸Cf. Josef Josten, *op. cit.*, p. 69; Hubert Ripka, *Le Coup de Prague* (Paris, 1949), pp. 50, 61.

³⁹Dr. Beneš stressed this principle in his very first suggestion regarding the Treaty which he made in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador A. Bogomolov on March 19, 1943. From Dr. Beneš' papers.

Another important matter which Dr. Beneš discussed with Stalin was the entry of the Red Army into Czechoslovakia. By late 1943 it was obvious that the Soviet troops would be the first allied Army (or perhaps the only one) to enter Czechoslovak territory and so Beneš wanted to make sure that the Red troops would stay within their limits. The non-interference clause of the Treaty he just ratified was of course applicable to such a situation, but Beneš wanted to play as safe as possible and have everything clear to the last detail.

He therefore brought up this specific issue in a long talk he had with Stalin on December 18, 1943. He requested that Czechoslovak Army units⁴⁰ march into Czechoslovakia with those of the Red Army and that each and every part of Czechoslovak territory be transferred to the Czechoslovak civil administration as soon as such area had been liberated. Stalin agreed immediately and said he would give appropriate orders to the Red Army Commanders.

When making this arrangement Beneš had primarily in mind the easternmost Czechoslovak province of Ruthenia (referred to by the Soviets as Subcarpathian Ukraine) which he expected would be the first Czechoslovak territory to be entered by the Red Army. He considered the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939 to be illegal and had made this amply clear in various declarations since the war began.⁴¹ However, ever since 1939 he had some doubts whether Ruthenia in fact could be recovered. He was certain that Hungary (which seized the territory in 1939) could not keep it, but he was not sure whether the Russians as co-victors might not claim Ruthenia on ethnic grounds as they had done in eastern Poland.

His attitude toward this issue, an attitude which he never changed after 1939, can be summarized as follows: He definitely did not like the idea of giving up that territory and was ready to exert every effort to recover it and to retain it. On the other hand, he did not want to do anything that would alienate the Russians. He thought he must remain on good terms with the Kremlin, for otherwise communists might deliberately create chaos and confusion in Czechoslovakia at the end of the war and might even establish a communist dictatorship. Moreover, he did not see how he could insure his country's security without Soviet support should Germany become a threat once again. Thus, if the price of those good relations with the Kremlin had to be Ruthenia, he was prepared to sacrifice it.

This is why he was eager to discover Soviet intentions in this matter.

As long as the Russians kept flirting with Nazi Germany and frowning at the West it was not feasible⁴² but after the German invasion of Russia in

⁴⁰There was a Czechoslovak brigade in the Soviet Union, composed mainly of Czechoslovak political refugees and Ruthenians who were taken prisoners while fighting in Hungarian units (plus some Soviet citizens of Czech descent from Volhynia).

⁴¹Cf., for instance, his message to the Czechoslovak State Council in London on November 25, 1941, reprinted in *Šest let exilu* (London, 1945).

⁴²Dr. Beneš remained in contact with the Soviet Ambassador Maisky in London even during 1939-41, but that was of course not the time to inquire about Soviet attitude in anything.

1941, the Soviets speedily granted recognition to President Beneš and his government in exile and Beneš decided it was time to raise the issue. He invited the Soviet Ambassador Maisky to see him on August 28, 1941, and described to him his attitude toward this question. According to his own account of the conversation,⁴³ here is what he told Maisky:

"Fundamentally we wish to reestablish our state as it was before Munich. That is: Czech lands, containing also the Sudeten German regions Slovakia and Ruthenia.⁴⁴ We do not exclude small changes, but in substance the Republic will consist of the same parts as before. According to what we hear from the Moscow broadcasts you seem to be following the same policy and have the same line. According to our view Ruthenia will again belong to us, and Slovakia and Sudeten German districts must also be returned to us.

"Maisky asked why we required those districts and if their possession would not prove disadvantageous for us. I told him to look at the post-Munich frontier on the map, and further, that we needed them economically and strategically because we did not know what would happen to Germany, etc. He asked whether we also would insist upon this in the event that Germany would be different after this war, for example revolutionary and socialistic. I replied most decidedly: yes."

And Beneš concluded his account with these words:

"The result of our discussion (to which he consented) was as follows: Ruthenia cannot remain with the Hungarians; the Poles cannot have it; that province can only belong either to Czechoslovakia or to Russia."

As can be seen, Maisky did not commit himself in either way. However, Beneš subsequently was given several official assurances that the Soviets recognized the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia. He attached particular importance to an oral statement he received personally from the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov when the latter visited London in 1942. Beneš had a long conversation with him on June 9, 1942, and preserved a record of this conversation in his papers:

"In the first place I thanked Molotov for Bogomolov's message concerning our pre-Munich frontiers⁴⁵ and I emphasized that only the Soviets were able to see clearly and accurately in such matters.⁴⁶ Molotov confirmed the message to me, adding that the USSR was in favor of pre-Munich frontiers because they could not consent to, or accept, anything which was connected with Munich and its consequences. Molotov ex-

⁴³Written immediately after Maisky left on August 28, 1941. From Beneš' papers.

⁴⁴Italics mine.

⁴⁵That was one of those assurances referred to above, made officially on behalf of the Soviet government by the Soviet Ambassador to the Czechoslovak government.

⁴⁶At that time Beneš still had some trouble with the British who consistently declined to declare the Munich agreement null and void. They eventually did so in August 1942, but even then did not commit themselves to recognise the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia. Cf. Eduard Táborský, *The Czechoslovak Cause* (London, 1944), p. 24 ff.

pressed his satisfaction that their point of view was thereby clearly stated.⁴⁷

Though none of these statements were delivered in writing and Ruthenia was not mentioned by name Dr Beneš was firmly convinced that the Soviets had no intention to claim that province for themselves. This belief was further strengthened by the fact that the Soviet authorities acceded to his request that the Ruthenians who had been drafted in the Hungarian Army and subsequently taken prisoners by the Red Army be allowed to join the ranks of the Czechoslovak Army in Russia. He took it as Soviet recognition of the fact that the Ruthenians were legally citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Thus he felt justified to report to his underground collaborators in March 1943:

"We have a firm agreement with Russia as regards our independence and the integrity of our territory. Russia recognizes our pre-Munich Republic and will help us to renew it in its former shape. Rumors that our Republic will be incorporated into the Soviet Union⁴⁸ are ridiculous because not even the Soviet Union desires it and knows that it would not be in its interest since it would bring it into undesirable controversies with western Europe. . . The union of Slovakia and Ruthenia with the Czech lands is an accomplished fact which no power in the world will prevent. . ."⁴⁹

Realizing, though, that one never can have too many guarantees in such matters, Beneš decided to avail himself of his Moscow journey to pin down the Russians, and especially Stalin himself, to their promises as tightly as he could. He brought with him to Moscow several memoranda which he intended to hand over personally to Stalin or to Molotov. It was yet another example of his caution and his endeavor to eliminate the possibility of any future misunderstanding. He had them translated from the Czech into the Russian language and left them with Molotov at the end of a long talk he had with him on December 16, 1943. One of these documents contained the following clause relative to the status of Ruthenia (which Beneš, using the Russian terminology, called the "Subcarpathian Ukraine"):

"Czechoslovakia will be recognized internationally as the Czechoslovak national state, i.e., a state of Czechs and Slovaks to which there will be attached the Subcarpathian Ukraine with a special autonomous status."⁵⁰

Not only that. When he had his main talk with Joseph Stalin two days later he raised the issue again hoping he might get a confirmation

⁴⁷From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁴⁸This was a reference to rumors spread in Czechoslovakia at that time both by the Nazis and some overzealous communists.

⁴⁹From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁵⁰From Dr. Beneš' papers.

directly from Stalin himself. And he was right. Stalin cut him short and said "Subcarpathian Russia will be returned to Czechoslovakia. We have recognized the pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia and that settles it once and for all."⁵¹

Beneš registered similar success in all the other matters he wanted to discuss with the Soviet leaders. Whatever he asked for was readily granted. He wished to secure military equipment for the Czechoslovak Army which he planned to reinstate on Czechoslovak territory as soon as any portion thereof had been liberated. Stalin promised to assist in this scheme. He even used this opportunity to urge Beneš to get the Czechs to intensify their sabotage against the Germans. "Don't you have vast forests in Czechoslovakia?" he asked Beneš with a tone of reproach in his voice. And he offered to place at his disposal a transmitter to be erected near Smolensk, or Orsha, and provide planes to parachute agents behind the German lines, in short to do everything that might further active resistance against the Germans.

Beneš asked also for Soviet support for his plans to transfer the Sudeten Germans to Germany. In one of the above mentioned memoranda left with Molotov he explained the main principles of his plan. Both Molotov and Stalin promised full help. "That is a trifle, that's easy!" was Molotov's reaction when Beneš explained his proposal of having something like two million or more Sudeten Germans moved into the Reich.⁵² And Stalin even went beyond this. Toward the close of their meeting on December 18 he took Beneš to a huge map of Europe which hung in his Kremlin office. On that map he had already marked the eastern frontiers of a future Germany in red pencil. There was the territory of East Prussian Königsberg marked off for Russia. There was the Oder-line as a boundary between Germany and Poland. And when Beneš remarked that the Poles figured their territory should extend to the river Neisse in the Southeast, Stalin took his red pencil and readily assigned that area to the Poles. While still holding his pencil, he asked Beneš what he wanted for Czechoslovakia.

Beneš was not one of those who wanted to grab as much foreign territory as possible. He was even prepared to trade some Czechoslovak frontier areas for German districts if that could straighten out the boundary and facilitate the transfer of the Germans. He mentioned this in one of his memoranda left with Molotov.⁵³ When now with his pencil ready, Stalin was waiting for Beneš to express his wish, the Czechoslovak President repeated that he would only desire to straighten somewhat the boundary line and as an example thereof he pointed to the Glatz region. Hardly concealing his astonishment at Beneš' moderation Stalin marked off that region for Czechoslovakia.⁵⁴

⁵¹An entry in the author's private diary of the Moscow journey.

⁵²An entry in the author's diary.

⁵³He thought that an exchange of a few densely populated Czech frontier districts for some thinly populated German border areas would facilitate the transfer of the Sudeten Germans and also make the idea more acceptable to western public opinion.

⁵⁴In the end the *Glatz* region was assigned to Poland.

Under such circumstances it can hardly be surprising that Beneš returned from Moscow in January 1944 with an unshakable belief that all was well and the future of his country was safe. "We came to a complete agreement about everything!" he triumphantly explained when returning from his final talk with Stalin on December 18, 1943, to the quarters where he stayed with his suite during his sojourn in the Soviet capital. And his highly optimistic speech broadcast from Moscow to Czechoslovakia in which he gave his people a report of his journey was a true expression of what he then sincerely believed.⁵⁵ So were all the secret messages he sent to his underground collaborators in Czechoslovakia around that time. Here is, for example, what he wrote to his collaborators at home after his return from Moscow to London:

"The Moscow negotiations, signing of the Treaty and talks with all the leading Soviet representatives have given me complete satisfaction. The Russians will support us in all the principal questions regarding the security of the Republic and as far as it concerns them they are maintaining an absolutely positive attitude as regards our international affairs. This covers also the full recognition of the independent pre-Munich Republic, of our pre-Munich frontiers, the realization of a common Czechoslovak-Soviet frontier in Ruthenia, carrying out the transfer of the guilty minority population from the Republic on the largest scale possible, full respect for our sovereignty, and non-interference in our internal affairs.

"The USSR does not stipulate any conditions for cooperation with us. It recognized the loyal policy of the Republic in respect to them during the prewar period and believes that our nation stands wholly and sincerely behind the policy which is expressed in our treaty. It is, by the way, the culmination of the efforts which our national revivalists have cultivated during the most difficult periods of our history in the Czech and Slovak lands. The Soviet Union believes that the Republic will remain democratic and progressive and that it will maintain social justice, and that its only interest is to carry out as quickly as possible in unity and peace all necessary constitutional, administrative, economic, and social reforms that postwar conditions will require and again become the first and best organized state of Central Europe. How far-reaching these reforms will be depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of our people and upon European conditions in general. It does not mean any communizing of the State, but a progressive reform of economic and social conditions.

"The Soviet Union does not request anything special from us. Our policy will simply be the policy of our democratic majority. We agreed upon postwar economic cooperation, we prepared a detailed military agreement with respect to our future armaments, unification of mili-

⁵⁵Cf. text in *Šest let exilu*, p. 141.

tary doctrines, standardization of weapons and mutual aid. . ."⁵⁶

In the same vein he described his negotiations with Stalin when, returning from Moscow to London, he accepted Mr. Churchill's invitation to stop at Marrakesh in French Morocco where the British Prime Minister was recuperating from a sharp attack of pneumonia which he had contracted after the Teheran Conference. Churchill was deeply impressed with what Beneš had to report and was particularly pleased to hear of Stalin's willingness to settle the Polish-Soviet controversy. He asked the Czechoslovak President to inform Mr. Eden in London and to help convince the Poles that they ought to accept the Soviet offer.⁵⁷

III.

Beneš' jubilant optimism lasted for about eight months. They were the eight happiest months in his life since the curtain began to fall in 1938. The Munich humiliation was wiped out, the Nazi empire was about to collapse and its Fascist jackal already lay prostrate. Beneš' consistent policy of East-West collaboration had seemingly been vindicated by events, his country's future seemed fully secured.

Yet by August 1944, new worries came, soon to be followed by even more serious matters which filled Beneš' mind with uneasiness and gravely shook his faith in Stalin's promises.

At that time the Red Army was already poised on a wide front along the Polish-Czechoslovak border and it was obviously only a matter of a short time before they would enter Czechoslovak territory. It was then that the Commander-in-Chief of the puppet Slovak Army, a General Catloš, made an attempt to save himself by selling out Slovakia to the Soviets. What was on his mind is amply clear from the secret message he sent to the Soviets at the beginning of August 1944⁵⁸ and which included the following two self-explanatory paragraphs:

"Slovak military dictatorship would find understanding and support in all classes of the population whereby the situation would immediately be stabilized and order maintained. Slovak declaration of war on the USSR and the allies would be cancelled and simultaneously war would be declared on Hungary, which would make the new regime at once popular. Overnight German military and civilian measures in Slovakia would be eliminated and possibilities created for big Soviet operations. *The prerequisite therefore is, however, that the Slovak army would retain its character as an independent national army, while becoming part of the armies of the USSR and cooperating with Czechoslovak units on the basis of independence. Otherwise controversies and serious conflicts would arise.*"

⁵⁶From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁵⁷Cf. *Pameti*, p. 404.

⁵⁸His delegation, accompanied by K. Šmidke, the leading man of the Slovak Communist Party, left by plane on August 2, 1944, for the Soviet advance base at Vinnitza, from where they were sent to Moscow.

And the other paragraph concerned read like this:

"The secret organization of Slovak bolsheviks would take care of mutual contact with the Soviets, though for the time being, in the interests of the natural course of events and of gaining the whole people, it would not do so openly. Anyhow, *the state-political consequences would ensue after the end of the war, so that the Slovak political matters might be solved in accordance with the interests of the USSR.* As regards the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreements hitherto concluded, the Slovaks ought to be given right to take an independent standpoint. Therefore the Slovak-Soviet contact ought to be direct."⁵⁹

The Soviets never appraised Beneš of this treacherous deed of the Slovak quisling General. Instead, they began negotiating with Catloš behind the President's back. Fortunately, he learned about it in time from an anti-Communist member of the delegation who managed to contact the Czechoslovak Military Attaché in Moscow Colonel Pika (executed by the communists after they seized power in 1948).

Beneš, greatly dismayed, lodged a sharp protest which indeed caused the Soviets to abandon the negotiations. Nevertheless, the explanation offered by the Soviet Ambassador Lebediev on September 5, 1944, was not very comforting. "The negotiations were led by the Communist Party," the Soviet Envoy told Beneš blushing. "The Soviet government had nothing in common with that."⁶⁰

Soon afterwards occurred another example of how little Stalin's pledges could be relied upon. In September 1944 an uprising was staged in mountainous Slovakia in the rear of the German Armies. The uprising was organized in agreement with President Beneš and on the understanding that aid would be forthcoming from the Soviets (who repeatedly kept clamoring for more active resistance to the Nazis.) But instead of sending effective help as he had promised Beneš in Moscow in December 1943 Stalin sent his agents to reconnoitre the situation. They left and nothing happened. Upon repeated, desperate entreaties of Beneš, Stalin consented to have some ammunition and machine guns parachuted to the rebels. In the end when the situation was already beyond rescue Stalin allowed a Czechoslovak paratroop brigade to be dropped in the area.

Largely due to this lack of Soviet cooperation—the Red Army made no attempt to come to the rescue—the attempt collapsed in the same way as the well-known Warsaw uprising of the Polish underground in August 1944.⁶¹

⁵⁹From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁶⁰Entry in the author's diary.

⁶¹In his despair Dr. Beneš tried to obtain aid from American military quarters and indeed the American planes based in southern Italy began to cooperate. However, this aid was suddenly stopped "on higher orders," (presumably because Slovakia was considered as "Soviet zone of operation").

IV.

The worst breach of faith which occurred between the two journeys Beneš made to Moscow was, however, the rape of Ruthenia. As previously stated Beneš took great pains to obtain clarity as to Soviet intentions toward that province. And after his first visit to Moscow and the assurance he got from Stalin he felt he had no reason whatsoever to worry on that count. Moreover, the arrangement he made with Stalin regarding the transfer of liberated territories into the hands of the Czechoslovak civil administration had been translated into a written agreement signed on May 8, 1944.⁶²

When the first Russians entered Czechoslovak territory, it looked at first as if everything would work out according to all these arrangements. In October 1944 the Red Army began to penetrate into Ruthenia and on the 27th of the month they took its Capital Užhorod. The Czechoslovak governmental delegation, headed by Minister Němec, was permitted to establish headquarters on the liberated territory and the administration of the first portion of Czechoslovak territory liberated from the Nazis was handed over to it. Beneš' hopes again rose high; the unsavory Catloš incident and the Soviet failure to help the Slovak uprising were almost forgotten.

However, highly alarming reports soon began to arrive at Beneš' headquarters in London. They spoke of communist agents taking over with the open backing of the Red Army; of local mayors being forced to sign petitions that their communities wished to be incorporated in the Soviet Ukraine; of Ruthenians being forcibly drafted into the Soviet Army; of our Government Delegation being literally interned and even robbed of its funds by troopers of local Ruthenian Soviet-sponsored authorities while the Soviet guards stood by inert; of anti-communists being arrested and deported by the NKVD. The Czechoslovak government delegation was not even granted permission to establish radio-telegraphic contact with Beneš in London and all messages had to go via Moscow despite an explicit earlier Soviet promise of free communications between Beneš and his government delegation. (Whatever direct messages were obtained by Beneš from Ruthenia at that time were sent through secret underground radio stations by people who literally risked their lives to send them.) On top of all that, the Soviet radio stations began to quote telegrams sent to Stalin from Ruthenia declaring that "it was the eternal dream of Ruthenia to live in one family with the Ukrainian people"⁶³ and the like. And similar telegrams were received by Beneš' office in London, asking "reunion with the Ukrainian brothers on the other side of the Carpathian Mountains."⁶⁴

The situation was perhaps best summarized in the following gloomy report from the Czechoslovak government delegation received in December 1944:

⁶²Cf. text in *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. 4, pp. 203-4 (July 1944).

⁶³A message dated November 7, 1944, reported by the monitoring service both of the Czechoslovak government in London and of the British government.

⁶⁴From Dr. Beneš' papers.

"The handing over of the administration is nothing but mystification. National Committees abuse their power. The Ruthenian National Committee was created without any agreement with the Governmental Delegate. It declared itself a Government, passed a resolution that Ruthenia would secede from Czechoslovakia and ordered the Czechoslovak Governmental Delegation to leave the region. All is lost."⁶⁵

Beneš was deeply shocked by these repeated acts of Soviet faithlessness. Nevertheless, so staunch was his trust in Stalin's word that he at first refused to believe that the men in the Kremlin had deceived him. He thought that the local Soviet commanders must have misunderstood their instructions, that, as he said in the instructions he sent to the Czechoslovak Government Delegate on December 12, 1944, "these matters did not suit Moscow very much, they did not like to see them happen just as our Government did not, and they would like to dispose of them in a conciliatory manner."⁶⁶ He sought to exonerate Moscow and place the main blame on Ukrainian nationalism. ". . . it appears to me," he wrote in the same message, "that the Ukrainian Government, Ukrainian soldiers and especially the Ukrainian Communist Party is intentionally proceeding differently. It wants to confront Moscow and ourselves with accomplished facts." He protested, pleaded, offered face-saving arrangements, but by the end of December 1944 he realized Ruthenia was lost. On December 19, 1944, the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, Fierlinger,⁶⁷ whom Beneš had instructed to protest against the behavior of the Red Army in Ruthenia, sent the following report about his talk with V. Zorin of the Soviet Foreign Office (the man who came to "supervise deliveries of Soviet wheat" when the communists were taking over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and who was later appointed as Chief Soviet Delegate to the U.N.):

"As we have promised you and as it is stipulated in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty we are not entitled and we do not wish to interfere in your internal affairs. Therefore it is difficult for us to help you in solving your problems in Subcarpathian Ukraine."

Ten days later another report came which confirmed beyond any possible doubt that the above was no accidental remark of Zorin, but an authoritative expression of Soviet policy regarding Ruthenian events. At this time Němec, the Government Delegate himself, reported on his visit to Molotov and Vyshinsky in Moscow. "One cannot expect" Molotov was quoted as saying, "that the Soviet Union would oppose a spontaneous expression of the free will of a people feeling close affinity with the Ukrainian nation."⁶⁸

⁶⁵From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁶⁶From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁶⁷A "fellow-traveling" Social Democrat who later became Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, preceding the Communist leader Gottwald in that function.

⁶⁸Both documents from Dr. Beneš' papers.

Beneš shuddered when he read such cynical distortions of the facts. He knew then that he was betrayed. The same clause of non-interference designed to protect his country from Soviet meddling with Czechoslovak domestic affairs was being misused through an almost unbelievably twisted interpretation for as crude an interference as one could imagine. The instrument intended to protect the integrity of Czechoslovakia was used to destroy it.

Even the Kremlin must have realized, on second thoughts, that they pushed Beneš too fast and Stalin sent him a personal letter which read as follows:

"Personal.

Dear Mr. President,

Today I have been informed by comrade Gottwald that the Czechoslovak government is worried in regard to happenings in Subcarpathian Ukraine, presuming that the Soviet Government intends unilaterally to solve the question of Subcarpathian Ukraine, despite the agreement existing between the two countries.

I must tell you that if you have obtained such an opinion, it is founded on misunderstanding.

The Soviet Government has not forbidden and could not have forbidden the population of Subcarpathian Ukraine to express their national will. And this is even more comprehensible as you yourself have told me in Moscow that you were prepared to cede the Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union.⁶⁹ As you will certainly remember, at that time I did not give my consent to it.

The fact that the Soviet Union has not forbidden Subcarpathian Ukrainians to express their will does not mean that the Soviet government has the intention to break the agreement between our countries and thus unilaterally solve the question of the Subcarpathian Ukraine. Such an opinion would be offending the Soviet Government.

As, however, the question was raised by the population of Subcarpathian Ukraine itself, it will be necessary to solve it. But this question can only be solved by an agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union either before the end of the war with Germany or after it, according to how both governments will deem it suitable.

I beg you to believe that the Soviet government has no intention whatsoever of harming the Republic of Czechoslovakia or its prestige. On the contrary, the Soviet government is fully prepared to give the

⁶⁹This is inaccurate. When Stalin's letter was received, the present writer asked Dr. Beneš about this and was told most emphatically that he never offered Stalin to cede him Ruthenia. On the contrary, before he ever came to talk about the said province with Stalin, he handed Molotov a written memorandum where he made it quite clear that he wanted to keep Ruthenia. (Cf. part II of this article). However, Dr. Beneš, whenever speaking about this matter with the Soviet statesmen and diplomats, always used the introductory formula that Ruthenia could not remain in Hungary and could belong to none but Czechoslovakia or Russia (cf. his talk with Maisky under II *supra*). Thus Stalin was indeed justified in believing that Beneš would yield the province *if he had to*.

Czechoslovak Republic every possible assistance for its liberation and reconstruction.

Yours truly,
J. Stalin.
23rd January, 1945."⁷⁰

Beneš replied on January 28, 1944:

"Mr. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars,

Kindly accept sincere thanks for your personal message of 23rd January.

My special thanks are due to you for expressing your point of view so clearly and in such a definite form which enables me on my part to express my point of view just as clearly. It responds to the sincere and friendly relations between our two countries and peoples.

I admit that *in certain of our circles* uneasiness has been caused by events in the Subcarpathian Ukraine.

These events were of *purely local character* and were assisted by *purely local factors*. In addition to this there were some announcements broadcast by the Kiev radio, which were misused by the international press and by opponents of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

Nevertheless, I assure you most emphatically, Mr. Chairman, that neither I personally nor the Czechoslovak government has for a moment suspected that the Soviet Government desired to solve the question of the Subcarpathian Ukraine unilaterally or had the intention of violating the agreement between our two states. I am thoroughly acquainted with the principles of the policy of the Soviet Union and I know that such action on their part can be definitely excluded. I therefore beg you to believe my words.

Further, I fully agree with you that this question should be solved by agreement between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and according to "how both governments will deem it suitable," as you expressed in your message. And we would desire that this should take place after the conclusion of the war against Germany, that is after our pre-Munich frontiers with Germany and Poland had been ensured and after I am in a position to discuss this matter with our people in Praha. I would add to this two remarks:

1. I have not changed my standpoint in respect to this question since the moment I discussed it for the first time with your Ambassador in London, I. Maisky, in September 1939⁷¹ and I will not change it in the future. In this sense I will also explain my attitude in Praha.

2. From our side this question will not be made the object of discussions or interventions with other Great Powers and we wish to attend

⁷⁰Translated from the Russian original by the author. From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁷¹Here is what Dr. Beneš wrote as having said to Maisky on that occasion regarding Ruthenia: "We shall settle the question of Ruthenia later and we will certainly come to an agreement about it." *Paměti*, p. 207.

the Peace Conference having entirely settled this question in complete friendship with you. As I and the Government view this matter, this question will never be the cause for misunderstanding between us.

At the end of your message you inform me that the Soviet government has no intentions whatsoever to harm the interests of the Czechoslovak Republic, but on the contrary is fully prepared to render every assistance in its liberation and reconstruction. I am truly thankful to you for those words. I wish to emphasize that the Soviet Union is already bringing those words to realization through the immense and amazing actions of the Red army during many past months and by the political support which it, on various important occasions (as, for example, lastly during negotiations with Hungary), has always so readily given us. The Czechoslovak people is fully aware of this. Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to express at this opportunity that there is no other nation who appreciates it more than the people of Czechoslovakia and there is no other state who fosters such sincere feelings of real friendship towards the Soviet Union as does the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

Yours respectfully, Dr. Edvard Beneš.⁷²

It seems hardly necessary to explain why Beneš wrote that letter the way he did. Its whole tenor reveals better than any document how deeply the Soviet-Czechoslovak relations had sunk since the days of Beneš' triumphant return from his first visit in Moscow in 1943. His state of mind on things Russian in January 1945 was a plain "let's save what we can." The Red Army was already deep in his country's territory. The Czech and Slovak communist leaders were ready to take over should Moscow give the hint.⁷³ With the support of the Red Army, (sometimes direct and sometimes indirect), they had already begun to terrorize their political opponents in Slovakia. The "will of the people" could be put to work by the Kremlin in the rest of Czechoslovakia on the same pattern as in Ruthenia any time they would choose to do so. As was evident from developments all over the area of Soviet penetration, the Western Powers obviously did not want to go beyond platonic protests in the face of the broken Soviet pledges. And the sad fate of Poland was to Beneš a warning of what was held in store for a country which sought to oppose the Russians.

Thus Beneš thought there was no other course open to him but to fight a retreating battle, to give in where he had to, prove again and again how loyal he had been and would be toward the Soviets, to try to pin Stalin down to his promises by professing trust in them—and for the rest, hope that Stalin would not want to lose the important asset of Anglo-Saxon cooperation by pushing events in Czechoslovakia too far.

⁷²Translated from the final Czech draft which was then translated into the Russian and sent as Russian original. From Dr. Beneš' papers.

⁷³Some Slovak communists, not initiated into the Kremlin's plans, did commence to work for the proclamation of a Soviet Slovak Republic. Only when some of their leaders came from Moscow with instructions that the Czechoslovak Republic be preserved, did they abandon their plans.

V.

Considering all that happened between Beneš and the Russians in 1944 and in the first two months of 1945, and in view of events in the rest of Soviet-liberated eastern Europe, one can easily imagine Beneš' feelings when he was leaving, on March 11, 1945, for his second wartime visit to the Kremlin from which he was then to proceed to Košice, the liberated capital of eastern Slovakia. Typical of his mood at that time is the following paragraph of his personal account of the farewell luncheon he had with Prime Minister Churchill at his country seat at Chequers:

"Before lunch we were alone for a while. Churchill began by saying: 'I heard that you have some fears of what the Soviets and the Red Army might do to your country.' I confirmed that I had certain worries, not fears. I did all that was possible: I concluded a Treaty with Moscow, I pursued democratic domestic policy—I could do no more. I hope it will be possible to keep matters under control."⁷⁴

As if all these troubles were not enough yet another stroke of bad luck came just before Beneš could depart for Moscow. Though his health had been good throughout the years of exile on the eve of his departure he suddenly collapsed. He recovered quickly, and the doctors did not then consider the matter to be serious. However, he never fully regained his earlier vigor and energy. In fact, that was the beginning of the disease which finally caused his death in September 1948 and which greatly reduced his strength and his resolve during the crucial test of February 1948.

When Beneš arrived in Moscow on March 17, 1945, he was received with the same high honors as when he came in 1943. Again it fell to Molotov to bid him welcome with his usual stony smile. The same "osobniak" (sort of "Blair House") on *Ostrovského* street was given him and his suite for their living quarters, there were the same type of official banquets and theatrical performances. But the outward similarity of the two visits made even stronger the contrast between the tight atmosphere of 1945 and the easy-going and friendly meeting of 1943. Nor could Stalin's customary *shutki* in any substantial way relieve the tension.

Beneš' negotiations were initiated by a visit he paid to Stalin on March 19, 1945. The main topic of the talk was military matters. Despite his previous disappointments Beneš tried again to secure from Stalin equipment for the Czechoslovak Army, for he knew how important it would be for him to be able to rely on his own army in the unstable and chaotic times following the liberation. Stalin promised as readily as he did in 1943 and declared that equipment for ten divisions was available. And one might add that this proved to be one of those very few promises he really did fulfill. Otherwise, the talk dealt with generalities.

Whatever negotiations proper there were to be made, were this time handled by Molotov. It was symptomatic how much matters had changed

⁷⁴From Dr. Beneš' papers.

between the two visits. In 1943 the main negotiations were conducted directly between Stalin and Beneš, and only preliminary talks or again arrangements of details were settled with Molotov. In 1945 it looked as if Stalin, having already obtained what he wanted, would not bother to waste his time with someone who had already become of much lesser importance to him than in 1943.

Thus the two meetings with Molotov on March 21 and 24 became the main Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations of Dr. Beneš' second visit to Moscow. Molotov's main interest was centered on Ruthenia. The Red Army was already in firm possession of the province. The Czechoslovak Government delegation had left for Slovakia and made no attempt to administer the territory. In his letter to Stalin, quoted above, Beneš made it quite obvious that he was prepared to yield and let the Soviets have it. But all that did not seem enough. Probably the Kremlin grew suspicious because in his letter to Stalin Beneš did not say explicitly that he agreed to cede Ruthenia but chose rather to settle the matter at the end of the war.

When the Czechoslovak President came to see Molotov about that issue on March 24, 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister had before him on his desk a complete dossier containing reports about all the talks which Beneš had with Soviet statesmen and diplomats ever since 1939. Evidently, it was supposed to serve as a sort of a "gun behind the door"⁷⁵ in case Beneš were reluctant to comply with Molotov's desire that he confirm in writing his willingness to give up the province. Beneš of course agreed to do so. His only concern at that time was to delay the formal cession of Ruthenia until he returned to Prague and could discuss the matter with others. (He adhered to this decision despite the ferocious insistence of Gottwald and his comrades who wanted him to cede Ruthenia at once.)

Beneš used the opportunity of this discussion to obtain from Molotov an assurance that the boundary would be drawn along the original dividing line between Slovakia and Ruthenia. He had a reason for this. For there were persistent rumors at that time that the Russians would claim, as belonging to Ruthenia, a portion of eastern Slovakia as well.

Another disagreeable topic was discussed in those meetings with Molotov: The question of the so-called "war booty". When the Red Army entered Czechoslovakia it began to seize, lock, stock and barrel, all industrial plants, and supplies of raw materials administered by the Germans claiming it was their legitimate war booty. Since all Czech plants and enterprises of any importance were placed under the German administration after the Nazi annexation of the Czech lands, such a Soviet policy meant that Czechoslovakia's industrial wealth was pillaged for the second time within seven years, first by the Nazis and now by the Soviets.

As soon as he was informed of this behavior, Beneš instructed Fierlinger to get the Soviets to change this policy, but there were no results. And so

⁷⁵Though in none of these talks had there been any real promise to cede the province to Russia.

it was left for Beneš to attend to this as so many other things whenever the going was rough. In his very first talk with Molotov he insisted as strongly as he could that such practice be abandoned. Finally, Molotov yielded and promised that the Russians "would think of a new formula". And indeed on the eve of Dr. Beneš' departure from Moscow a new protocol was signed, somewhat improving the matter.⁷⁶

In one thing Molotov was most generous. As did Stalin in 1943, the Soviet Foreign Minister again invited Beneš to speak out and say what slices of German territory he wanted. And he was just as disappointed as Stalin was in 1943 when Beneš did not want any. "We do not want the Germans in, we want them out," he said and explained to Molotov once again his idea of the transfer of the Sudeten Germans, reminding the Soviet Foreign Minister of the Soviet promise of active support for such a plan given in 1943.⁷⁷ Yet the earlier eagerness with which the Russians promised their help was gone. Molotov did not commit himself in any way, he just "had understanding" for the problem.⁷⁸

Not everything was black though during this second visit to Moscow. There were a few brighter points which gave some hope that democracy had still a chance in Czechoslovakia. To begin with, Stalin and Molotov still spoke of Roosevelt and Churchill with great respect, meaning they still had high praise for the aid they obtained from the West. At an official banquet given in Beneš' honor at Moscow's Spřidínovka on March 20, 1944, Molotov made a most cordial reference to the cooperation of the Big Three, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, and proposed to drink to its future continuation. And at the usual farewell banquet in the Kremlin Stalin himself made two short speeches which almost reminded one of the good old days of 1943. In the first one the Red Marshal did what was most unusual for him. In front of the communist top brass he publicly apologized for the misconduct of the Red Army in Czechoslovakia:

"You drank toasts to the audacious, glorious, heroic Red Army and everyone honors the Red Army in this manner when speaking of their battles. But it is not an army of angels. As every army, the Red Army has also committed acts of wantonness. It is, however, necessary to comprehend this. We have already mobilized more than twelve million people. Those people have actually accomplished great and heroic deeds, but it is necessary to realize that they came from Stalingrad to the vicinity of Berlin. The war is not finished yet, and some of them presume that they can still be killed. Therefore, one cannot be surprised that, after all that they have seen and lived through, they commit errors and cause disorder. Everyone speaks of the Red soldier as a hero and so he feels himself a hero. He therefore thinks that, being a hero,

⁷⁶In essence, it was provided that only such enterprises would fall under "war booty" as the Germans had transferred to Czechoslovakia or built there since the beginning of their occupation of the country.

⁷⁷Cf. *Pameti*, pp. 330, 361-62.

⁷⁸An entry in the author's diary.

he must be forgiven as a hero. One must have understanding and view it indulgently. I know that many misunderstandings will still occur and that the Red Army will still commit many acts of wantonness on your territory. You know, in this army are many people, and just those who are uneducated consider themselves heroes and are misusing this honor. That our mutual friendship may not be disturbed, it is essential to comprehend that the army is not composed of angels. Grasp this and forgive them."⁷⁹

In his second speech he explained his conception of "neo-Slavism":

"I am raising my glass to drink a toast to all neo-Slavs. I especially accentuate it—to new Slavs—to differentiate it from the old conception of slavism as Aksakov, the pioneer of Czaristic slavism has preached. As is known the substance of that form of slavism was to unite all Slavs under the Czaristic regime. It would have meant that every Slav nation would have accepted the Russian state constitution and would have had to adapt its entire state life to the Russian system irrespective of its individuality and characteristics. We, Bolsheviks, or you can say communists, have another idea of slavism. We wish that all will be allied irrespective if small or large, but that *every nation will preserve its independence and regulate its internal life according to its ideology and tradition, be they good or bad*. It rests with each state individually how it arranges it.

I hate Germans. Slavs footed the bill for the first world war and also the second world war is being solved at their expense. In the first world war the English and the French fought the Germans, but the Slavs paid dearly for that. And finally the Germans were put on their feet again to form the so-called European balance of power. Also in the present world war everything is being solved at the Slavs' expense. The French have opened the door for the Germans, the Germans have occupied a part of France and a part remained unoccupied and Belgium and Holland have also failed (Stalin accompanied these words with a disdainful gesture of hands). England is an island and could therefore hold out. And who suffered again? Germans threw themselves at the Slavs and Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Russians, and Yugoslavs paid dearly for it. Only the Bulgarians thought that if they remained neutral they would escape the storm. But it proved neither honorable nor profitable. But this time we will break the Germans so that never again will attacks against Slavs be repeated. We are attempting to make them harmless.

"The Soviet Union wants nothing else than to gain allies who will always be prepared to resist the German danger. The Soviet Union will not interfere in the internal affairs of its allies. I know that even among you there are such who doubt it. *Perhaps even you are a little dubious*,

⁷⁹There is no authentic text of these two extemporaneous toasts by Stalin. They were noted down by a person present at the dinner. From Dr. Beneš' papers.

but I give the assurance that we will never interfere in the internal affairs of our allies. Such is Lenin's neo-slavism, which we bolshevik communists are following. There can be no talk of a 'hegemony of the Soviet Union'."

In 1943, such speeches would have made Beneš most enthusiastic. In 1945 they were to him just a spark of hope that Stalin may have realized there were some limits to what he could and could not do.

All those meetings and dealings with Stalin and Molotov were, however, only the lesser part of Beneš' work in Moscow in 1945. The main purpose of his journey was to form a new Cabinet which would then proceed to the liberated part of Czechoslovakia.

During his first visit to Moscow in December 1943 he had several long discussions with the quadrumvirate of Czech communist leaders in exile in Moscow, Gottwald, Slánský, Šverma, and Kopecký.⁸⁰ The communists declined at that time to join his cabinet in London⁸¹ and insisted that a brand new cabinet would have to be formed when the time had come to go home. They urged that such a cabinet be headed by "a man of the left" and communist representation on it be commensurate to the anticipated strength of the party.

When thus by 1945 the time came to return to Czechoslovakia it was agreed that a new cabinet should be formed in Moscow of representatives of the four major parties which were reconstituted in exile, i.e. the Czech Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, Czech Socialist Party, and the non-socialistic People's Party, plus representatives of the two parties which were established in liberated Slovakia, i.e., the Communist Party of Slovakia and the non-socialistic Democratic Party.⁸² The negotiations conducted in Moscow to that effect were, however, completely dominated by Gottwald and his associates. When the delegates of the other parties arrived in Moscow Gottwald presented them with a neatly mimeographed 32 page copy of their own complete "program of the government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks". There was some tough opposition to some of the points of this program by the Czech Socialist Party and the People's Party, but only minor changes were made and the program was subsequently proclaimed in the first session of the new cabinet in its provisional headquarters at Košice in eastern Slovakia.

Gottwald and his comrades had prepared also a list of the new cabinet with cabinet posts tentatively distributed among the parties. They had the "Social democrat" Fierlinger for the Premiership and never tired of stressing how unselfish it was on their part that they did not claim that function for a communist. The selected for themselves and their Slovak Party comrades the most important ministries, in particular those which carried most influence in domestic affairs. After some tough bargaining they got all they

⁸⁰They are discussed at length in his *Paměti*, pp. 405 ff.

⁸¹Dr. Beneš offered them two seats in his London Cabinet.

⁸²No other parties were allowed at that time.

wanted except the Ministry of Justice which they had to yield to the Czech Socialists.

The result was that the key position of power, the Ministry of the Interior controlling the whole apparatus of internal administration fell into communist hands. So did the ministries of information and of education, leaving in their hands a powerful weapon of thought control; and the ministry of agriculture which could gain them credit among the peasants through distribution of land confiscated from the Sudeten Germans. They claimed and obtained another most important position of power, the Ministry of Defense, for one of their fellow-travelers, General Svoboda, a man whom, as commander of the Czechoslovak brigade in Russia, they had built from an unimportant Lieutenant-Colonel into an almost legendary hero. And they got their man, the Slovak Communist Vlado Clementis, appointed as Deputy Foreign Minister to watch Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Finally the top men of the Czech and Slovak communist parties, Gottwald and Široky, became deputy premiers.⁸³

Thus Beneš returned to Czechoslovakia from Moscow with a cabinet in which the most important positions were held by communists or their fellow-travelers. How could he have consented to all that, one may ask. The answer lies in the situation prevailing at that time in Czechoslovakia as well as in the relations between Soviet Russia and the Western powers. The Red Army was deep in Czechoslovakia and with its backing the communists were ruthlessly liquidating their democratic opponents. The same process was going on throughout the rest of eastern Europe. Western diplomatic protests and reminders of promises given at Teheran and at Yalta could not change the situation and the behavior of Britain and the United States in 1945 clearly indicated that they did not intend to do more than just that.

Under such circumstances Beneš simply could not afford to form a cabinet without communist participation. He was afraid that such a procedure would have meant a civil war with overwhelming odds in favor of the communists. Gottwald and company knew all that. They knew that Beneš had to have them in the cabinet—at any price. He had no choice but between two evils. He chose the one he thought to be the lesser of the two, hoping that he would be able to restore the balance later on.

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⁸³Cf. the complete list in Josten, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

NOTES

A special course on the Iron Curtain countries was held at New York University June 23 to July 30, under the auspices of the university's Institute of Public Affairs and Regional Studies, in cooperation with the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Professor Cyril E. Black of Princeton University acted as coordinator of the course. Among the lecturers were a number of distinguished former ministers of Central European countries: Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, former Prime Minister of Poland; Ladislav Feierabend, former minister of agriculture of Czechoslovakia; Hubert Ripka, former Minister of Foreign Commerce of Czechoslovakia; Geza Teleki, former Hungarian minister of religion and public education. Among other lecturers were: Branko Peselj, member of the Croatian Peasant Party, Jan Wszelaki, former economic adviser to the Polish foreign office, Arnold Zürcher, Director of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and Professor Black.

* * *

The Bonn Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutschen Fragen has been publishing for several years a series of studies of developments in the Soviet Zone of Germany which merit notice. Just as the hopes of West Germany for eventual union with East Germany are perfectly understandable, so it is natural that the citizenry of West Germany should be informed as to how their fellow Germans are faring as seen by close students of economics, agriculture, health, food, labor conditions, religion and education.

Some of the brochures appear as *Bonner Berichte aus Mittel-und Ostdeutschland*, and some appear as separate documents and studies. The *Bonner Berichte* for 1951 included: *Die Bevölkerungsbilanz der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1939 bis 1948* (pp. 30), which shows that population growth in the Soviet zone has been markedly less than in the rest of Germany; Gerhard Hass, *Die rechtliche und soziale Lage der Arbeitnehmer in der Sowjetzone und in Ostberlin* (pp. 62) which describes in detail the vast differences between the rights of labor in the Soviet Zone and those in West Germany. In a sentence: "Arbeits-und Sozialrechte, die der deutsche Arbeiter in jahrzehntelangen Kämpfen errungen hatte, wurden in der Sowjetzone mit einem Schlage abgeschafft."

In 1952 the following *Berichte* were published: Lothar von Bullerseeck, *Zur Lage der bildenden Kunst in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (illus., pp. 40) recounting the pressures upon artists to produce works of art that propagate the proper social ideology; Wilhelm Weiss, *Das Gesundheitswesen in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (pp. 52) which describes the structural changes in medical and public health organization, as organs of the military apparatus, and the somewhat worse than mediocre personnel entrusted with this administration, chosen for political compliance and not professional competence; K. von der Neide, *Raiffeisens Ende in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (pp. 55) tells the story of the destruction of the agricultural societies (similar to the American Grange) by the Politburo of the SED, beginning with mid-1948—an organization that had counted three-fourths of a million East German farmers in 1946; *Die Sowjetische Hand in der deutschen Wirtschaft* (pp. 100) a closely documented exposé of the penetration

and absorption of East German industry and commerce by the conventional Soviet corporation; a useful list of these corporations is appended. Otto Walther, *Grundlagen und Technik der Plan-Erstellung in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (pp. 40) presents a detailed analysis of the whole economy under the Soviet *Gosplan* for East Germany, with an explanation of the relation of the administration of this plan to the political structure of the whole state. Hans Köhler, *Zur geistigen und seelischen Situation der Menschen in der Sowjetzone* (pp. 48), describes the Soviet procedures to atomize the family and all its moral values by a regime of threat and planned uncertainty for the individual; *Die Ausbeutung der menschlichen Arbeitskraft in der Sowjetzone* (pp. 106) demonstrates by elaborate statistics how production is increased by threat of disciplinary action and the individual worker is without recourse against an employer who is at the same time legislator, judge and police. Mathias Kramer, *Die Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (1913, pp. 80), describes the working of the *Zwangswirtschaft* to which the agricultural element has been subjected, and the campaign to force the average and larger landowner-farmer to the wall, as well as the resistance which this campaign to reduce the free farmer to the peasant serfdom has met. *Berichte on Religion and Education* may have been published, but have not yet come to hand.

In addition to these *Berichte*, the Bundesministerium has published occasional studies and collections of documents which contain interesting material: *The Efforts made by the Federal Republic to Re-establish the Unity of Germany by means of All-German elections* (1951, pp.53) which contains in English translation declarations and statements of the Federal government and its responsible officials, and correspondence with the occupying powers; Bruno Gleitze, *Die Wirtschaftsstruktur der Sowjetzone und ihre gegenwärtigen sozial-und wirtschaftsrechtlichen Tendenzen* (1951, pp. 26) which shows a marked diminution of real income for the workers from the 1939 level, and for all industry, a production in the Soviet Zone of 82% of 1936, whereas in West Germany production was already in 1950 over 105% of 1936; *Materialien zur Wirtschaftslage in der sowjetischen Zone* (1951, pp. 24) which is useful for the list of goals in 16 basic industries as set in the plan for 1952 (by quarters); *Dokumente des Unrechts* (1952, pp. 48) is a selection of court judgments delivered by courts in the Soviet Zone which illustrate the abandonment of justice in effect under that régime. It would be difficult to give a fair idea of their norms in brief compass. *Die Bemühungen der Bundesrepublik um Wiederherstellung der Einheit Deutschlands durch Gesamtdeutsche Wahlen* (2nd ed. 1952, pp. 112) is a collection of documents, official statements, resolutions of the Bundestag, speeches and letters of *Bund* ministers, and notes from the western powers, in the campaign to effectuate all-German elections, looking to the ultimate unification of Germany.

S. H. THOMSON

BOOK REVIEWS

PAGEL, KARL, *Die Hanse*. Brunswick: Georg Westermann 1952. Pp. 457. DM24.

This is the second edition of Karl Pagel's popular history of the Hanseatic League from its misty origins to the dwindling of its last corporate vestiges in the seventeenth century. The first edition appeared in 1941, and was therefore scarcely reviewed at all outside Germany. German historians who noticed it then praised the lucidity of its organization and style, the color and vigor of its narrative, and the faithfulness, on the whole, with which it summarized and reflected the considerable volume of German research and publication which has been devoted during the past century to the Hanseatic League. They noted also, of course, that Pagel's book made no pretension to original scholarship, and, since it was entirely lacking in documentation and had only a very brief reading list noting the most celebrated monographs on its subject, would not even be of any use to serious scholars. There is little to add to these judgments. The second edition differs from the first only in its handsomer format and in the addition of a number of interesting and excellently reproduced illustrations. In a brief foreword Pagel remarks that none of the criticisms of the first edition obliged him to change a line.

Possibly had the book been reviewed more widely outside of Germany the criticisms might have been more severe. In the main they would have been directed not so much to Pagel's command of the relevant scholarship, although this reader could find no evidence that Pagel made any use of Hanseatic studies in any language except German, but to the method of interpretation and general point of view. Pagel begins with a chapter on the Peace of Stralsund which he glorifies as the triumph of peaceful commerce and German *Bürgertum* over parochial aggressive tyranny. This is characteristic of his treatment throughout. He sees the Hansa as an expression of German national spirit and the agent of a great movement of colonization and civilization throughout the whole Baltic area. It is notable that he slights the role of non-German and even of south German towns in Hanseatic activities. In the political history of the Hansa in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to which he devotes considerable space he discerns a "tragedy" in the failure of the Holy Roman Empire "which could look only southward" to support the legitimate aspirations of the north German folk to the complete dominance of the Baltic. With proper political support, he thinks, the Slavs might have been pushed back to the steppes, and the "northern Germanic peoples" (the Scandinavians) have been united to the main stem of their race from which they were separated only by arbitrary historical accidents. One wonders whether Danish, Norwegian and Swedish scholars would quite agree either with this dictum or with Pagel's glowing description of the unmitigated benefits which the Hansa brought to the northern lands. The point of view is, of course, thoroughly characteristic of the atmosphere of 1939-1941. Eleven years later, in Germany, no modification seems to be felt necessary. This is not to say that Pagel's volume bears any of the stigmata of the more furious Nazis. It is simply, like so much German popular history for a long time, a rather naively nationalistic book. For readers who are willing to make allowances for this bias, it is a highly readable and, in most respects, reliable and informative popular account of the most interesting medieval league of city states.

Columbia University

GARRETT MATTINGLY

MEDIGER, WALTHER, *Moskaus Weg Nach Europa, Der Aufstieg Russlands zum Europäischen Machtstaat im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen*. Brunswick: Georg Westermann, 1952. Pp. 744. DM. 28.

Despite its occasional verbosity and sometimes faulty organization of materials, this volume of Walther Mediger on the intrusion of Russia as a decisive factor into the power politics of Western Europe constitutes a dramatic and massive contribution to the historical literature of the eighteenth century. The core of the study is devoted to a searching analysis of Russian foreign policy during the nineteen years from 1739 to 1758 as it was shaped by Vice-Chancellor Ostermann and Tsaritsa Elizabeth's Grand Chancellor Alexej Bestuzev-Rjumin, the formidable antagonist of Frederick the Great of Prussia. No less illuminating and important are the introductory chapters on the social and religious mainsprings of Russian foreign policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, especially on the contest between the new Petrine northern orientation of foreign policy symbolized by St. Petersburg and requiring perpetual alertness and intervention in the affairs of Europe on the one hand and the isolationist Moscovite opposition with its southern orientation popular with the nobility and the church. Thus every major step in foreign policy was accompanied by an internal struggle, and not until Bestuzev succeeded in making his anti-Prussian policy in the Seven Years War popular with the army officers was the Petrine tradition, so contends the author, securely established. Thus Mediger's problem was not only to coordinate Russia's foreign policy with her frequent internal upsets but to integrate this policy with the broad stream of European international affairs. To this formidable task Mediger brings a remarkable command of the historical literature and sources in Russian, Polish and Swedish as well as those of western Europe, a not inconsiderable literary skill, a rigorously empirical method, and an outlook conspicuously free from the Prussian historical tradition. While others have exploited the vast resources of the Sbornik collection and the Voroncov-Archiv before him, no one has exploited the Hanoverian and Saxon archives more scrupulously than Mediger. If the informed student may often be perplexed by the importance which he attributes to Hanoverian sources, except for critical moments, he will be all the more grateful to the author for his exhaustive study of the Saxon archives which, because of the Saxon envoy Funcke's intimate relations with Bestuzev, constitute perhaps the best source on Russian policy during the reign of Tsaritsa Elizabeth.

Mediger's thorough examination of old and new sources has enabled him to arrive at a number of new positions which merit mention: a higher critical estimate of Astermann's foreign policy, though the author acknowledges his debt to Kocubinskij and the American D. K. Reading; a substantial revision of the role of the Tsaritsa Elizabeth directed chiefly against the superficial caricature of Waliszewski whose uncritical acceptance of irresponsible court gossip led him into a whole series of major errors; a far greater direct Hanoverian influence upon British foreign policy toward Russia than Richard Lodge, D. B. Horn and others were willing to accept, exemplified especially by the important memoir of the Hanoverian Privy Council of February 23, 1753, hitherto unknown (p. 453), which sought to persuade the British that the defense of Hanover against Prussia was impossible without British subsidies to Russia and which immediately resulted in the Duke of Newcastle's and the British Cabinet's decision to send a special courier to St. Petersburg ordering Guy Dickens to negotiate a subsidy treaty with Russia; again, the consistently bad judgment and stream of misinformation which Axel von

Mardefeld, the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, relayed to his master Frederick the Great thus prompting the later to commit a number of all but irreparable errors; above all, a carefully documented re-assessment of the entire policy of the Grand Chancellor Bestuzev who here no longer appears as a corrupt and venal politician who was bought out by his allies as even Count Kaunitz fancied, but as a formidable and tenacious statesman whose grandiose program for making Russia the dominant power in northern Europe went beyond that of his master Ostermann, a program which won over to his side all the important leaders of the opposition, especially Peter Shuvalov and Voroncov, and which, once the army reform was carried through, made Russia the decisive factor in the Seven Years War both by its presence and later by its absence.

The principal value of this interesting book, however, lies less in old errors corrected than in the larger conceptual mold into which the author has cast his study. Mediger's trenchant interpretation of Russian foreign policy of supporting the so-called *barrière de l'est* which, originated by Cardinal Richelieu and developed by Louis XIV, was designed to employ Sweden, Poland, and Turkey as a counter-balance against the expansionist tendency of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Though all but completely demolished by the Peace of Nystad (1721) and the War of the Polish Succession this *barrière* was quickened into sudden vitality when Turkey, its southern pillar, and Sweden, its northern pillar, contracted a defensive alliance in 1739. In the political system of Cardinal Fleury the *barrière*, in 1739, was no longer directed against the enfeebled and isolated Austria, its sole function was rather the exclusion of Russia from the affairs of central Europe. Thus France and Russia pursued opposite policies in the *barrière*. While France sought to re-invigorate Sweden to enable that power to recover its lost provinces on the eastern shore of the Baltic, Ostermann, the Russian Vice-Chancellor, sought to reduce Sweden to dependence upon Russia as the best guarantee of retaining the conquests of Peter the Great, a policy which by 1743 was completely successful. Having already detached Saxony-Poland from the French *barrière*, Ostermann allied himself with Austria and Great Britain to prevent any major shift in the balance of power in northern and central Europe. To exclude French influence completely he sought to attach Prussia to this northern bloc.

All this changed when Prussia under Frederick the Great conquered Silesia, thus becoming a new and formidable military power in northern Europe. Frederick, as Mediger points out, always professed to be perplexed by the implacable hostility of Russia, especially after Bestuzev assumed direction of affairs in 1744. He, like most of his contemporaries and modern historians, could find no other explanation than that Bestuzev had been bought out by his enemies. "Without money—no Russia" had become the first principle of every chancellery in Europe. It is on this question that Mediger concentrates his keenest and most penetrating analysis (p. 582 ff), and no student can henceforth ignore the results of his investigation. After a critical examination of all the documentary evidence Mediger arrives at the following conclusion. It is true, Bestuzev collected enormous sums of money from Saxony, Austria, and Great Britain, but these transactions are entirely irrelevant to the basic lines of his foreign policy which were firmly established before he became involved in private financial difficulties and were never altered. The upshot of Mediger's argument is that Bestuzev abandoned the eastern and southern orientation of Russian foreign policy to concentrate on the west because he saw the rise of Prussia as a great power was incompatible with Russia's new position on the Baltic, established by Peter the Great and consolidated by Oster-

mann. The struggle between Russia and France for the control of the *barrière* had perforce to concentrate on Prussia, for once Prussia under Frederick the Great had become the cornerstone of the French alliance system in central and eastern Europe a reactivation of the anti-Russian *barrière* was inevitable and there is evidence enough to support his position not only in Frederick's political correspondence but in his Political Testament of 1752.

While Frederick sought to strengthen the Swedish crown's control over the army, Bestuzev saw in the continuance of the parliamentary regime in Sweden the best security for the Russian frontiers. Bestuzev's perspicacity suggested to him that sooner or later Frederick must seek control of Saxony, Danzig and Polish Prussia, and, had he known of Frederick's designs on these areas expressed in his secret Political Testament, he would scarcely have been surprised. Saxony, however, since it was the foundation of his Polish policy, was absolutely vital to Bestuzev's system. There can be little doubt that the ultimate aim of Frederick's policy was to exclude Russia from European affairs, although he was skeptical of the possibility of a Swedish reconquest of the Baltic provinces. Bestuzev on the other hand was convinced that Russia's position would not be secure until Prussia, like Saxony-Poland, had been reduced to a Russian satellite state. Thus, long before 1756, Bestuzev had become the convinced advocate of the necessity of a preventive war against Prussia, just as in the same year Frederick resorted to the same device to escape from being engulfed by the hostile coalition that planned the destruction of Prussia.

Ohio State University

WALTER L. DORN

HANDELSMAN, M., *Adam Czartoryski*. Warsaw: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie. Vol. I, 1948, pp. xx, 334; vol. II, 1949, pp. 382; vol. III, 1950, parts i and ii, pp. 756.

This posthumous work of a great Polish scholar is, strangely enough, the first full and extensive biography of a statesman who not only was by far the greatest among the Polish leaders but who played in the first period of his political career a leading part in Russian diplomacy and was for sixty years, even in exile, one of the most prominent political personalities in Europe. Many problems relating to his life and his activities have been studied before by many historians in numerous special studies; but a general work was lacking.

Handelsman's work brings the harvest of several decades of research but it was written mostly in the first years of the last war, in the midst of perils and trials, and brought to a hasty end before his incarceration by the Gestapo, which was followed in a year's time by his death in a concentration camp. The book consists in fact of two different works. The first one was intended to be a narrative of Czartoryski's life with some inclination towards a *vie romancée*; it gradually developed into a more scholarly and elaborated study of his activities shown against the background of the Polish political history; but it was discontinued at 1846. The second work is a detailed study of the diplomatic history of the Crimean war, with emphasis on the Polish problem and Czartoryski's policy in exile.

The unfinished life story of Czartoryski is contained in the first volume of this work. Its first chapters, until 1815, are rather disappointing. There are many interesting details about Czartoryski's private life, especially some important quotations from his correspondence with his mother and elder sister and from his diary in addition to those given by Askenazy in his studies; but the interpretation seems

sometimes to invite controversy, and the history of his partnership with Alexander I seems rather sketchy. Next to nothing is told about his "Grand Design" of 1803, about his instructions of 1804, where he was a forerunner of Woodrow Wilson; his memoranda of that early period are not confronted with his *Essai sur la Diplomatie* (published in 1830) which expounded systematically the same ideas. Not even a full page in this 1000 page book was dedicated to Czartoryski's conceptions of a united Europe. The explanation of Czartoryski's partnership with Alexander I by the former's sentimental weakness and complexes and the latter's astuteness is rather unconvincing. Czartoryski's memoirs, diaries and his political correspondence, even the small part of it available in print, gives ample evidence of his motives, ideas and aims. It is striking to find again and again, even in chapters dealing with Czartoryski's struggle against tsarist autocracy and with his leadership in the war of independence in 1831, concerning his alleged inability to take risks, and the lack of activity as a feature of his character. Curiously enough, the author speaking in the third volume of the same man as he was a quarter of a century later—at the age of 84—praises not only his moral and intellectual grandeur, but also his energy, efficiency and indefatigable activity. An explanation of the enigma is not far to seek. Handelsman had much more understanding for the patriotic leader in exile, an outlaw challenging the Tsar, than for the friend of the latter's predecessor.

What follows is an elaborated history of the Polish question in the Crimean war. It is preceded by a survey of Czartoryski's policy in 1832-1849 in connection with main problems of the diplomatic history of Europe. Palmerston's personality and policy is well in the foreground and his partnership with Czartoryski, the parallelism of their beliefs and the divergence of their aims as well, because Czartoryski's policy was one of liberation, while Palmerston's was one of containment. The discovery of that unique phenomenon—an active and efficient diplomacy of a leader of exiles and especially its part in the developments in the Near East and in the events of 1848-49—was Handelsman's and his school's achievement; the second volume gives a synthesis of their studies. Most of the third volume deals with the Eastern and Polish questions at the time of the Crimean war and the exertions of the veteran statesman, who has been semi-officially recognized by the Allies as representative of his nation and whose position was enhanced by his close relation with Napoleon III. Handelsman's interpretation of the latter's policy does not seem wholly convincing; nor is he more successful in an analysis of Austrian policy, which is stigmatized emphatically as the villain of this volume. But the author is yet in that part of his work at his best, and he expounds here a prodigious amount of new material. A few final chapters give an outline of Czartoryski's last years—showing him in political action almost to the end.

This voluminous book is an agglomeration of two or three disparate works and the author did not have the necessary time to put to any of them the finishing touch. Thus the whole seems rather incongruous, uneven, abundant in repetitions and redundancies; references are lacking in both first volumes and the very scanty appendices are rather accidental. Yet the book contains an immense amount of historical knowledge and in spite of its deficiencies it will be indispensable for any student of the nineteenth century in Central and Eastern Europe.

The work has been edited with a minimum of scholarly apparatus by S. Kieniewicz, once Handelsman's pupil. In his preface (1948) he thought it necessary to excuse his late master for having written a biography of a great aristocrat; in a postscript to the last volume (1950), he even apologizes for his master's failure

to expose the 'selfish crooked and perverse' policy of the Western Powers and for having himself published this book. The two statements do not seem negligible as documents of our time.

London, England

MARIAN KUKIEL

JACKH, ERNEST, *Background of the Middle East*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952. Pp. viii, 236. \$3.50.

The scholar no less than the person who wants a deeper insight into world conditions than can be found in current periodicals will welcome this long-range background of the politically weak countries of the Middle East that lie at the intercontinental crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Here is a well-edited co-operative volume of condensed background information and interpretation. It correlates a great region, a long period of history, and many fundamental problems of civilization. The work goes all the way from the ancient civilizations of the Near and Middle East to modern rivalry for the petroleum reserves of that area.

The problems of the people of the Near and Middle East are many and difficult. Their cultural patterns have been formed by what historical influences? What of their contacts with the West? These and other fundamental questions are behind their present quest to find political security and stability. From classical and even pre-classical times the background story of these countries is told with emphasis upon the three great religions of their area, Hebrew, Christian, and Mohammedan.

The twenty-two chapters are written by seventeen authorities, all of whom are to be commended. Each chapter has the rare quality of brevity. Despite intense condensation, little is sacrificed in essential background material. Especial thanks go to Editor Ernest Jackh (a former professor of Turkish history at the University of Berlin) for his analysis of the now thoroughly confused delineations of "Near East" and "Middle East." Harry N. Howard contributes the finest brief analysis that has yet appeared of American-Soviet relations in the Near and Middle East since 1945.

Harry W. Hazard contributes statistical highlights; William S. Haas, early cultural developments. Salo W. Baron comments on Hebrew civilization; André Michalopoulos, the influence of Hellenism; Edgar Alexander, early Christianity as related to Rome, the Orient, and Byzantium; Arthur Jeffrey, Islamic civilization; Philip K. Hitti, the Arab caliphate.

The modern developments are handled by Zeki Validi Togan, who discusses the Turkish empire; Lewis V. Thomas, European imperialism; Edgar Alexander, Russia and the Middle East; Hans Kohn, nationalism; George Hakim, social and economic problems; William Reitzel, the Mediterranean; Joseph Schacht, law; Maurice S. Diman, the arts; Ann Perkins, American archaeology in the Near and Middle East.

No single writer could do justice to such a vast field of inquiry. This book perhaps attempts too much, so wide is its sweep of history and institutions. The usual disadvantage of the lack of complete unity in subject matter when a general account is written by many chapter authors is offset here by the advantage of fresh and stimulating opinions.

The book's material is stated to be copyrighted in 1952 by the Encyclopedia Americana and is reproduced by permission. This is the fourth book about the Middle East to be published by the Cornell Press recently.

University of California

VERNON J. PURYEAR

ALLBAUGH, LELAND G., *Crete, A Case Study of an Underdeveloped Area*, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Press, 1953. Pp. 572. \$7.50.

This is a report of a study of the island of Crete carried out by the Rockefeller Foundation in an effort "to discover what kinds of assistance can be usefully given to underdeveloped areas, and in what ways." Subjects covered include resources, family life, food and nutrition, health, community facilities, government, agriculture, industry and commerce. Interviews, sample but substantial surveys of households, farm and communities, on-the-spot checks, and all the other modern paraphernalia called "scientific techniques" were utilized by trained investigators. If not the most complete survey of any comparable, underdeveloped area (and it well might be), it is surely the most detailed study of Crete or of any other section of Greece yet made. Two-fifths of the book is given over to "statistical methodology" in which all the data, problems and conclusions relating to methods used in the survey are described. This will be especially useful to those interested in sociological research.

Crete is really an underdeveloped country. Before World War II it had the lowest per capita national income of any region in Europe. Since then war, enemy occupation, and communist guerrilla activity have further lowered the standard of living. The main physical deficiencies of the island are in water supply, agricultural production and health. The land capable of producing any kind of yield is equivalent to less than two acres per person, even excluding the people in town. (Rural population is 375,000 out of a total of 475,800). In Europe only Poland, Norway and Switzerland have as high a density of agricultural population per square mile of "arable equivalent agricultural land"—485 to the square mile. While the farms are small, they are, with very few exceptions, owner-operated and free from land mortgages. The average farm, even though under ten acres, is made up of thirteen lots scattered throughout the community—a result of the practice of dividing land among children by bequest. Most farms have nothing more than a plow, a sickle and a hoe for tools, and a donkey, an ox or a work-cow. Yet the average value per acre is \$591 comparable to the best land in the Middle West. Olives and grapes are the most important crops.

Poor as Crete is, the survey found no noticeable evidence of widespread malnutrition—and this without much meat, with no refrigeration. Bread in Crete is surely the "staff of life," it is the main food for most Cretans at every meal. Yet the island's crude death rate (11.9 in 1938) was not too dissimilar from that of the United States (10.7 in 1938) and England (11.6 for 1938), and since then malaria, which plagued Greece for centuries, has been almost eliminated.

Among its many other liabilities, Crete has too much governmental control from Athens, not enough initiative is given to its own local and provincial units to carry on functions so necessary to the welfare of the people in the rural villages and towns. As a result of excessive centralization, things just don't get done. And above all, Crete suffers from lack of modern transportation. Many perishable products that are not used for local consumption go to waste because of the lack of such facilities both within the island and to the outside world.

What can be recommended for a place like Crete? Available water supply can be increased: there should be a "water engineer" available over a period of years to help villages increase and conserve their supply for domestic use and irrigation. Olive production could be increased in quality and quantity: for example, the ravages of the dacus fly can and should be controlled. Some use should be made

of the thousands of acres of rough, barren land. More fertilizer should also be made available. Better marketing facilities must be developed. Small-scale industry and the tourist trade can be encouraged. Cretans could raise their own standard of living with a minimum of outside aid either from Athens or from friendly nations and organizations. But this is only possible if some agency with social objectives and an understanding of the complications which in Greece inhibit action takes a supervisory and responsible interest. Neither Cretans nor Greeks can do this now without more guidance and training.

The Pennsylvania State College

HAROLD F. ALDERFER

KAUFMAN, WALTER H., *Monarchism in the Weimar Republic*, New York: Bookman Associates. 1953. Pp. 305. \$4.00.

This well-conceived and compact book is a welcome addition to the serious studies of the Weimar Republic. Against the background of the major German parties and their orientation towards the monarchy from the Second Reich through the Revolution and the Weimar Republic, Mr. Kaufmann, with the "invaluable advice and criticism" of Professor Arnold Brecht, is primarily concerned with the parties and groups which worked or hoped for a monarchist restoration whoever its beneficiary might be, William II, another Hohenzollern prince, or Prince Rupprecht of the Wittelsbach family. He is less interested in their political ideas in the manner of Armin Mohler, whose book *Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland*, 1918-1932, (Stuttgart, 1950), is not mentioned, than in their political fortunes. For the first time, he has brought together the more significant evidence, much of which is well known, in such a way as to explain convincingly, for the most part, the monarchists' paralysis during the Revolution, their resurgence from 1920 to 1924, their decline and collapse thereafter. There is a final chapter of summary and conclusions, and an appendix identifies the political affiliations of the members of the cabinets from Scheidemann to Hitler. In general, the bibliography is excellent, but it omits, besides Mohler's book, such obvious titles as Carl Severing's *Mein Lebensweg*, 2 vols. (Köln, 1950) and Otto Meissner's *Staatssekretär* (Hamburg, 1950).

Like the friends of the Republic, the monarchists succumbed to the vice of splinter parties, and largely because of the powerful influence of nationalism. Stresemann and the German People's Party (DVP) became reconciled to the Republic as they learned how to use it at home and abroad for the recovery of Germany's greatness. While this is true, the author fails to account for Stresemann's famous letter of September 7, 1925, which suggests that, in his view, the former crown prince had a right to receive his innermost thoughts about German foreign policy. Hugenburg's Pan-Germanism forced the expulsion of Westarp and his friends from the most monarchist of parties, the German National People's Party (DNVP), because of their approval of the party's participation in the right of center governments during the Stresemann period for opportunist reasons. While those who left the party disintegrated into splinter parties, the rump DNVP gave priority to nationalism over monarchism. The ground was thus prepared for the Hursburg Front in 1931 and Hitler's triumph. Especially noteworthy is the view that Hindenburg's election in 1925 as President doomed the cause of monarchism to defeat. With Hindenburg's massive figure overshadowing the former Emperor and other candidates even in the eyes of their partisans, a monarchist restoration no longer seemed an immediate necessity. Loyal monarchist that he always continued to be, Hindenburg rejected Bruening's proposal for a restoration because of unacceptable

conditions, an episode related in John W. Wheeler-Bennett's biography of Hindenberg and confirmed here in a letter from Bruening to the author. (p. 286)

In regard to certain other matters, the author's views carry less conviction. Only in the negative sense that the monarchy was the sole alternative government were the activities of the Free Corps and the violence directed against the republican leaders during the early 1920's calculated to serve monarchical interests. The memoirs of Gerhard Rossbach (*Mein Weg Durch Die Zeit*, Weilburg-Lahn, 1950), a notorious Free Corps chieftain, leave the impression that he, at least, was moved less by monarchist loyalties which indeed were largely destroyed by William's flight to Holland than by the peculiarly German psychology of the front-line warrior out of a job. Like Arnold Brecht, whose *Prelude to Silence* he quotes, Mr. Kaufmann minimizes the responsibility of the monarchists as of the republicans for Hitler's access to power by attributing that catastrophe to the accidental convergence of factors which they were powerless to control. Political blindness and lack of resolution cannot be so easily erased from the historical record.

Duke University

E. MALCOLM CARROLL

WAITE, ROBERT G. L., *Vanguard of Nazism, the Free Corps in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923*. "Harvard Historical Series" Vol. LX. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. xii, 344. \$6.00.

This is a survey of the Free Corps movement in post World War I Germany, from its origins in the pre-war youth movement, wartime experiences, and the post-war situation in and around Germany until the failure of the putsches of late 1923. Included are sections on the role of the Free Corps in the struggles of 1919 in Berlin and Munich, the Kapp Putsch and its aftermath in the Rheinland, and the disturbances in the Baltic States and Upper Silesia. In a special chapter and in shorter sections throughout the book an effort is made to explain the motivation, nature, and functioning of the Free Corps as well as their relations with the regular army, political parties, and economic groupings.

The presentation is made on the basis of a careful study of primary sources and monographic works, cited in very instructive footnotes and brought together in a most valuable bibliography. The author has relied heavily on a critical examination of memoirs of Free Corps members, quoting these repeatedly to very good effect. Such quotation is probably the best, if not the only, way of conveying a realistic picture of these revolutionaries who had no program but continual, violent, revolution. There is also the good reason given in the Preface (p. ix), that otherwise such incidents as the killing of some workers by Free Corps members on the grounds that "We needed cadavers for our anatomy class" (p. 182; n. 39) might not be believed.

On the whole, the book combines excellent scholarship with good style. Certain portions are particularly significant. The discussion of the German storm troops (*Stosstrupps*) of World War I (pp. 23-29) as precursors in form and spirit of the Free Corps and the Nazi storm troops is of special importance. The presentation of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements in and around Munich is very valuable. A substantial contribution to the history of the Free Corps and some sad pictures of Weimar justice are contained in Chapter VIII on the period of underground activity from the summer of 1920 to the summer of 1923. The account of the Kustrine Putsch in Chapter IX should settle the controversies about the role of its leader, Major Buchrucker, in the crucial days at the end of September, 1923 (pp. 252-53).

The one point at which the author has fallen short is his failure to utilize captured German documents bearing on his topic from the historical archives of the Nazi Party and the papers of Groener and Seeckt. Not even publications based on such material, e.g. Alma Luckau's article on the Kapp Putsch (*Journal of Central European Affairs* VII (1948, 394-405), have been taken into consideration.

The basic thesis of the author—that the main contributions of the Free Corps to the Third Reich were their "brutality of spirit" and "exaltation of power"—is clearly sustained by the evidence. In such acts as the execution as "Communist terrorists" of twenty Catholic workers, arrested at random while at a cultural discussion (p. 50), lies part of the explanation for the great emphasis placed by the Nazis on executions, preferably of innocent people and on a large scale. Another inheritance of the Third Reich from the Free Corps might also have been pointed out—the combination of authoritarianism with anarchy, of the leadership principle with empire-building. The author properly emphasizes the constant rivalries among the Free Corps and the Free Corps leaders (a.g. pp. 119-20, 259-62). The persistence of this type of rivalry within the Nazi state deserves further study.

Dr. Waite has written an excellent book, based on research of unusual scope. It will contribute greatly to the understanding not only of the Free Corps movement itself, but also of the roots—and fruits—of the Third Reich.

Columbia University

GERHARD L. WEINBERG

LAROCHE, JULES, *La Pologne de Pilsudski. Souvenirs d'une ambassade, 1926-1935*.

Paris: Flammarion, 1953. Pp. 233. 600 frs.

In April, 1926, Jules Laroche was appointed French ambassador to Poland. He had barely reached his new post when Pilsudski, the national hero, enacted the coup that made him in effect master of the country. Pilsudski's dictatorship, reinforced in 1929, was relatively mild and his power exercised indirectly. It was real none the less and lasted until his death in 1935, an event almost simultaneous with the termination of Laroche's mission. Hence the appropriate title of these memoirs.

Naturally, in view of his position, Laroche is primarily concerned with Polish foreign policy, and more especially with Franco-Polish relations, though his descriptions of various aspects of Polish life and society add welcome color to his narrative. The large Poland that emerged as a consequence of German defeat and Russian disintegration had cause to be attached to France, the chief power on the continent with a similar stake in the preservation of the status quo. The alliance of 1921, though primarily sought by Poland, and despite some French hesitation, had the solidity deriving from true community of interest, quite apart from traditional sentimental links. From the French point of view Poland could take, to a degree at least, the place formerly held by Russia in containing Germany, while she constituted also the foremost link in the *cordon sanitaire*; Poland had equal cause to fear the vengeful enmity of both her neighbors.

This state of affairs points at the same time to the sources of strength and of weakness of the alliance. Thus Locarno was seen in Poland with uneasiness, which the French effort to modify the terms of the military convention of 1921 tended to confirm. There was a difference also from the fact that, if French distrust of Germany persisted, French policy was much more negative and defensive than the vigorous nationalism of a newly reborn Poland. To a degree, in fact, France endeavored to exert a mediating action in the violent Germano-Polish difference over the Corridor and Dantzig.

Despite this cloud, Laroche found the alliance in good health. It continued such during the general euphoria of the late twenties, but the stresses arising from the economic crisis and the related phenomenon of Nazism in Germany created a new set of conditions. Pilsudski's own views and role were highly important at this point. A realist, operating the East European milieu, he put relatively little stock in everlasting conferences and League of Nations palavers. No Germanophile, he was nevertheless much more alive to the Russian danger. On the issue of German rearmament he would have brooked no compromise, and this became, according to Laroche, the touchstone of Franco-Polish relations. French concessions to *Gleichberechtigung*, however hedged and qualified, were viewed with suspicion and looked upon as signs of weakness.

Through the evolution of Franco-Polish relations one may, in fact, accurately follow the disintegration of the French position and with it of the whole European structure born of the war. In retrospect, one may grant that the Polish view of German rearmament was the sounder, but the nature of the Nazi régime was badly misjudged. Totalitarian methods did not *per se* arouse revulsion in Pilsudski, and even less in his unfortunate choice as a protégé, Colonel Beck, whose influence was growing ever more important. Hitler was "Austrian," hence would be more tractable than the "Prussians".

But Mussolini's Four-Power Pact was most unwelcome in Poland for the same and good reason that it was disliked by the other small countries of Europe. Poland, in addition, resented it as a slur on her importance. This exaggerated touchiness where it came to prestige was in part responsible for a policy of *farà da se*. This would serve, among other things, as a warning to France, whose alliance was not however abandoned. Thus the year 1934 opened with a Germano-Polish agreement, partly result of the Four-Power Pact: "While Mussolini has ostensibly tended to orient German ambitions toward the East, Pilsudski replied by a *détente* which directed them toward the South" (p. 151). To the issue of the *Anschluss* Poland seems to have been insensitive, though one must admit the validity of Beck's observation that, if the *Anschluss* was to be prevented, it would be by France and Italy mobilizing.

Highly fraught with danger was the attitude of Pilsudski and Beck toward Czechoslovakia whom—not very reasonably perhaps, considering the composition of their own country—they regarded as an unviable compound of nationalities; they felt much more sympathetic toward Hungary. Pettily, Beck in particular, was also resentful of Beneš' prestige in European councils. French efforts never succeeded in compounding the Czecho-Polish divergence.

The French connection, already growing weaker, was further attenuated by two developments: the evidences of French internal dissensions which the 6th February, 1934, advertised spectacularly, and more important, the French rapprochement with the Soviet Union. That Polish suspicion of Russia was well founded no one would gainsay, but the result was that Poland stoutly refused to become a party to any multilateral eastern pact and in effect played the German game. Barthou's visit in 1934 was a personal success—the popular enthusiasm that greeted him irked the government—but led to no concrete results; Laval the following year, stopping in Warsaw on his way to Moscow, could achieve little more. Polish protestations and French efforts at clarifying the situation could not alter the fact that the solidity of the alliance depended, as Laroche correctly observed to Beck, on the real intent of the partners. Beck continued to remain evasive.

While Laval was in Moscow Pilsudski died. On the sad note of his demise Laroche's mission ended.

His testimony is a valuable one which should be placed next to Beck's memoirs and to the more useful ones of Szembek¹; his appraisal of events and situations is judicious. Once Germany and Russia had regained their power, a French position essentially defensive and negative was bound to diverge increasingly from the preoccupations of a Poland caught between the two strongest military powers of the continent. This fact would seem more fundamental than specific mistakes, French and Polish, which helped draw the countries apart despite the basic community of their interests. They have both paid the price of blindness.

Paris, France

RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE

SMAL-STOCKI, ROMAN, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union*. Milwaukee (Bruce Publishing Co.) 1952. Pp. 474. \$6.00.

Although the present book sets as its task the analysis of the nationality problem in the Soviet Union, its main emphasis is on matters which are not directly connected with this subject. The author is more interested in the alleged identity of Communism and the Russian political tradition, and in heated quasi-political polemics with the opponents of his views, than in dealing with the complexities of the nationality question itself. As a result, the discussion of the actual theme of the book is relegated to a secondary place.

The historical section of the book centers on the argument that Soviet Communism is a mere extension of traditional Russian imperialism. This assertion, which is certainly open to debate, is here supported by evidence which cannot stand the test of objective criticism. In order to free his own, Ukrainian, nation as much as possible of responsibility for the sins of Tsarist Russia (which had included Great Russians, Ukrainians and many other nationalities), Mr. Smal-Stocki is compelled to create a completely artificial division between the history of Kiev and the history of the northern Russian principalities. The reader learns with amazement that the Ukraine is mentioned in the so-called Nestor Chronicle (p. 14), although in fact it is used there only in the sense of "borderland" in general, and never in the sense of a specific country; that the northern principalities of the Kievan state had "a different kind of Christianity from that of Kiev" (p. 15), although in fact both had espoused the same Orthodox Christianity; that incidents in the wars of the Russian princes of the appanage period, such as the attack of Suzdal on Kiev in 1169, were due to divergent national allegiances (p. 15); and so forth. The misdeeds of imperial Russia are also oversimplified and exaggerated. The whole complex, and as yet inadequately studied, history of pre-1917 Russian imperial administration, is disposed of with a few generalities concerning Russian addiction to sadism and cannibalism, and by a few historical facts taken entirely out of context.

A considerable portion of the book is devoted to attacks on various American scholars, institutions, and publications, most of which have at one time or another disagreed with what the author holds to be the correct view of the nationality question, or simply have shown indifference to his viewpoint. He now accuses them all of adherence to Communism or subjection to Communist control. His data consists of copies of personal letters, articles (some written a quarter of a century ago), and similar types of evidence, few of which support his charges; if, at best, his examples prove that some of his opponents had been wrong, they by

¹Comte Jean Szembek, *Journal 1933-1939*, Paris, 1952.

no means demonstrate that his viewpoint is correct. Since the roster of the accused includes not only some of the most eminent Slavists in the country, but also such institutions as the Modern Language Association (p. 246-49), and—of all things—the *Reader's Digest* (p. 246), one is justified in discounting such accusations as largely personal in their motivation. The few examples of genuine Communist propaganda on the nationality question in the United States which Mr. Smal-Stocki does cite, are so indiscriminately lumped together with writings which have nothing to do with Communism, that they lose their significance. Such arguments *ad hominem*, of course, not only prove nothing and fail to inform the reader about the subject of the book, but they also can be turned against the author himself. Mr. Smal-Stocki, who assures the reader in the introduction that he had "fought Pan-Germanism of the Nazis and their German imperialism and chauvinism" (p. XV), turns out to be the author of a book on German-Ukrainian cultural relations, published in Nazi Germany at the height of World War II, at a time when most enemies of Nazism had no access to German publishing houses. This book (R. Smal-Stocki, *Die Germanisch-Deutschen Kultureinflüsse im Spiegel der Ukrainischen Sprache*, Leipzig, 1942, p. V), had as its purpose to demonstrate "that within the confines of the body of European culture, the role of the leading *Kulturtræger* belonged to Germany"—a thesis hardly likely to displease "German imperialists and chauvinists."

The valuable sections of the book are those dealing with the linguistic controversies in the Soviet Union (Chapter IV, parts of Chapter VIII), where the author utilizes his philological training to explain some of the intricacies of the Marr dispute. One can only wish that he had devoted more space to such discussions, and less to partisan polemics which do little to advance either the cause which he espouses or scholarship in general.

Russian Research Center, Harvard University

RICHARD E. PIPES

MEHNERT, KLAUS, *Stalin versus Marx: The Stalinist Historical Doctrine*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952. Pp. 128.

Dr. Mehnert makes it clear that May, 1934, marked not only a watershed in Soviet historiography, but also a turning point in Soviet (Russian) history. The event was the posthumous indictment of Michael Pokrovsky, and the confinement of his works to the dung heap of Soviet history. Pokrovsky, whose historical writings had elicited the admiration of his colleagues and the plaudits of the politicians, was repudiated—lock, stock, and barrel. Five years later the Moscow Academy of Science took it upon itself to publish a series of articles under the general heading, *Against M. N. Pokrovsky's Historical Conception*. Thus, the former darling of the Marxists was thrice killed.

Pokrovsky's mistake, it seems, was to take his Marxism seriously. He continued to repeat the old shibboleths long after they had lost their validity in the rapidly-changing Soviet scheme of things. He talked of universals at a time when only the particular—Soviet Russia—mattered. He persisted in dealing with the substructure (the material conditions of social existence) at a time when human elements in the superstructure (the ruling *élite*) were anxious to justify their own importance in the shaping of society. In his enthusiasm for general principles, he failed to take cognizance of the fact that practical experience with such issues as those of religion, the exercise of power in a state, and the problem of classlessness, had forced Soviet leaders to formulate new rationalizations for policy. In short, Pokrovsky remained too much the Marxian purist at a time when Stalin had found ideo-

logical reorientation a *sine qua non* if a satisfactory explanation for the realities of power politics was to be found.

The author has adduced considerable evidence to show how the present regime, especially under Stalin, has found it necessary to engage in practices which have given the U.S.S.R. an un-Marxian turn. The first has been the exaltation of the superstructure over the substructure, going so far that Stalin could say that, "... once the superstructure has come into existence, it becomes the most powerful force. . ." This is rightly identified as a rationalization for the dictatorial aspects of the regime. The second practice has been the growing emphasis upon the peculiar historical destiny of the Russian people. Mehnert does not try to bring together all the evidence, which is dealt with in greater detail in special studies by other authors. However, the implication is clear; namely, that much about Russia's earlier history can be excused because all the while the nation contained within itself the seed of the Bolshevik revolution. Thus, the Russian people have unwittingly been in the vanguard of history and their destiny is linked intimately to the destiny of all mankind—as leaders. All Russians must, therefore, resist every temptation which might lead to "cosmopolitanism." That would contaminate the special blessing and abort the world mission of the Russian "nation."

What does all of this mean? Mehnert feels that it is (or was) a sign of Stalinist ambition. Pure Marxism had proved to have weaknesses as an instrument for world domination. For that reason the Big One had supplemented it with another motivation, a new nationalism, magical and messianic. But would that serve the purpose? Mehnert thinks not, because it creates a contradiction in Soviet policy which is bound to cause defections, Tito being but the first in what promises eventually to be many. Mehnert thus ends on a note of optimism for those who still believe that ideas have such far-reaching consequences.

University of Nebraska

ALBIN T. ANDERSON

BULLOCK, ALAN, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1953. Pp. 776. \$6.00.

Two Hitler biographies have appeared simultaneously: the one under review and a German one by Walter Goerlitz and Herbert A. Quint (Stuttgart, 1952). The English study, done by a professional historian, is infinitely superior to its German journalistic counterpart, both as an historical and as a literary performance. In the present German situation, Mr. Bullock's study should be translated and published in Germany without delay. The biography has great merits. It is extremely well written, thoroughly documented, and, on the whole, a convincing portrayal of Hitler. It will remain, for many years to come, the authoritative biography since it is unlikely that new documentary evidence will decisively affect Mr. Bullock's presentation. There are certain chapters which are truly brilliant; such as the analysis of the unsuccessful 1923 putsch and its impact on Hitler's subsequent strategy; the role of legality in his struggle for power; the role of the Nationalist parties vis-à-vis National Socialism, and particularly the diplomatic history between 1933 and 1939.

The term "gutter-elite," coined by the author, seems an exceedingly happy description for the Nazi elite—a term which ought to enter the terminology of social scientists.

Yet, in another sense, Mr. Bullock's study is a disappointment because of its rather conventional character. It is not a "study of tyranny" but rather a study

of a tyrant. This may perhaps be due to the biographical treatment but is certainly not inherent in it. There are, in my view, two faults which deprive the biography of much of its potential value.

Mr. Bullock attributes much significance to what he calls Hitler's "formative years" (1889-1918). This is, of course, justified. But his treatment of this period does not fully show why these years are so decisive probably because the author lacks adequate knowledge of depth psychology. Nor is the available material for such a psychological study fully exhausted. There is in Ludwig Curtius' book on Greek Antiquity and Germanism an illuminating reference to Schuler and his Munich circle which supplies certain clues to the development of National Socialist symbolism and ideology. This whole period would need further exploration by a trained psychologist.

A decisive fault of the book, however, is the omission of the German people. True, up to 1933 there is some, although inadequate, discussion of the trends in German society. After 1933 there is a mention here and there that a German nation exists. But after 1939 the German nation does not seem to exist at all. Party leaders, diplomats and generals crowd the scene—but they appear on an empty stage. Thus this is not study of tyranny and nobody could, on the basis of Mr. Bullock's analysis even state with certainty that there ever was a tyranny because neither its mechanisms nor the attitudes of the German nation are ever discussed.

The total disregard for the German people, be it as actor or as acted upon, leads Dr. Bullock to the extremely doubtful statement that quest for power, power for its own sake, was the motive of Hitler's actions. This is questionable as a psychological theory and is not even supported by the body of his book. The rationale of Hitler's policy appears quite clearly. In the domestic field, it is the attempt to organize the German nation in such a way that November 1918 (as he interpreted it) could never be repeated. That required the establishment of a totalitarian system which permitted no opposition and suffered nobody to break out. No more stab-in-the-back. Externally, it meant a transformation of Europe into a German Empire composed of the ruling mother country and surrounded by protectorates and colonies which were to supply the mother country and make it the foremost power in the world. It is quite true that these objectives were unattainable but they are perfectly rational conceptions. They are not the product of Hitler's power drive but constitute one powerful trend (among others to be sure) in Germany's tradition.

Columbia University

FRANZ L. NEUMANN

CHURCH OF SCOTLAND, *The Church Under Communism*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 79.

This book is the second Report of the Commission on Communism appointed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May 1949. The first half of the Report contains a survey of Church life under Communism with up-to-date facts and figures (it was presented to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May 1952). The conclusion of the chapter on Soviet Russia is that in spite of certain liberties in return for their active support of the regime the Churches now as before are unable to propagate the Christian faith. The closing note is pessimistic: "In due course a generation of indoctrinated unbelievers will leave the Church high and dry and out of real touch with the people. The Soviet authorities are already persuaded that along this way the Church can never be a rival loyalty

but is already the unquestioning servant of the State . . ." (p. 15). I am afraid that this will soon become true of other Communist-dominated countries—if they will not be liberated in the near future—where the Christian Churches are also becoming more and more "unquestionable servants" of the State. A few martyrs here and there seem to have little positive bearing on this tragic development.

In the chapter on Czechoslovakia the reviewer found one inaccuracy: the authors speak constantly of the Roman Catholic Archbishop Beran of Praha as "Cardinal." This courageous spiritual leader, held prisoner by the Communist regime, has not yet been made a cardinal, contrary to the expectations of many Catholics and non-Catholics. The writers seem to be too optimistic so far as the effectiveness of influence of Communist pressures upon the Protestant Churches is concerned: "The religious press is the easiest to control of all Church activities, yet in Czechoslovakia it is in fact the freest" (p. 31). After five years of experience with the Communist system we cannot but conclude that the Church press in Czechoslovakia was much better off under the Nazi "Gleichschaltung," even if it was far from being free, than it is now under the Communists. The soundness and faithfulness of Christian witness does definitely suffer under the Communist rule as it suffers in all Communist countries.

In the second half of the Report the authors draw some lessons which Christians should learn facing the danger of Communism. They are not afraid of Communism, they are not proposing any loyalty checks, public hearings or launching of any spectacular crusades against Communism. However, the churchmen from Scotland recognize very gravely the real challenge of Communism for Christianity and the free world. They see that the "virile Faith" of Communism, even though false, exerts more influence than the faith of many Christians who become lukewarm or completely indifferent. They believe that the strongest bulwark against Communism is a vital faith and that the greatest peril in the fight against the Communist menace is a "spiritual vacuum." "Fundamentally, the only answer to Communism is a reborn Church, and that means rededicated members of the Christian communities. Communism is only one of the many enemies of the Christian Church and Christian Faith; the worst enemy of the Church is indifference within her own borders" (p. 74).

This little book, rich in information, analysis and inspiration should be read particularly by all those who are engaged in psychological warfare where very often blunders are being made when the false faith of Communist materialism is met only by the false faith of Western Democratic materialism in disregard for Christian spiritual and moral values. It is refreshing and inspiring to read in a time of fear, hysteria and even occurrence of inquisition—which at the end play into the hands of Communists—this calm and really existential Christian statement from Scotland on Communism and its challenge for the Church and the Western world.

New York City

BLAHOŠLAV HRUBÝ

SWETTENHAM, JOHN A., *The Tragedy of the Baltic States: A Report Compiled from Official Documents and Eyewitnesses' Stories*. London: Hollis and Carter, 1952. Pp. 216. 15s.

The literature on the Baltic states and peoples, in English, is of very modest proportions and the present volume, much of it in the nature of compilation, is welcome. The story is not all tragedy but it is mainly so to the extent that it deals

with the period since 1939. The military occupations of World War II bulk large but are given decreasing emphasis; the Russian occupation of 1940-41 receives seventy pages, the German rule of 1941-44, twelve, and the renewed Russian occupation of 1944-45, only three. This tapering is completed as the story fails to go forward with Russian rule in the postwar period. Even for the war years there is less than might be expected on the population transfers eastward into the Soviet Union. Outweighing this is the relatively full treatment of shifts westward and of life in the German (and Swedish) refugee camps.

Several special topics are illuminated by generous and useful quotations, such as: steps in sovietizing a university (Rei), treatment of refugees, mostly Estonian, who fled to Sweden (Kaasik), and the Baltic peoples as denizens in the German camps. The latter is a subject on which the author speaks quite in his own right since his volume grows out of his experiences as a member of the Displaced Persons Division of the Control Commission for Germany and later (1948) as commander of a Relief Detachment "which administered between ten and twenty thousand persons of whom the majority were Baltic." With an earnest desire to speak well of these people as refugees and as potential citizens of democratic countries it proves a bit unexpected, to one reader at least, to find no reference to an educational venture which flourished for a time at Pinneberg near Hamburg, namely the Baltic University.

The survey of rapid economic and social development in the Baltic states during the two decades of independence, drawn largely from Kareida's *The Technique of Economic Sovietization*, is meant to show with what facility the Baltic peoples slipped into the ranks of the democratic nations. Here the historian will miss any consistent delineation of the world depression and its effects, with the concomitant partial desertion of democratic ways in favor of varying degrees of totalitarian rule.

Of the seventy odd pages devoted to the independence period well over half are taken up with texts of documents, covering mainly foreign relations. These are drawn from August Rei's *Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States and Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*, issued by the United States Department of State. The volume closes with a very useful appendix, the text of the Bonn Government's Law of April 25, 1951, on "The Legal Status of Homeless Foreigners on Federal Territory," which is basic to any current study of refugees still remaining on German soil. It should be noted that when the author moves on to discuss (pp. 181-90) the resettlement of refugees in other countries he drops the Baltic groups as such and without sufficient warning proceeds to cite statistics which cover the refugee operation as a whole. The volume is minus any bibliographical listing or index.

Its merits, however, are clear. There is a story eventually to be told—that of the violent displacement of sizable proportions of the Baltic peoples, eastward as well as westward, in the troubled years after 1939. Here that story is off to a helpful and sympathetic beginning, with a nucleus of the raw materials that later will be needed.

New York University

OSCAR J. FALNES

SCHECHTMAN, JOSEPH R., *The Arab Refugee Problem*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. xi, 137. \$3.00

Mr. Schechtman's study is a revised edition of his two previously published pamphlets on the same subject. According to the author, these pamphlets had served, to a considerable degree, as a basis for a memorandum issued in December,

1951, under the auspices of the Nation Associates, which a group of well known Americans submitted to the United Nations under the title: *Arab Refugee Problem, How It Can Be Solved*. The memorandum met with favorable reception in Zionist circles inasmuch as it conformed in its essentials to the official Israeli views on the refugee question. By the same token it encountered considerable hostility in Arab circles and was critically analyzed in a pamphlet *The Palestine Refugees*, written by Fayez A. Sayegh (Amara Press, Washington, D. C., February, 1952). It is in this context that Mr Schechtman's book should be read and studied.

From the point of view of objective scholarship, Mr. Schechtman's study may be divided into two parts. In one, dealing with the evolution of official U.N. and Western attitudes since 1948, he preserves impartiality and renders a faithful account of how some influential members of the United Nations have gradually modified their original preference for repatriation in favor of resettlement or temporary "reintegration." This is undoubtedly the most useful portion of the book. Outside of this account the author leaves the terrain of impartiality to argue, with considerable skill, in behalf of two theses, both favored by Israel: first, that resettlement is the only acceptable solution, and second, that it is the Arab political leadership and not, as Arabs allege, Zionist terror, that should be held morally responsible for the mass flight of the Palestinian Arabs in 1948. In pursuance of his task the author tends to omit certain facts or statements which do not fit into his general thesis. Thus he passes under silence the testimony of two such diverse witnesses as the late Count Folke Bernadotte and Mnachem Begin, ex-chief of the Irgun, on the impact of the Deir Yasin massacre on the Arab behavior. He omits the whole question of Arab expulsions from Israel after the establishment of the state, while, at the same time, playing down the numbers of refugees or persons become destitute as a result of hostilities. And in his assertion that there is no precedent for repatriation he overlooks the fact that the International Refugee Organization not only gave the top priority to repatriation in its charter, but made strenuous—and often successful—efforts to send back to their native lands hundreds of thousands of European refugees after World War II.

For someone who seeks the whole truth about the refugee problem it would be advisable to follow the old maxim of *audiat et altera pars* and to supplement the reading of Mr. Schechtman's study by the perusal of materials emanating from Arab sources. In this connection the earlier-mentioned pamphlet by F. A. Sayegh may be recommended. Only then would it be possible to obtain a truly balanced picture of the refugee situation.

American University, Beirut, Lebanon

GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

EASUM, CHESTER V., *Half-Century of Conflict*. New York: Harper's, 1952. Pp. 929. Maps. \$6.00.

It is not usual to review college and university textbooks in the *Journal*, but this substantial text of Professor Easum covers a period during which Central Europe occupies a most prominent part of the world-stage, and a note seems amply justified. As a text in modern history intended for advanced undergraduates, the presentation of facts is the primary objective. Interpretation, though proper and inevitable, is less prominent. From this point of view this text is thorough, careful and up to date in its accuracy. Mr. Easum has not hesitated to provide footnote references to the latest monographic studies on many disputed points.

There is an inherent difficulty in beginning any historical treatment at a certain

point. To have to begin the story of the war of 1914 by a brief summary of a few pages is bound to give rise to a sense of dissatisfaction. Another half dozen pages of introduction would have helped here. The sections descriptive of the Central European lands are excellent. Only here and there could one cavil at details. Moravia could hardly be called a province of Bohemia (p. 171). They were separate lands. The Sudeten Germans were so called long before 1930 (*ibid.*); the term was first used in 1904, and grew rapidly in popularity. It was current and usual in the 1920's. The adverb "presumably", applied to Henlein's Carlsbad speech, is quite moderate. The help given Pilsudski by General Weygand (p. 187) could easily be magnified. The plan of the Battle of Warsaw was Pilsudski's exclusively, and French matériel sent to Poland was not unloaded at Danzig until after the battle was won. The notorious falsifications in the East Prussian as well as Silesian plebiscites (p. 188) might have been mentioned. The judgment of Stresemann, usually a controversial figure, is realistic and less favorable than one frequently meets. The account of Munich though brief, is vivid and exact. No attempt is made to judge whether Litvinov's assurances of Soviet support of Czechoslovakia and willingness to go to her defense were window-dressing or reality. The course of the war is told in a straightforward fashion with a lively sense of the overall strategy. The footnote on p. 708, concerning the Warsaw uprising remarks that "the Russians did not encourage" allied efforts to drop supplies to the Warsaw insurgents is something of an understatement. The reference to "West Prussia" is not quite apt. West Prussia was a part of Poland since 1919. In general the period since 1945 is treated in less detail than the rest of the half century, and no attempt is made to draw certain conclusions from the present uncertainties. In appendices are given the Fourteen Points and significant sections of the League Covenant, the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Yalta Protocol, the Charter of the United Nations and the North Atlantic treaty. There follows a most useful selective bibliography, almost exclusively titles in English, but including a few in French and German. There are several duplications and some queer omissions. There is nothing by R. W. Seton-Watson, B. E. Schmitt, T. G. Masaryk nor by R. L. Buell. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Forgotten Peace* is missing as is F. L. Schuman's *Europe on the Eve*. But certainly an author who composes a selective bibliography has the right to do his own selection. All in all this is a first-rate balanced, thorough and highly usable text which fits the key area of Central Europe into the whole picture in an extremely successful way.

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SHORTER NOTICES

LOCKHART, SIR ROBERT BRUCE, *My Europe*. London: Putnam, 1952. Pp. 273. 16 s.

Sir Robert has written lightly and enlighteningly for over twenty years of his business, diplomatic and personal experiences. Much of his interest has been in Central Europe. His present book begins with the statement: "Russia has been the dominant influence in my life. Try as I will, I cannot escape from it." Certainly his descriptions of his first diplomatic assignment to Moscow in 1911 and his comments on men, places and events in pre-Bolshevik Russia would lead the reader to agree that what the striking, the bizarre, the tragic and the desperate in Russian life and thought held for a young Scot passed the limits of the ordinary. As head of the British mission to Moscow in 1918, his observations on the Revolution, in part not previously published, have some documentary value. Book Two of this diplomat's odyssey is centered around Prague and post-1945 Czechoslovakia. Lockhart's intimacy with Jan Masaryk lends piquancy to this very personal record. Lockhart admires the Scandinavians and his account of his trip to Sweden, Denmark and Norway makes pleasant reading. Germany and France trouble the author, but for quite varied reasons.

T.

LISTOWEL, COUNTESS OF, *Crusader in the Secret War*. London: Christopher Johnson, 1952. Pp. 287. 18 s.

The Countess of Listowel recounts how she first became aware of the "war within the war" in 1914 as she lectured to British troops for the Ministry of Information, and her construction of the Serb-Croat struggle came under attack. Her interest in the facts behind the news deepened, and she became acquainted with Colonel "Peter Nart", whose intelligence work in Lisbon for the four years 1941-1945, forms the core of this book. Colonel "Nart", who had been Polish Military Attaché in Moscow, was assigned the task of separating or helping to separate from the Axis the unwilling satellites Hungary, Roumania and Italy. As Lisbon was a focal point of intrigue and behind the scenes bickering and feinting and the source of almost as much 'information' as misinformation, the story here told, with names, dates and quotations, may not infrequently fill in minor gaps in the more orthodox accounts of the maneuverings of these small Axis partners—or elements in their political and military structures—to protect themselves, either against Germany, Russia or the western Allies. "Unconditional surrender" is the principal object of the author's attack. Just why Colonel "Nart" is protected by "anonymity" is not clear. If he was as important as the story makes him out to be, there are bulging dossiers on him in the intelligence bureaus of a dozen states.

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